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Abstract
New Orleans experienced elevated homicide rates throughout the 30 years between 1985
and 2015. The city’s homicides were especially prominent in socioeconomically disadvantaged
communities. This study explored the lived experiences of residents from one such
neighborhood, Hollygrove. Using qualitative methods of individual interviews, focus groups,
and participant observation, the study explored homicide through three prominent theoretical
lenses, Social Disorganization Theory, Subcultural theories, and Institutional Anomie Theory, to
better understand the conditions in a high-homicide neighborhood that help to explain
neighborhood-level violence. While existing theories of homicide causation have taken a
predominately quantitative approach that compare high-homicide neighborhoods, I took an
ethnographic approach informed by a social constructivist paradigm to test existing theories
against the lived experiences of those whose daily lives were impacted by neighborhood-level
homicide in a single community. Interviews were conducted with neighborhood residents,
community leaders, neighborhood politicians, and police officials.
The data indicated three conditions connected to high- or low-homicide risk in the
community. The neighborhood’s values-orientation moved between subcultural values and
prosocial values. Structural conditions in the community shifted between marginalization and
enhanced social capital. Finally, neighborhood boundaries were found to vacillate between
porous and rigidly defensive. Each of these conditions impacted the neighborhood’s ability to
enact collective efficacy and to create a milieu that either resisted or enhanced the likelihood of
homicide. While none of the existing theories was sufficient to explain neighborhood homicide,
elements of each were present in the data.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In January of 2002, 17-year-old Brandon Aggison was shot in front of the Olive
Superette at the Corner of General Ogden and Olive Streets in Hollygrove. Just months away
from graduating high school, he had returned to the neighborhood to visit childhood friends from
the days before his mother moved the family to a safer community. During his visit a shooting
erupted and Brandon was used as a human shield. He was shot, dropped onto the sidewalk, and
the intended target jumped into an escape vehicle. The corner had become one of the most
dangerous in a city that averaged almost one homicide per day. “The Big Easy” had become
“The Murder Capital of the United States.”
Since 1985 the city’s murder rate remained high, vacillating between a low of 27.1
murders per 100,000 residents in 1985 to a high of 94.7 in 2007 (FBI Uniform Crime Reporting,
2015). The raw numbers ranged from a low of 150 murders in 2014 to 424 in 1994 (FBI
Uniform Crime Reporting, 2015). For the 29-year period of 1985 to 2015 the city experienced
7,334 total murders (FBI Uniform Crime Reporting, 2015; Lane & Bullington, 2016). Charts 1
and 2 graphically represent the raw number of New Orleans murders between 1985 and 2014,
and the rate per 100,000 residents. Data for each of these years, except 2005, 2013, 2014, and
2015 were drawn from the FBI Unified Crime Reports (UCR). Van Landingham’s (2007) data
for number of murders and murder rate was used for 2005, a year in which FBI data was
unavailable. Raw murder numbers in 2013 and 2014 are based upon the UCR data, while 2015
data was drawn from the New Orleans Times Picayune (Lane & Bullington, 2016). Population
estimates to calculate murder rates for 2013 to 2015 were drawn from the Greater New Orleans
Community Data Center (2016).
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Chart 1: Murder Counts, New Orleans, 1985-2015
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Chart 2: Murder Rates, New Orleans, 1985-2015

Year

The majority of the city’s homicide victims, as well as their murderers were young,
African American males. Wellford, Bond and Goodison (2011), in a review of New Orleans
Police Department crime data from 1985 to 2010, noted that over half of those arrested for
homicide were 23 years of age or younger (p. 15), 97.1% were African American, and 95.1%
2

were male (p. 16). They were also known to the police: 82% had prior offenses, 58.8% were
violent offenders, 57.6% were drug offenders and 41.2% were charged with firearm offenses (p.
17). Victims were 86.5% male and 91.5% African American (Wellford et. al., 2011, p. 12).
Homicides in New Orleans were concentrated in specific neighborhoods. In 2012 the
city targeted three neighborhoods with high numbers of homicides for significant intervention:
St. Roch, Central City and the Seventh Ward. All three high-homicide communities shared
demographic characteristics: a majority African American population, mean income below the
city average, a percentage living below poverty higher than the city, a higher number of renters
than homeowners, educational attainment well below the city’s average and high numbers of
vacant homes.
Table 1: Demographic Comparison of High Homicide Neighborhoods

% Af. American

St.

Central

Seventh

New

United

Roch

City

Ward

Orleans

States

91.5

74.2

87.4

59.6

12.2

$27,400

$39,200

$32,442

$59,952

$70,883

33.9

37.9

44.1

24.4

13.8

55

76.9

64.8

52.2

34.9

% less than High School Education

33.6

30

30.1

16.7

15.2

% vacant houses

37.7

39.5

38.3

25.1

11.4

mean income
% below poverty
% renters

Source: Greater New Orleans Community Data Center analysis of 2010 U.S. Census data
The Hollygrove neighborhood of New Orleans was similar in many ways to the city’s
three target communities: 93.9% of its residents were African American, mean income was
$33,113, 49.3% of residents rented their homes, 32.9% of homes were unoccupied, and 32.4% of
3

residents earned less than the federal poverty standard. One difference was educational
attainment; only 18.3% of Hollygrove residents had less than a high school diploma (Greater
New Orleans Community Data Center, 2014). Like the three target neighborhoods, Hollygrove
had a reputation for lethal violence, earned between the early 1980s and Katrina’s landfall.
Based upon statistics provided by the NOPD’s second district, between 2010 and 2015 the
neighborhood’s homicide rate ranged from a high of 182.77 in 2012 to a low of 45.69 in both
2010 and 2015. With the exception of 2010 the neighborhood’s homicide rate exceeded the
city’s. Hollygrove’s high homicide rate dropped substantially since 2012. This suggested that
Hollygrove residents might have a perspective on homicide which may reflect both an
understanding of the connection between neighborhood and lethal violence, and what
neighborhoods might do to reduce it.

Homicides per 100,000

Chart 3: Hollygrove and New Orleans Homicide Rates 2010-2015
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In 2014 there were 137 homicides in the city of New Orleans which equaled a citywide
homicide rate of 39.9 per 100,000 residents (number of homicides multiplied by 100,000 and
divided by total population of city according to census data). By comparison, Central City’s
homicide rate was 115.5, St. Roch’s was 150.8, the Seventh Ward’s was 98.1 and Hollygrove’s
was 68.5. The 2014 national homicide rate for cities with more than 250,000 residents,
4

according to the FBI’s Unified Crime Statistics was 9.3. More affluent neighborhoods told a
different story. The Garden District, West Riverside and the Lakeshore/Lake Vista
neighborhoods experienced no murders in 2014. Demographically these neighborhoods were far
different than the aforementioned high-homicide neighborhoods. When compared with the city’s
average, each of these neighborhoods had fewer African American, higher mean income, lower
poverty, more education and fewer vacant homes. While West Riverside’s renters slightly
exceeded the city’s average, the other two communities had more homeowners than renters. The
difference between high and low homicide communities suggests that neighborhood violence is
related to demographics.

Table 2: Demographic Comparison of Low Homicide Neighborhoods

% Af. American
mean income
% below poverty
% renters
% less than High School Education
% vacant houses

Garden

Lakeshore/

West

District

Lake Vista Riverside

New

United

Orleans

States

3.2

2.1

22.8

59.6

12.2

$128,701

$125,473

$74,441

6.2

4.0

12.6

24.4

13.8

47.3

16.2

54

52.2

34.9

2.2

2.0

12.5

16.7

15.2

12.9

12.0

13.3

25.1

11.4

$59,952 $70,883

In New Orleans, as in other U.S. cities, homicide rates vary by neighborhood. Thus a
city’s aggregate homicide rate only tells part of the story; each neighborhood is a chapter in the
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overall tale. This study focused upon the Hollygrove neighborhood, one with a reputation for
violence but also for recent innovations that appear to have reduced violence in the community.
Statistics provided by The New Orleans Police Department for the years 2010 through
2015 indicate that Hollygrove had more shootings during the period than the city average. There
was complete information on victims of both shootings and homicides, the data regarding
aggressors was incomplete. In some cases there was no data on the aggressor, in others the race
and gender was identified but not the age. During this period there were 81 shootings in
Hollygrove and 24 homicides. A total of 53 cases had incomplete data on the aggressors, only
nine of the homicides were complete.
The data were consistent with the findings of Wellford et al (2011), both victims and
offenders were black, male and young. All of the identified aggressors and victims in
Hollygrove between 2010 and 2015 were African American. The majority of perpetrators were
male, 95.5% (Chart 4), as were the majority of victims, 88.8% (Chart 5). Most of the aggressors
were 23 or under, 73%, and 69 % of these were between the ages of 17 and 23 (Chart 6).
Likewise, the majority of victims, 56%, were under 23, and 47% were between the ages of 17
and 23 (Chart 7).
The hours between 6 PM and 12 AM were the most active times for shootings, with 45%
of total shootings (Chart 8) and 42% of homicides (Chart 9) occurring during these hours. The
number of shootings (Chart 10) ranged from a low of five in 2015 to a high of 27 in 2012, while
homicides reflected a low of two in 2015 to a high of nine in 2012 (one homicide in 2015 was
the result of a stabbing, this was the sole non-shooting homicide in the data).
From a neighborhood perspective, these homicides mirror national statistics. First,
shootings in the neighborhood were solely black-on-black, something not surprising given that
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93% of its residents were African American. Second, both perpetrators and their victims were
young adult males which was consistent with neighborhood violence citywide. Third, the
majority of the violence occurred in the evenings after the typical work day concluded and when
people returned to the neighborhood. Finally, between 2012 and 2015 there was a drastic
reduction in the number of violent incidents occurring there.

Number of Shootings

Chart 4: Gender of Hollygrove Aggressors 2010-2015
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Chart 5: Gender of Hollygrove Victims 2010-2015
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Chart 6: Aggressors by Age 2010-2015
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Chart 7: Victims by Age 2010-2015
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Chart 10: Shootings & Homicides in Hollygrove by Year
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Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this study was to explore the lived experience of violence and homicide at
the neighborhood level to better understand the factors contributing to the high homicide rate in
urban neighborhoods. The study was informed by theories of neighborhood-level violence, i.e.
social disorganization theory (Sampson, 2012), crime prevention through environmental design
(Saville, 2009), anomie theory (Agnew, 2001; Messner & Rosenfeld, 1997) and subcultural
theories (Anderson, 1999). It used a qualitative, ethnographic approach rooted in a social
constructivist paradigm to elicit a grassroots understanding of the dynamics underlying
neighborhood-level violence and homicide. Beginning with an individual homicide at a violent
corner, the study expanded outwards into broader circles incorporating the views of those living
nearest the corner, other neighborhood residents, community leaders, and city officials. Data
gathered through semi-structured interviews and focus groups were supplemented by crime and
census data, direct observation of homicide scenes, and photographs. The data were coded,
compiled into themes, and situated within the existing literature pertaining to neighborhood-level
violence.

9

Much of the existing research on neighborhood homicide was quantitative and studied
communities on the aggregate level. This allows researchers to make comparisons between
neighborhoods across metropolitan statistical areas and draw conclusions based upon the
differences. Although this enhances the ability to generalize findings, macrosociological studies
cannot explain the variations in lethal violence within an individual neighborhood. Lethal
violence is differentially located at specific geographical locations and some places within a
neighborhood are more dangerous than others. This pointed to a gap in existing research that
could be addressed by limiting the focus of study to an individual neighborhood.
New Orleans’ Hollygrove neighborhood had two factors that made it appropriate for such
a study. First, the neighborhood had a reputation for murder that developed throughout the
1980s and 1990s and which continued to impact perceptions of those both inside and outside of
the neighborhood. Second, there was a marked reduction in the number of homicides from 2012
to 2015. This demonstrated that residents had experience with homicide and homicide reduction
strategies, lived experiences that proved fruitful to a study attempting to bridge the gap between
micro and macrounderstandings of the phenomenon.
Brandon Aggison’s murder was shocking to many. To those who lived near the corner of
General Ogden and Olive, however, it wasn’t a surprise. This corner was marked by violence.
A complete understanding regarding what happens at corners like this throughout the city is not
possible apart from the voices of those directly affected by the violence. They had valuable
insights that served to richly inform my understanding of the phenomenon. Brandon’s death,
that corner, and this neighborhood began the study.
Hollygrove residents perceived a clash of values occurring in the neighborhood. On the
one hand there was a conservativism expressed as they delineated a set of values reflective of the
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mainstream culture. These included neighborliness, hard work and pride of ownership. All of
the residents considered prosocial values to be important and fundamental. At the same time
they described a neighborhood that was experiencing a clash between prosocial and subcultural
values. There was widespread concern that the subcultural values had become stronger while
prosocial values were no longer being transmitted to succeeding generations. This clash of
values was especially pronounced in the younger participants who struggled to negotiate between
the prosocial values of previous generations while daily living in a milieu where subcultural
values demanded their attention. This clash of values forced a sort of bi-cultural response
between home and work on the one hand, and life on the street on the other. The strongest value
clash appeared to occur in the arena of conflict resolution. Many residents were concerned that
the subculture’s emphasis upon violence as a conflict resolution tactic had become normative
and was destructive to the neighborhood.
The subculture was also seen as a destructive neighborhood force. The younger residents
had a name for the subculture and its value system, Keeping It Real. This was a conflicted
concept, however, as those who described its rules and values simultaneously pointed to its
limitations. One key limitation was termed “outchere” by a focus group of 20-something males
who suggested that adherence to subcultural values limited one’s life chances by relegating their
power and prestige to the neighborhood, while harming one’s ability to function outside the
neighborhood’s boundaries. The subculture they described had rules that, when broken, invited
violent retribution. They also described a neighborhood status hierarchy where those who
adhered primarily to the rules and values of the subculture could rise to the top and become what
they termed a Hood Star. The processes of succumbing to or resisting the subculture was an
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important facet of one’s chances beyond the neighborhood and comprised the final subthemes of
the chapter.
Also concerning to those in the neighborhood was the illicit economy, especially the sale
of drugs, and the violence that accompanied it. Residents saw drug sales as the primary force
driving both homicide and the Keeping It Real subculture in the community. They pointed to
alcohol beverage outlets as the homicide hotspots in the community, especially a two-block
stretch in the neighborhood where a corner store operated during the day and a bar operated at
night. Rather than being allies in their fight against drugs and violence, Hollygrove residents and
the police both described the presence of the police as akin to an occupying force. This led to
legal cynicism and mistrust, creating an environment where homicide flourished as residents felt
powerless to stop it themselves but didn’t trust police to act in their best interests.
In an atmosphere of legal cynicism residents extended their mistrust beyond the police to
most outsiders. Many thought outside actors were creating the violent conditions inside the
neighborhood rather than local residents. The illicit economy and the influx of drug dealers and
buyers were one group of outsiders thought to be driving violence. Others were concerned about
renters without an ownership stake in the community’s well-being, especially those displaced
from various public housing projects that had been restructured after Hurricane Katina. This
mistrust of outsiders manifested itself in rigid definitions of who was from the neighborhood and
who was not. An unfortunate consequence occurred when this mistrust was extended to those
who potentially were able to enhance the neighborhood’s social capital by providing valuable
resources and connections. The result was increased marginalization and disconnection.
Katrina’s widespread devastation of the neighborhood helped to reverse this. Many of
the first returnees were elderly homeowners with strong adherence to prosocial values and a
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desire to rebuild the neighborhood better than before. Neighborhood boundaries became more
porous as these residents recognized the need for outside resources to assist them in the
rebuilding. Outside resources flowed into the community from concerned agencies. Residents
experienced improved relationships with politicians and police. Their social capital was
enhanced and this resulted in a newfound collective efficacy or “social cohesion combined with
shared expectations for social control” (Sampson, 2012, p. 27). This condition appeared to be
connected with a significant reduction in neighborhood homicide after a peak in 2012.
Three constructs emerged as key to understanding the neighborhood’s high- or lowhomicide conditions. First, Hollygrove residents’ value-orientation shifted from subcultural to
prosocial values. Second, the neighborhood experienced a shift from marginalization to
enhanced social capital. Finally, the neighborhood boundaries changed from rigidly defended
against outside invaders to porously accepting of outside collaborative efforts toward community
improvement. These three constructs appeared to determine whether the neighborhood
experienced high collective efficacy and lower homicide, or low collective efficacy and higher
homicide.
The interrelationship of these constructs may prove a beneficial avenue of future
research. Sampson’s (2012) research has shown that collective efficacy affects homicide.
Anderson (1999) discussed the impact of values and street codes on neighborhood violence.
Numerous studies have shown the connection between a neighborhood’s structural
marginalization and homicide (Sampson & Wilson, 1995; Messner & Rosenfeld, 1997;
Savolainen, 2000; Maume & Lee, 2003). Little has been written about the porosity of
neighborhood boundaries and its connection to homicide, making this an especially promising
avenue for future homicide research.
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Because this study was limited to a single neighborhood in New Orleans, further studies
might explore whether these findings can be replicated elsewhere. One important challenge of
the current study is the impact of Katrina. Few other neighborhoods experience the opportunity
to completely rebuild their community. Further research is needed to determine whether these
findings were unique to Hollygrove or if they have applicability in other, similar communities.
The study is divided into thirteen chapters. The first includes an abstract, introduction,
and the purpose of the study. The second is devoted to theories of criminality and homicide and
is divided into two sections: theories that attempt to explain crime from an individual or agencybased perspective and those that use a social-structural lens to do so. The third chapter is a
review of the social-structural literature that informs neighborhood-based homicide and includes
social disorganization studies, anomie studies, and subcultural studies. Chapter four addresses
this study’s design and includes explanations of the research design, methods, data, validity,
reliability, and the role of the researcher.
Chapter five describes the setting of the study and describes the neighborhood as if one
were walking from one border to the next down Olive Street. The community’s marginalized
status, its diversity, the epicenter of homicide at one corner, and its juxtaposition relative to more
affluent neighborhoods is described. This chapter was included in the study to provide the reader
perspective on the study and includes a map and pictures to better set the stage for the
subsequent findings.
Chapter six is the first of five dedicated to a description of the study’s findings. This
chapter describes the clash between prosocial and subcultural values in the community.
Subtopics include: resident concerns regarding the failure of prosocial values to be transmitted

14

between generations, the value of caring neighbors, the value of hard work, values based on
pride of place, and a clash between prosocial and subcultural conflict resolution strategies.
These values were experienced predominately in the Keeping It Real subculture, the topic
of chapter seven. Separated into five subthemes, it explores: life on the streets of Hollygrove,
subcultural rules, status, and the processes of either succumbing to, or resisting the pull of the
subculture. Throughout this chapter the clash between prosocial and subcultural values is
described as a process of living in a bi-cultural world, and the challenges this presents for
younger Hollygrove residents. Comparison is made to newly arriving immigrants struggling
between the values of dominant American society and the values of their homeland.
Closely related to and deeply rooted in the subculture is the illicit economy, the subject of
chapter eight. Residents strongly connected the sale of drugs to the violence in the community,
understanding the illicit economy to be the primary driver of neighborhood homicide. This
chapter explores four subthemes: the interrelationship between drugs and violence, the
connection between alcoholic beverage outlets and violence, economic considerations of the
illicit economy, and the struggle between the neighborhood and the police as part of the war on
drugs in the community.
Chapter nine addresses residents’ perceptions of outsiders as agents of either community
destruction or community improvement. When neighborhood mistrust and cynicism was highest
the residents took a decidedly negative approach toward outsiders, seeing them as the source of
most of the neighborhood’s ills. A second subtheme explores resistance to outside influences,
including agents of positive change. This chapter proved important in the study’s conclusion
that neighborhood boundary maintenance helps explain conditions of high or low homicide.
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The final findings chapter explores resident thinking regarding solutions to
neighborhood-level homicide. Many of the homicide reduction strategies implemented by the
City of New Orleans began as best practices elsewhere. Yet local knowledge of neighborhood
conditions suggests that those closest to the problem may have the best potential solution to
violence in their neighborhood. The solutions proposed fell into five categories: communitybased strategies, educational strategies, formal control strategies, quality of life strategies, and
economic strategies. Many were innovative and addressed the neighborhood’s physical, social,
and economic infrastructure.
The discussion chapter begins by summarizing themes and subthemes that emerged from
the data. Next it situates the findings of the study amidst the social-structural literature. Third,
the constructs of neighborhood values, structure and boundary porosity are linked to collective
efficacy and conditions of high- and low-homicide in the neighborhood. Finally, the
implications of the study are addressed as are avenues for future research.
The conclusion chapter connects the findings to the questions that drove the research.
Then the chapter turns to policy and practice implications, making connections between the
solutions to homicide proposed by neighborhood residents and those proposed by prominent
social structural researchers. While some of the resident solutions closely reflected those
emerging from existing research, others did not and provide promising new directions for
neighborhood-level homicide intervention strategies. The chapter concludes with
recommendations for policies and practices for homicide reduction at the neighborhood level.

16

Chapter 2
Theories of Criminality
A good place to begin understanding why murders occur in certain neighborhoods would
be a review of criminological theories. Since the Enlightenment numerous theories as to the
etiology of crime have arisen. For the most part these theories fell into two camps: those that
were focused upon the individual or the personal motivation to act in criminal fashion and those
that focused on environmental factors creating conditions within which crime was more likely to
occur. This section will briefly address theories explaining violence by focusing on the
individual before exploring social-structural theories that better inform the current study’s
research questions and purpose.
Enlightenment criminologists sought to explain criminal choices through the lens of
individual self-interest. Cesare Beccaria, whose On Crimes and Punishment (1764) was deeply
grounded in the thinking of the Hobbesian Social Contract, proposed that people act in ways to
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maximize pleasure and minimize pain. Jeremy Bentham’s Introductions to the Principles of
Morals and Legislations (1789) advanced a “felicity calculus” in which humans weigh the
pleasure of behavioral choices against the potential pain that might accompany such choices.
For both men crime was a conscious decision based upon a deliberate calculation. Both
concluded that deterrence of crime would require punishment that was swift, certain and severe,
but also just and humane, fitting the nature of the crime but also strong enough to avert most
from making criminal choices. This represented a significant movement from the thinking of the
Dark Ages where punishment was seen as torture which was considered to cleanse the soul and
was often far more severe than the crime. The era’s theorized social contract, however, assumed
that all rational humans fundamentally agree upon what is right and wrong, something generally
considered utopian today. Furthermore, the notion that swift, certain and severe punishment
would deter crime is belied by both lifetime criminals and the chronic recidivism that is a
byproduct of the prison system.
The burgeoning scientific method would mark a positivist turn for criminology at the
beginning of the 19th century. Franz Joseph Gall proposed a theory of phrenology, wherein
which he postulated that the size and shape of one’s skull could lead to a better understanding of
the brain and therefore could help predict who might be more prone to criminal behavior (van
Whyte, 2002). The newly emerging field of evolution, spearheaded by Charles Darwin, led
some to propose that crime might be due to humans who had not developed sufficiently and thus
were more prone to behave like primitive savages or barbarians, acting upon basic instincts and
urges. Cesare Lombroso, in 1876 concluded that some may be atavistic criminals or primitive
humans who had degenerated to an earlier state and were more prone to base behaviors in
violation of socially accepted norms (Wolfgang, 1961). These thinkers thought a criminal
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predisposition was inborn and highly individualistic, leading them to conclude that the scientific
method had potential to explain why certain individuals engaged in criminal behavior.
Another twist in the positivist turn would signal the beginning of the demarcation
between individual explanations for criminal offending and a new focus on social factors that
could explain why crime occurred. Quetelet and Guerry, who wrote in the early 1800s, observed
correlations between crime and social factors and attempted to connect economic inequities and
crime causation (Bohm & Vogel, 2011). Their ability to show statistically that crime rates
remain stable established that crime might be situated in social structures rather than in the
choices of individuals as was the prevailing understanding. Durkheim also theorized that crime
may have roots in social conditions. As societies made the transition from mechanical to
organic, from rural to urban, and from collective cohesion to personal isolation, a breakdown in
socially accepted values may occur, leading to anomie, moral uncertainty and lawlessness
(Winters, Glokobar & Roberson, 2014). At the close of the 19th century the Chicago School
sociologists began to expand Durkheim’s thinking regarding the breakdown of social
organization in some urban neighborhoods. They proposed that in transitional neighborhoods,
ones where high poverty, ethnic heterogeneity and social disorganization were prevalent, there
would be a concomitant elevation of crime (Park, Burgess & McKenzie, 1925). Thus the
beginning of sociological criminology would take root and form the basis of the divergence
between agency-based explanations and those that are structural in nature.

Agency-Focused Theories
In one theoretical camp lay those theories that attempted to explain criminality and
violence as a product of an individual’s learning, psychopathology, development, choices, or
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evolutionary adaptation. Behavioral and social learning theories concluded that individual
psychology was shaped by environmental reinforcers that rewarded deviant behavior. Bandura
(1973) understood aggression to be learned via modeling, reinforced by satisfying outcomes, and
reinforced via practice. Psychopathology approaches contended that some individuals were
psychologically flawed and their deviant choices stemmed from internal conditions predisposing
them to act in criminal fashion. Rowe, Oswood & Nicewander (1990) proposed a Latent Trait
Model that explained criminal behavior as a function of inborn, internal conditions and early
environmental influences creating a propensity toward criminality. Samenow (2014) concluded
that violence was inborn and emerged throughout the lifespan as a character defect.
Developmental theorists pointed to truncation or delays in the psychosocial or moral
development that predisposed one to act in deviant fashion. Thornberry, Lizotte, Krohn,
Farnworth & Jang (1991) observed that an individual’s acceptance of norms, values orientation,
and attachment to institutions such as family or school determined subsequent delinquency.
Catalano & Hawkins (1996) developed a social development model where children’s ability to
develop prosocial bonds determined whether they would choose a pro- or antisocial pathway and
thus engage in later criminal behavior. The Age-Graded theory of Samson & Laub (1995)
connected criminal choices to weakened social controls, lack of individual social capital, and
structural disadvantaged which mitigated the individual choice to engage in criminal behavior.
Rational choice theorists contended that crime was a conscious decision made after an evaluation
of the potential rewards versus the consequences (Cornish & Clark, 1986). Evolutionary
psychology considered deviance to serve an adaptive or functional purpose (Daly & Wilson,
1999). These theories situated responsibility for criminal choices upon the individual and thus
sought to understand what happened to individual to prompt behavior that violated social norms.
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Although these models were helpful for understanding the pathways to criminality, their
ability to explain neighborhood factors leading to homicide had limited applicability to this
study’s purpose. Human learning and development occur in a context and not in isolation.
Whether an individual makes a conscious choice to be delinquent or is driven by inner
conditions, deviancy can only be defined in juxtaposition to society, its norms, its laws and the
conditions under which people make decisions. The individually-based theories were
tautological in nature; many criminals do have underlying deficits and this may partially explain
their choices but at the same time many psychologically flawed individuals choose not to commit
crimes. While criminal behavior may indeed be a conscious choice, choices are a means to an
end, an end which can only be defined in the context of larger social structures. One does not
choose to steal, or have stealing behaviors reinforced, or differentially associate with other
robbers unless stealing helps one to achieve a desirable end, something defined by the culture to
be desirable. Furthermore, if legitimate means to attainment were possible the need for illegal
means would not be necessary. Finally, what is legal and illegal and who gets convicted is a
matter of both power and definition; the agency-based theories neglected to account for the fact
that those defined as criminals and those that are not may be a matter of structural conditions.
Those with less social capital experience diminished ability to participate as equals in the making
and enforcing of laws. With these challenges in mind the study focuses instead on socialstructural criminological theories which better inform the current research.

Social-Structural Focused Theories
As noted previously, in the 19th century a shift in the understanding of crime causation
began to occur. Quetelet and Guerry separately noted connections between social conditions and
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crime statistics leading them to both question individual will as the sole causative factor and to
explore the interconnection between poverty and crime (Bohm & Vogel, 2011). Beirne (1987)
contended “by suggesting that crime was subject to causal laws of the order found in the natural
sciences and by implying that criminal behavior was a much a product of society as of volition,
Quetelet also opened up the possibility of a sociological analysis of crime” (p. 1166). Upon this
foundation Durkheim (2000) began to view the Industrial Revolution’s impact upon a primarily
rural and agrarian society as it modernized from a mechanical society with largely shared values
to an organic society with diverse, and sometimes competing values. The breakdown of these
shared values, to which he referred as the collective conscience, resulted in anomie or the pursuit
of individualism to the detriment of the greater societal good. Given the widely divergent values
in heterogeneous societies crime was both normal and expected, and served three beneficial
functions: establishing the outer boundary limits of morality, organizing a citizenry to address
criminal behavior, and paving the way for social change. Ultimately this divergence from
agency-based theories of criminality would pave the way for the social-structural theories to be
explored in this section. These include Anomie/Strain Theory, Social Disorganization Theory
and Subcultural Theories.
Anomie Theory had its roots in the sociology developed by Durkheim (2004) who
proposed that humans internalized cultural values, or social facts, which he defined as “every
way of acting, fixed or not, capable of exercising on the individual an external constraint; or
again, every way of acting which is general throughout a given society, while at the same time
existing in its own right independent of its individual manifestations” (p. 91). These were
internalized via enculturation which happened through education and socialization and gave rise
to a collective conscience. However, as society became increasingly more complex and
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specialized, society’s collective exerted less influence upon individuals who, feeling
disconnected, pursued individual goals sometimes in defiance of societal constraints. This
disconnection was termed anomie, or a sense of normlessness, which gave rise to deviant
behavior.
Merton (1938) was the first criminologist to apply Durkheim’s anomie to the study of
criminology. He posited two elements of social structure that were operative, separate but
working in tandem. The first consisted of culturally defined goals, purposes and interests. The
second was constituted of institutional structures that defined, regulated, and controlled the
acceptable means of meeting these goals. As long as there was balance between the two, social
relations tended to be harmonious. At times, however, one of two poles created tension, one
being ritualistic adherence to institutionally prescribed goals and the other being a stress upon
cultural goal realization without regard for institutional regulation. When a segment of the
population was barred from achieving the culturally important goals, anomie resulted. In U.S.
society financial success was a highly valued goal, yet inequalities in institutional structures
prevented a significant portion of the population from achieving their economic ends. The result,
according to Merton was “countermores and antisocial behavior” (p. 674) acting in rebellion
against the institutions of social control.
Not all responses in reaction to societal restrictions of goal attainment were criminal,
however. Thus Dubin (1959) elaborated by adding to Merton’s institutional means the concept
of institutional norms, which he defined as “the boundaries between prescribed behaviors and
proscribed behaviors in a particular institutional setting” while proposing that institutional means
were “the specific behaviors, prescribed or potential, that lie within the limits established by
institutional norms” (p. 149). The importance of this distinction allowed Dubin to differentiate
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between whether it was the cultural goals being rejected, the institutional norms, or the
behavioral pathway to achievement. Dubin’s restatement served to normalize some behaviors
that Merton considered deviant, rather they were adaptations to institutionally prescribed norms.
Another important clarification noted that anomie was not monolithic; different
perceptions of anomie would inevitably lead to a variety of personal reactions to similar stimuli.
This led Agnew (2001) to further nuance the theory by concluding there were objective and
subjective experiences of anomie. Objective strains “refer to events or conditions that are
disliked by most members of a given group” (p. 320) while subjective strains “refer to events or
conditions that are disliked by the people who are experiencing (or have experienced) them” (p.
321). Objective strains resulted in subjective strain and involved “goal blockage, the loss of
positive stimuli and/or the presentation of negative stimuli” (p. 323). The characteristics of
strain that were most likely to result in crime were those that were: seen as unjust (voluntary and
intentional violation of social norms), seen as high in magnitude (sufficiently severe as to prompt
criminal coping), associated with low social control (therefore reducing the cost of crime) and
prone to create pressure or incentive to engage in criminal coping. The types of strain strongly
related to crime, according to Agnew, included: failure to achieve core goals that were not the
result of conventional socialization and were easily achieved via crime; parental rejection;
supervision/discipline that was strict, erratic, excessive and/or harsh; child neglect and abuse;
negative secondary school experiences; work in the secondary labor market; homelessness
(especially youth homelessness); abusive peer relations, especially among youth; criminal
victimization; and experiences with prejudice and discrimination based upon ascribed
characteristics such as race/ethnicity.
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Anomie theory was especially helpful in explaining criminal behavior when understood
in the context of the market-based economy. Unequal economic development in an urban
context led to a variety of social ills that created the conditions conducive to deviant behavior,
something Messner and Rosenfeld (1997) have termed Institutional Anomie Theory.
Institutional structures that restricted economic goal attainment by preventing participation in the
formal economy resulted in goal attainment in ways that were not socially sanctioned and were
thus considered illicit.
The post-industrial, globalized economy led to chronic unemployment in central cities
which precipitated participation in the underground economy (Venkatesh, 2006). The
institutional racism that created the ghetto, contended Wilson (1997), had been supplanted by
institutional structures barring inner city residents from participation in the marketplace. The
resultant anomie of those who could no longer participate in the marketplace was theorized to be
related to the higher rates of crime occurring in those communities.
Anomie/Strain Theory has tremendous potential to explain crime in underprivileged
urban communities. Institutional racism and the consequent economic inequalities bar
participation in the marketplace, relegating a significant portion of the urban population to make
drastic survival choices. This is exacerbated by institutional choices to penalize individuals for
their choices rather than change the structures that have facilitated them. Thus a vicious cycle is
created branding participants in the underground economy as deviant and creating more stringent
barriers to participation in the institutionally sanctioned means of goal attainment.
Several challenges to Anomie/Strain theory present themselves. First, given the sheer
size of the underclass in America, the theory would suggest far more widespread participation in
criminal behavior to achieve desired goals. Secondly, there was an assumption that the goals of
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society are uniformly desired across all social strata. Finally, the theory had difficulty
accounting for white collar crimes committed by those of the privileged class who have already
achieved the goals for which those experiencing anomie/strain are purported to be striving.
Proposing that cultural values may differ throughout society, especially between different
socioeconomic strata, the subcultural theories attempted to accomplish what anomie/strain theory
did not.
Anomie/Strain Theory’s focus on subcultural desires to achieve dominant cultural goals
connected to another theoretical school, Subcultural Theories of criminality. This theoretical
orientation posited a divide between the values of the prosocial, dominant culture and
subcultures within society. Subcultural values espoused mores that deviated from the dominant
culture. They ranged from immigrant communities with a set of mores and behaviors that
reflected the culture from which they emigrated, to neighborhood values that intentionally
countered dominant values inadequately serving the population and viewed as hostile to the
subculture. Elements of subcultural theories helped to explain gaps in Anomie/Strain Theory,
especially the recognition that value systems may not be monolithic even within subcultures, and
that dominant values may not be the only set of values driving criminality.
One of the first theorists to connect subcultures and crime was Louis Wirth (1931) who
proposed that “human conduct presents a problem only when it involves a deviation from the
dominant code or the generally prevailing definition in a given culture” (pp. 485-486). While
Wirth’s focus was immigrant communities, Miller (1958) addressed subculture from a class
perspective, concluding that a unique subculture arose within the lower class community, one he
noted was deeply rooted, distinctively patterned, and possessed an integrity of its own. In its
specific, subcultural context the delinquency of the underclass was a matter of definition; it was
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normal and functional in the subculture while perceived as delinquent by the middle and upper
classes. Miller termed these divergent values the focal concerns of lower class culture and
included dealing with trouble, physical and mental toughness, street smarts, creating excitement
to counter drab routine, dealing with the vagaries of fate through fortune or luck, and autonomy
from those in authority who would restrict or control their lives.
Noting that homicides in Philadelphia were concentrated in black communities,
Wolfgang and Ferracuti (1967) sought to explain this by proposing a culture of violence running
counter to dominant cultural values in these communities. They submitted that this subculture is
transmitted via social learning and differential association, and is viewed as an adaptive response
to a hostile environment which in turn reframed criminal behavior and alleviated guilt.
Anderson (1999) delineated the subcultural values of African American communities by
describing the unique codes by which African Americans, relegated by structural racism to
disadvantage, adapted to discrimination. While most lived by the values of dominant society, or
codes of decency, others lived by the code of the streets which were disharmonious with decent
codes, consisting of “a set of prescriptions and proscriptions, or informal rules, of behavior
organized around a desperate search for respect that governs public social relations, especially
violence” (p. 9). His premise was that ours was a culture in conflict, where different sets of
values functioned to regulate behavior depending upon the specific arena in which we act.
Related to these were Sykes and Matza’s (1957) proposed Techniques of Neutralization, which
they used to explain subcultural criminal value systems. They theorized that justifications and
rationalizations for deviance served to mitigate feelings of having transgressed social norms.
Knowing dominant values, and having internalized them to some degree, those who eventually
subscribed to the code of the streets needed techniques to justify their behavior and neutralize
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their guilt. These techniques included: denial of responsibility, denial of injury, denial of victim,
condemnation of the condemners, and appeal to higher loyalties. While this school of thought
was helpful to explain the rationale behind crime, it did not discriminate between those who were
raised in the same neighborhood but chose a different life path. It did, however, help to explain
the thinking that preceded criminal activity and participation in the illicit part of the informal
economy.
Values were transmitted through intimate peer groups. They served to demonstrate
which behaviors were valued and which were irrelevant. Deviance happened when subcultural
values were at odds with dominant values. As the dominant cultural values had the power of
institutions behind them they could serve to marginalize the subculture’s values and thus conflict
arose.
Cultural values were learned through interactions with others, concluded Sutherland and
Cressy (1974), whose view drew upon interactionism and social learning theory. Through
differential association individuals learned criminal codes via interaction with others in a manner
similar to any other learning. Both criminal and noncriminal behavior were expressions of the
same needs and values, but learned criminal methods provided an alternative path to meeting
those needs, especially in an environment where law-breaking was seen as a favorable alternative
to self-fulfillment. Thus learned subcultural values may express themselves in behaviors
considered deviant by the dominant culture.
Cultural conflict theory posited that deviance may be a normal political process of intergroup struggle for dominance (Keel, 2005). Sellin (1938) concluded crime causation resulted
from “a conflict of conduct norms” which occurred as “a result of contact between norms drawn
from different cultural systems” and was a “process of group differentiation within a cultural
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system” (p. 98). Dahrendorf (1959) added that conflicts arose between the dominant cultural
group and subcultural groups who organized themselves into conflicting factions along group
interests which led to systemic change. Agnew (2011) noted that criminal law reflected, in part,
the interests and values of dominant groups who controlled legislation. This intimated that
“those behaviors that threaten the interests and value of dominant groups tend to be criminalized,
while other harmful behaviors are less likely to be criminalized, particularly if they are
committed by members of powerful groups” (p. 16). Thus, according to the conflict theorists,
when a subcultural group acted in defiance of the dominant group conflict occurred; this was
defined as deviant or criminal.
Social constructionists argued that reality was objective and external to individuals while
also being continuously created and recreated by society (Berger and Luckman, 1967). Thus,
what was “criminal” changed across time, space and cultures and “is a classification of behavior
defined by individuals with the power and authority to make laws that identify some behavior as
offensive and render its perpetrators subject to punishment” (Henry, 2009). Therefore, as Hester
and Eglin (1992) proposed, from a social constructionist viewpoint crime was a social
construction. Those who control the construction of cultural definitions, i.e. the media
(Rhineberger-Dunn, 2013) were disproportionately able to define which cultural values were
acceptable and which were not. Those with less power found themselves outside of the nexus of
control of these definitions and tended to be inordinately labelled as deviant.
Rose and McLain (1990) attempted to bridge the culturalist-structuralist divide with their
“subculture of materialist aggression” view. They contended that “one of the primary, negative
externalities associated with the spread of post-industrialism is the heightened risk of violent
victimization” (p. 241). With Anderson (1999) and Wilson (1997) they proposed a link between
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a group’s inability to participate in the legally-sanctioned marketplace and the rise of subcultural
values rejecting the dominant culture. Sampson and Wilson (2005) echoed this sentiment by
positing “in structurally disorganized slum communities it appears that a system of values
emerges in which crime, disorder and drug use are less than fervently condemned and hence
expected as part of everyday life” (p. 185). These authors appeared to agree that the rise of, and
participation in, the underground economy reflected a set of values labelled deviant, but which
were necessary to survival in an inequitable society.
Summarizing the subcultural theorists Covington (2003, pp. 270-271) found four key
themes emerging from the literature. The first was The Self-Hating Black Male as described by
Poussaint (1983), where the twin forces of institutional racism and negative images of blackness
led to rage and self-hatred which was projected onto others, lowered the threshold for violence,
and was manifested in black-on-black crime. The second, The Brittley Defensive Black Male,
was proposed by Curtis (1975) who attempted to use the macrosocial forces of slavery, the
southern violence subculture, limited access to masculine roles via gainful employment, and
ghetto overcrowding to explain the genesis of a contraculture thought to explain racial
differences in violent crime. A third was Oliver’s (1994) The Compulsively Masculine Black
Male who, because of slavery, limited access to masculine roles, and unemployment responded
with violence due to compulsive masculinity and perceived threats to personal autonomy. The
fourth theme was The Angrily Aggressive Black Male, who Bernard (1990) concluded engaged
in black-on-black violence due to a subculture of angry aggression brought about by the forces of
urban life, low social position, and racial discrimination resulting in heightened physiological
arousal and transfer of anger toward whites onto other blacks. Covington noted that these
subcultural themes had been widely embraced in society and thus concluded with this warning
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about subcultural stereotypes: “The fact that the image of black males, depicted in these theories,
are already so widely accepted may explain why there has been so little outrage expressed over
recent increases in the number of black males placed under criminal justice supervision” (p.
279).
Like Anomie/Strain Theory, subcultural theories have limitations. While there are higher
rates of violence in poor, black communities, the vast majority of males living there do not
choose to engage in violent, criminal behavior. The danger of these theories is the potential they
have to reify widely held notions that conflate race or minority status with crime, leading to the
assumption that living in an urban, ghetto community necessarily means adopting violent
subcultural values. There is also an implicit assumption of a monolithic black community,
something Eugene Robinson (2010) has adeptly dispelled by purporting four black Americas
with distinctly different values and viewpoints about their place in society. Also, as Covington
(2003) concluded, there is a deterministic bent implicit in subcultural theories, implying that
one’s geographical place in the urban environment determines both one’s cultural values and
therefore one’s life chances. However African Americans have always been able to negotiated
two worlds, a theory forwarded as early as 1903 when W.E.B. Du Bois theorized the two
consciousnesses in The Souls of Black Folks, and more recently by Elijah Anderson (1999) as he
described the ability of many in the ghetto to successfully traverse both decent and street values.
Subcultural theories may explain why micro-societies emerge and are sustained within the
broader culture but their ability to fully explain criminal behavior is limited; a subcultural system
that did not tolerate crime, for example African American communities in the River Parishes that
don’t share New Orleans’ high homicide rates, mark the limits of the subcultural theoretical
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perspective to explain crime. This is an example of social organization or collective efficacy,
something better explained by Social Disorganization Theory.
In 1925, Park, Burgess and McKenzie published The City and began an enduring
dialogue as to the causes of crime. They theorized that population declines in central cities
resulted in a loss of social structures and cohesiveness, a key factor in social unrest. They
concluded that crime and delinquency resulted, stemming from the failure of families and key
social organizations to function effectively in ways that maintained and enforced community
values.
Fifteen years later Shaw and McKay (1942) wrote “rates of delinquents reflect the
effectiveness of the operation of processes through which socialization takes place and the
problems of life are encountered and dealt with. Low rates of delinquents reflect the existence of
stable institutional structure” (pp. 383-384). Mapping juvenile crime, Shaw and McKay
discovered that socially disorganized neighborhoods, those in the transition zone between the
cities industrial center and the bedroom community for blue collar workers, had the highest rates
of delinquency. They inferred from this that the informal controls exerted by an engaged
citizenry were failing to operate in the transition zone. They understood this to be caused by
residential transiency, fewer opportunities for prosocial community engagement and legitimate
employment, and failure to assume conventional values. They concluded that the neighborhood
or community was the most appropriate unit for intervention, proposing that a united community
acting in concert to re-assert social controls would improve community life and keep crime in
check.
Building upon his predecessors, Faris (1955) theorized that healthy communities were
ones that extended strong social controls. When these falter crime resulted. He asserted that
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“the ‘crime problem’ is primarily a phenomenon of urban disorganization” (p. 198).
Furthermore, as social disorganization led to crime, crime produced further social
disorganization, creating a vicious, downward spiral.
What made neighborhoods safe, according to Jacobs (1961), was eyes on the street.
When a neighborhood was alive and connected, thus organized, residents made eye contact,
observed what is happening around them, and kept criminal behavior in check. The converse, a
neighborhood in decline, was marked by residents who either were afraid to see what was
happening around them, fearing retaliation, or who chose to ignore the decaying cohesiveness
that delineated a safe community. The declining concern for the community also precipitated the
decay of the built environment. A decaying community was one that signaled an environment
where crime could occur (Newman 1973). The opposite, a community comprised of wellmaintained homes and manicured lots, sent an altogether different message. Both realities, eyes
on the street and the quality of the built environment, were interconnected components of Social
Disorganization Theory.
As social controls decreased and communities became less organized, physical
deterioration resulted, giving visible evidence of social disorganization. Kelling and Wilson
(1982) understood the physical decay of a disorganized community to send visual signals which
tended to stimulate more criminal activity in what they called a developmental sequence.
Evidence of community decay via neglect was interpreted by those observing the community as
a lack of concern by residents, marking the neighborhood as one where criminals felt safe and
law enforcement officers felt unwanted. Thus Faris’ downward spiral was extended to include
the physical concomitants of social disorganization.
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Social disorganization was thought to be most prevalent in central city communities with
high levels of poverty and fewer opportunities. Rose and McClain (1990) tracked the economic
changes facing these communities as the urban economy transformed from industrial to postindustrial. As those with skills left for better opportunity, homogenization occurred, resulting in
“a congestion of households composed of individuals who demonstrate a willingness to prey
upon others as a survival strategy” (p. 241). Venkatesh (2006) described this world in detail,
noting that the underground economy operated according to a street code that was both violent
and predatory and could be maintained because the residents of the community either feared
facing retribution or benefitted from the illicit activity. In the absence of economic opportunity,
these at-risk communities prohibited residents from achieving economic stability and social
mobility, reifying the necessity of the underground economy and diminishing social controls.
Weak communities, those often considered dangerous by those living outside the
community, failed to exert what Sampson (2012) defined as collective efficacy or “social
cohesion combined with shared expectations for social control” (p. 27). Communities with
limited resources lacked the capacity to exert such social controls partially because of a sense of
abandonment by politicians and law enforcement and reacted to deteriorating conditions with
resignation. Wilson (2012) concluded that deeply impoverished communities disproportionately
suffered the effects of concentrated poverty which gave rise to social isolation, or a lack of
collective efficacy. Both considered macroeconomic conditions to exert uneven effects across a
metropolitan area, where harder hit areas experienced an ongoing exodus of the middle class and
left behind what Wilson termed the ghetto underclass. According to Sampson these effects were
enduring and resistant to change. Thus, a lack of collective efficacy tended to breed further
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social disorganization which, unless dramatic steps were taken, had the potential to become a
permanent feature of the community.
When communities exerted their collective efficacy, on the other hand, acting
collectively to exert informal social controls, Social Disorganization Theory postulated that
crime would diminish. The SafeGrowth model espoused by Saville (2009) theorized that
community residents possessed a better ability to understand their space, an intimate knowledge
of its strengths and weaknesses, and a clear recognition of who belongs and who does not. This
model, also known as Second Generation Crime Prevention through Environmental Design,
recognized that “safe places emerge less from outside experts implementing strategies to or for
neighourhoods (sic), and more from neighbours (sic) creatively planning with prevention
experts, police and security” (p. 386). It focused upon a community’s internal capacity to act in
its own best interests and recognized that improved social cohesion, what Sampson terms
Collective Efficacy, would result in lowered crime. In addition to its explanatory value, the
SafeGrowth model helped bridge the gap between Social Disorganization Theory as a
macrosociological theory to its application at the neighborhood level; by bolstering collective
efficacy the impact of social disorganization could be ameliorated as an individual community
acted to improve itself and to reverse the self-fulfilling reputation as a dangerous and
disorganized community.
Summarizing the essential tenets of Social Disorganization Theory Siegel (2015)
delineated five key components:
1) Community disorder evidenced by physical and infrastructure deterioration,
residential instability, family disruption and transiency;
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2) Community fear which is experienced via victimization, expressed through incivility,
propagated via narratives of danger and maintained by withdrawal and inaction;
3) Siege mentality which begins as powerlessness, metastasizes via mistrust of
authorities and may be exacerbated by either police inaction or harassment;
4) Community change, especially changes brought about by the flight of the middle
class from the inner city to outer neighborhoods and suburbs, and maintained both by
the constant turnaround of new residents and perceptions of the neighborhood as a
dangerous place, and
5) Poverty concentration, where deep poverty marginalizes ghetto neighborhoods
because a dearth of jobs assures the effects endure.
These structural factors defined communities in terms of power and place, suggesting that one’s
physical location increased risk factors for violent crime while simultaneously decreasing
opportunities to engage in opportunities for personal and collective advancement.
Unlike anomie/strain and subcultural theories, Social Disorganization Theory was
centered upon place. Because homicides in New Orleans generally occur in a few, high-risk
neighborhoods the theory may explain its rootedness in specific places. As well, it has potential
to inform prevention as collective efficacy and informal controls can be taught and reinforced.
Criticisms of this theory focused on definitions of disorganization, differential treatment
of certain neighborhoods, conflation of disorganization and its effects, and the locus of
responsibility for community disorganization. Before being resurrected by Sampson and Groves
(1989) the theory underwent a long period of disfavor. The term disorganization may be partly
to blame as some high crime neighborhoods were highly organized but around an illicit economy
and accompanying violence. A second challenge lay within the actual crime statistics; a socially
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disorganized community may not truly have higher crime but rather may receive differential
treatment by law enforcement and the courts, thus giving the appearance of higher crime. Third,
the historical definition of disorganization was weak, something brought about by the failure to
adequately distinguish between disorganization and its effects (Bursik, 1988). Finally, there was
an implied assumption that those living in socially disorganized communities cause their own
plight by allowing deterioration, abiding incivility, failing to act on their own behalf, leaving
when achieving success rather than fighting to improve the community, and failing to adequately
prepare for the job market, factors which lent themselves to a process of blaming the victim. The
forces that created the ghetto, such as loss of jobs, flight of the middle class, deteriorating
schools and public policies such as redlining played a far more important role. There were also
forces that maintained the ghetto, such as inadequate policing, poor schools, and a desire to
maintain crime in certain communities lest it overspill the boundaries. In short Social
Disorganization Theory has potential to identify elements that co-occur in high crime
neighborhoods but may not be either predictive or sufficiently powerful to provide direction for
prevention.
Because homicide is overrepresented in a few at-risk New Orleans neighborhoods, these
social-structural approaches to understanding crime may prove more valuable to understanding
the complex interplay of neighborhood and homicide than individualistic explanations of
causation. Thus they will become the focus of this study. Work to date found elements of each
of these theories represented in interviews with community residents. The study’s focus upon
neighborhood-level factors undergirding homicide as experienced by community residents lends
itself well to these theoretical orientations and thus they will be used to guide the research.
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Chapter 3
Research Questions
For much of recent history New Orleans had the highest murder rate in the nation. As
noted earlier, these homicides occurred in some neighborhoods but not in others. Three
criminological theories appeared to be especially suited to understanding neighborhood-level
homicide: Anomie/Strain Theory, Subcultural Theory, and Social Disorganization Theory, each
of which have unique elements that give partial, but incomplete explanations for neighborhood
violence. Most often, as will be discussed in the literature review, quantitative research has been
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used to study rates of violence resulting in homicide. While quantitative research has helped to
explain variations in violence between neighborhoods it has limited ability to explain the factors
leading to variations within an individual community.
Scott (1998) proposed two approaches to understanding local conditions. The first,
which he called techne, was an approach which “is characterized by impersonal, often
quantitative precision and a concern with explanation and verification” (p. 320). This type of
knowledge took a bird’s-eye view of the situation and brought a technocrat’s global knowledge
to be applied to local conditions, an approach thought by many to be higher and more scientific
than the alternative. The second, which he termed metis, was practical and local, “as economical
and accurate as it needs to be, no more and no less, for addressing the problem at hand” (p. 313).
This knowledge reflected the learned experiences of those whose life history had been one of
adaptation to a local environment in constant flux. This type, often overlooked by technocrats,
often was superior because it represented “a rudimentary kind of knowledge that can be acquired
only by practice and that all but defies being communicated in written or oral form apart from
actual practice” (p. 315). The quantitative research done to date is more akin to techne than
metis and, while valuable in scope and breadth, has missed an important element of
understanding regarding what is happening with neighborhood-level violence. Such knowledge
is adaptive to local conditions and may help to explain why violence occurs in neighborhoods
and how residents respond to it. Residents may also have innovative solutions that have been
overlooked by technocrats who lack understanding of local conditions.
The central question of the study was “What factors at the neighborhood level, from the
perspective of neighbhorhood residents, contribute to the high homicide rate in New Orleans?”
Rather than study homicide from an top-down perspective, one which Scott would call techne,
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this study approached the issue from the viewpoint of those whose lives were affected by
homicide and by the routine violence in a socioeconomically disadvantaged community, seeking
to understand the local knowledge, or metis, often overlooked in studies of homicide. Several
sub-questions were explored as well:
1) Does the lived experience of residents in a high homicide community reflect existing
theories or suggest new ones?
2) Will the experience and knowledge of family members who have lost loved ones to
homicide reflect existing theories or suggest new ones?
3) Will the relationship between concentrated disadvantage and homicide that is
reflected in the literature as a factor for homicide risk be reflected in the lived
experience and local knowledge of those living in a high homicide community?
4) Will social disorganization theory, anomie theory and subcultural theories be
reflected in the narratives of those who live in high homicide communities?
In short, this study attempts to bridge the gap between the predominately quantitative,
macrosociological studies of social scientists and the daily, lived experience of those who cope
with violence at the neighborhood level.

Literature Review
Introduction
In The City (1925) the pioneers of the Chicago School of Urban Sociology created a
concentric circle model of urban development. Its five circles began with a central business
district, followed by a transition zone of mixed slum housing and industry, a zone of blue collar
residences, a zone of middle class residences, and culminated with a commuter circle which, at
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that point in Chicago’s history, was comprised of residences of the wealthy who could
financially afford to travel into the center to work. In this model neighborhood closest to the
center became contested space where concentrated disadvantage was most likely to be located,
where social controls were diminished, and where crime resulted. Central city neighborhoods
were the slums where new immigrants and African Americans moving northward in the
industrial diaspora could afford to live. These neighborhoods developed enduring and stable
reputations as being unsafe, what Sampson (2012) termed neighborhood effects. These were the
economically and socially disadvantaged communities where the theorists hypothesized crime
flourished and where higher rates of homicide occurred.
The criminological theories outlined in the previous section concluded that crime
occurred disproportionately in some neighborhoods for three reasons. First, underclass
neighborhoods had historically been segregated from middle and upper class neighborhoods and
over time had developed reputations for being dangerous. Second, the underclass who were
isolated in ghetto communities experienced anomie/strain; wishing to achieve societally
sanctioned goals but unable to accomplish them through legitimate avenues, they found informal
means to do so. Third, as a result of the isolation both geographically and materially, a
subculture arose that deviated from that of the dominant class. Understanding homicide in an
urban context requires studying these isolated communities. This literature review focuses on
empirical studies which addressed homicide in the neighborhood context, with specific emphasis
on social disorganization, anomie, and subcultural studies of homicide.

Social Disorganization Studies
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The importance of Social Disorganization Theory to this study was its ability to explain
crime at the neighborhood level. There were two competing schools within the larger camp
competing for preeminence, one focusing upon disorder as a cause of crime and the other
focused upon a neighborhood’s internal organization.
The first was derived from the Broken Windows hypothesis of Kelling and Wilson
(1982) which purported that disorder did not cause crime as much as “create the conditions in
which crime can flourish” (Bratton and Kelling, 2006). Physical disorder was evidenced by
infrastructure decay and was ongoing while social disorder reflected behavioral decay, or
incivility, and was episodic (Skogan, 1990). Disorder created a negative spiral of impact: fear, a
siege mentality, flight from the neighborhood of those that are able, and weakened social
controls among those that remain. Weakened social controls created an environment in which
criminals were free to act, further weakening social controls and creating more disorder. The
implication of this hypothesis was that outside intervention was required to reduce disorder and
thus prevent crime.
The second reflected the concept of Collective Efficacy (Sampson, 2012) which was
defined as “social cohesion combined with shared expectations for social control” (p. 27). These
theorists would agree that disorder is destabilizing, leading to neighborhood abandonment and
concentrated disadvantage. They would further argue that it is the abandonment of the inner city
neighborhood and the loss of informal social controls that impact crime, not disorder (Sampson
and Raudenbush, 1999). In this theory the signs of disorder that were the hallmarks of Broken
Windows were actually crimes (damage to property, graffiti, littering, loitering, etc.) and led to a
conclusion that lack of collective efficacy was the link between neighborhoods and crime.
Unlike Broken Windows, the lack of informal neighborhood social controls gave rise to
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conditions favorable to crime. While both hypotheses connected disorder and crime in
structurally disadvantaged neighborhoods, the key distinction was whether disorder caused the
breakdown of informal social controls or the breakdown of social controls led to disorder.
Skogan’s (1990) work on disorder formed much of the backbone of the Broken Windows
hypothesis. Measuring disorder through surveys and direct observation the author concluded
three things: residents generally agreed about what constituted disorder and how much was
present in their community, there was a direct link between disorder and crime, and disorder both
directly and indirectly, via its connection to crime, created neighborhood decline. Subsequent
research began to challenge the link between disorder and crime proposing that another variable
may better explain both crime and disorder. Sampson and Raudenbush (1999) questioned
whether disorder caused crime or actually was crime (such as graffiti or public drunkenness), the
implication being that another factor prior to the disorder would better explain its presence.
Kane and Cronin (2009) found that disorder arrests did not deter violent crime unless they
occurred in a neighborhood with high levels of residential instability, leading them to conclude
that the lack of informal social controls brought about by high levels of neighborhood turnover
and not disorder was the precipitant. In their meta-analysis of the Broken Windows research to
date, Braga, Welsh and Schnell (2015) found that order maintenance strategies did not generate
significant crime reduction while community problem-solving approaches had, and thus they
concluded that a community’s ability to work cohesively may better explain neighborhood
crime. St. Jean (2007) has forwarded several flaws in the Broken Windows hypothesis,
including:
1) Differing interpretations of disorder of those inside the community from outsiders,
2) This middle-class bias of disorder,
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3) A mistaken assumption that offenders choose to commit crimes based upon a
community’s visible disorder,
4) The inevitability of the sequence of disorder, crime, neighborhood decline, resident
fear, neighborhood flight, criminal invasion and maximized dangerousness,
5) Failure to situate disorder within a context of race, class and gender, and
6) Failure to account for the motivations of offenders in their choices of crime locations.
While physical and social disorder were linked to crime, it would appear that another mediating
factor may better explain why crime rates were higher in structurally disadvantaged
neighborhoods.
Sampson and Groves (1989) groundbreaking study of Social Disorganization Theory
paved the way for a resurgence of the theory after years of dormancy. They surveyed British
neighborhood residents asking about willingness to supervise neighborhood teens, the number of
local friendships, and level of participation in neighborhood social organizations. They
concluded that “communities characterized by sparse friendship networks, unsupervised teenage
peer groups, and low organizational participation had disproportionately high rates of crime and
delinquency” (p. 799). Years later Lowenkamp, Cullen and Pratt (2003) would replicate the
findings and conclude “the major propositions specified by social disorganization theory—that
certain structural characteristics of communities affect the ability of residents to impose social
control mechanisms over their members, and that the loss of such control mechanisms affects
rates of crime—are supported” (p. 366). Unlike Broken Windows, this research addressed the
primacy of community controls rather than increasing disorder as the important variable in
explaining neighborhood crime.
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In the late 1990s Sampson and his colleagues defined a new concept in the field of Social
Disorganization Theory known as collective efficacy. Up to this point the theory was predicated
upon a fuzzy notion of neighborhood control as the variable that explained why crime rates were
higher in socially and economically disadvantaged communities. In 1997 Sampson, Raudenbush
and Earls found that “the differential ability of neighborhoods to realize the common values of
residents and maintain effective social controls is a major source of neighborhood variation in
violence” (p. 918). In a study of 343 Chicago neighborhoods they were able to show that
collective efficacy had a strong, negative relationship to violence and was negatively associated
to both crime victimization and homicide. Moreover, they hypothesized that a neighborhood
with strong internal organization would also be able to attract external resources such as police
participation, implying that strong informal control was connected to enhanced ability to secure
greater formal controls.
In 1999 Sampson and Raudenbush tested whether physical disorder or social disorder
proved to have the stronger link to violent crime. They concluded that lowered collective
efficacy was more strongly connected to violent crime and that collective efficacy more
completely explained physical disorder. This was also reflected in the perceptions of
neighborhood residents who, when they perceived their neighborhood to be violent, also
perceived collective efficacy to be low (Duncan, Duncan, Okut, Strycker & Hix-Small, 2003).
Collective efficacy was impacted by homicide levels as well; when homicides in a community
increased whites moved away while blacks remained and the resultant residential instability and
concentrated disadvantage diminished the ability of those remaining to exert informal controls
(Morenoff, Sampson & Raudenbush, 2001). Collective efficacy was also shown to be negatively
associated with both intimate partner homicide rates and non-lethal partner violence especially in
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neighborhoods with low tolerance for intimate partner violence (Browning, Feinberg and Dietz,
2004). Sampson (2012) summarized the research done on collective efficacy and homicide by
concluding, “the greatest declines in homicide are found in neighborhoods that experience
increases in collective efficacy and decreases in disadvantage” (p. 175). In a meta-analysis of
criminological studies, Pratt and Cullen (2005) found that the empirical evidence strongly
supported the concept of collective efficacy and showed “considerable promise in predicting
levels of neighborhood crime” (p. 427). The significance of collective efficacy, therefore, was
its ability to explain the means by which a neighborhood’s lack of organization manifested itself
in higher rates of violent crime and homicide.
One challenge to this theory was the presence of highly organized communities that were
also high crime communities. The research of Venkatesh on gangs (2008) and the informal
economy (2006) found that neighborhoods may in fact be organized by groups whose subcultural
value systems ran counter to traditional values and thus supported criminal undertakings. Others
noted that a substantial portion of neighborhood-level crime was committed by residents who
were socially embedded in the community and whose removal by incarceration may create a
destabilizing effect on informal controls, especially as regards the mass incarceration of black
men that led to single-parent families (Rose and Clear, 1998; Alexander, 2012). Furthermore,
the system of network exchange and resulting obligations served an organizing effect and
increased the social capital of offenders shielding them from informal social controls, something
that Browning, Feinberg and Dietz (2004) referred to as negotiated coexistence.
The corollary to this was a section of a neighborhood that experienced both low crime
and low collective efficacy (St. Jean, 2007), where few places suited for crime were located.
Although crime rates may be high for the neighborhood overall, parts of every neighborhood
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would experience lower rates of crime as there were no strategic places there for crime to
flourish. While neighborhoods were treated by macrosociological theory as complete entities,
there were microcommunities within them, blocks that were both well-maintained and without
crime hotspots that exhibited low collective efficacy and low crime.
A challenge of Social Disorganization Theory specific to this study is its
macrosociological perspective which stemmed from an attempt to explain how structural issues
in American society created the conditions in which crime could occur. The concept of
collective efficacy lends itself to a smaller scale study, one that might be termed a
mezzosociological view. The work of Saville (2009) has potential to bridge this gap. In an
extension of Crime Prevention through Environmental Design (CPTED), Saville proposed a
second generation CPTED model named SafeGrowth that helped neighborhood residents
envision, “create and self-regulate their own safety in collaboration with service providers such
as planners and police” (p. 390). This was a training model to help community residents build
collective efficacy in an effort to combat neighborhood crime. Duncan et al (2003) also posited
a community psychology model where collective efficacy might be adapted to multiple levels in
a neighborhood, micro, mezzo and macro. Thus, while Social Disorganization has traditionally
been seen as a macrosociological theory, there is potential to adapt it to the individual
neighborhood context via a vehicle like SafeGrowth or community psychology.
The potential of Social Disorganization Theory for understanding neighborhood-level
homicide lies within its ability to explain the connection between structural inequities and
concentrated disadvantage and homicide. Its explanation of neighborhood violence as a product
of poor collective action and failure to exert informal controls serves to partially explain what is
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happening at the neighborhood level. At the same time the limitations suggest other explanations
may be needed to create a more thorough model of community violence.

Anomie Studies
Another model that sought to explain how the inequalities of a market-based economy
impacted crime in certain communities was Anomie/Strain Theory. The loss of blue-collar jobs
and the suburban outmigration of the middle-class created urban neighborhoods rife with
concentrated disadvantage (Wilson, 1997). Filled with the same aspirations as the middle-class
but lacking in socially-sanctioned avenues for their fulfillment, the marginalized either competed
for a diminishing pool of living wage jobs, compromised with a low-paying service sector job or
participated in the informal economy (Bourgois and Schonberg, 2010; Venkatesh, 2006).
Anomie/Strain Theory posited that crime occurred when the marginalized deviated from
socially-sanctioned means of goal attainment and instead resorted to proscribed means.
Historical periods during which sweeping social changes occurred tended to have higher
crime counts. Comparing crime trends in Buffalo, NY between 1854 and 1956, to historic social
changes, Powell (1966) found that the period of Reconstruction and the Progressive Era had
higher than average rates of crime, which he contended were rooted in existential and
institutional anomie. He concluded that “when there is a near collapse of the institutional order”
or “where expectations exceed the possibility of fulfillment” anomie exists and higher rates of
crime were to be expected (p. 171). The structural conditions that led to deeply entrenched
economic disadvantage in contemporary urban neighborhoods like Hollygrove would seem to
meet both of these conditions: institutional order appears to have collapsed and aspirations for
personal advancement were stymied.
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Recent anomie research has focused in two areas: individual strain theory such as
Agnew’s (1992) General Strain Theory (GST) and institutional anomie theory such as Messner
and Rosenfeld’s (1997) Institutional Anomie Theory (IAT). In the former, Agnew attempted to
cast anomie theory into social psychology parlance, noting that strain was a negative emotional
state that resulted from three conditions caused by an external entity: prevention of achieving a
positively valued goal, removal of a positively valued stimuli, or presentation of a noxious or
negatively related stimuli. Those lacking psychological, cognitive and social capital may choose
delinquency when the benefits outweighed costs and when their social environment reinforced
delinquent behavior. This theory has received some empirical support. At-risk homeless youth
exhibited the expected connection between strains and resultant negative emotional states and
these predicted crime, especially violent crimes, property crimes and drug abuse (Baron, 2004).
Boston high school students were shown to have elevated rates of anger and hostility in response
to negative life events which played a causal role in fostering more aggressive forms of
delinquency (Aseltine, Gore and Gordon, 2000). Responses to the National Youth Survey,
which has measures for both delinquency and constructs consistent with GST, showed those who
experienced elevated strain also reported higher levels of delinquency participation (Mazarolle
and Maahs, 2000). While GST does appear to have some empirical support, the theory is biased
toward agency and is less useful for explaining neighborhood-level violence.
The Institutional Anomie Theory (IAT) of Messner and Rosenfeld (1997) posited that the
American dream had a dark underside: a cultural emphasis promoting productivity and
generating pressure to succeed at all costs, a glorification of competition that fosters personal
ambition while weakening the collective sense of community, and a preoccupation with
monetary rewards that restricts the kinds of achievement to which people aspire (p. 8). The
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resultant focus upon economic success was detrimental to social institutions that once regulated
norms and behavior because “under conditions of extreme competitive individualism, people
actively resist institutional control” (p. 79). The result was elevated crime rates, especially
homicide rates, which far outstripped those of other capitalist societies, suggesting the problem
lay not in capitalism as much as in the American dream. In the disadvantaged African American
community two forces worked together to foster crime, one was the assimilation of the black
community into the values inherent in the American dream of financial success and the other was
“the alienation of young black men from the major institutions of the larger society” (p. 81).
The research was mixed when it comes to supporting IAT. One study found that
instrumental crime increased when there was a high commitment to monetary success combined
with a weak commitment to legitimate means of attainment, and this was exacerbated by the lack
of participation in non-economic social institutions, low educational attainment, low economic
attainment, and high economic inequality (Baumer and Gustafson, 2007). Messner and
Rosenfeld (1997) compared national homicide rates across 18 capitalist nations with a range of
social safety nets thought to partially insulate individuals’ personal well-being from market
forces. They found that nations with higher degrees of decommodification of labor, or the
dependence upon the market as the primary distribution mechanism for “the material resources
for personal well-being” (p. 1394), had lower rates of homicide. Replicating the study, but
including Eastern Europeans nations that had newly adopted market-based economies,
Savolainen (2000) found that strong social safety nets moderated the effects of an uneven market
economy and were associated with lower homicide rates, concluding that nations with a smaller
underclass experienced less anomie and therefore less homicide. Asserting that different types of
homicide may differently impact anomie, Maume and Lee (2003) explored instrumental
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homicides, or “lethal violence in pursuit of some material gain” contrasted with expressive
homicides, or “those committed in the context of a lover’s quarrel, or a fit of rage” (p. 1144).
They found family inequality to be a strong predictor of both types of homicide, that welfare
expenditure moderated the impact of economic inequality on both types homicide, and that noneconomic institutions played a mediating role via the impact of economic motivation upon
instrumental homicides. This suggested that IAT may explain homicides committed in the
pursuit of economic gains.
Other studies proved less convincing. Studying Russia as it made a transition from a
command economy to a market economy Sang-Weon and Pridemore (2005) found that regions
where economic conditions were worst showed higher homicide rates, that family strength and
voter turnout (measures of non-economic institutions) were negatively associated with homicide,
while education had no relationship. This led the authors to conclude only partial support for IAT
but implied that the social structures may not have had sufficient time to adapt to the rapid social
changes and thus may have lost some of their buffering capability. In a cross-national study of
IAT, Hughes, Schaible and Gibbs (2015) found homicide to occur most often in countries where
free-market principles and practices drove the economy and where core cultural commitments
were oriented toward achievement, individualism and fetishism of money but that the impact of a
market-driven economy was not more pronounced in countries with weakened non-economic
institutions. They concluded that “countries with strong structural and cultural emphases on the
economy and personal responsibility for achieving monetary success tend to experience the
highest rates of lethal violence” (pp. 117-118) and that post-materialism and favorable structural
conditions may actually buffer society from high rates of homicide. Finally, Bjerregaard and
Cochran (2008) were unable to show that either annual expenditures on social welfare or the
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strength of the free-market economy in a country were significantly related to homicide but they
did find that family disruption and low voter turnout (a measure of non-economic institutional
strength) was directly related to higher homicide rates, as was high economic inequality,
especially when coupled with a poor educational system.
The promise of anomie theory is its ability to explain the interplay between individual
motivation and structural deprivation for explaining crime. In the context of this study, the goal
of which is attempting to understand homicide at the neighborhood level, anomie theory may
prove to have some value. This value is enhanced when coupled with the explanatory value of
Social Disorganization theory and especially the concept of collective efficacy. Conditions of
low collective efficacy, when coupled with conditions of high anomie, would appear to be
precursors to higher homicide rates. Anomie theory also may provide a bridge between Social
Disorganization theory and subcultural explanations for violence as it helps explain the structural
conditions of concentrated disadvantage and the vantage point of a potential offender
experiencing anomie in the context of a neighborhood where inequalities abound and a
subculture develops to adapt.

Subcultural Studies
Early studies connecting urbanization and crime, especially the Chicago School of Urban
Sociology, paired Social Disorganization theory with subcultural theories. Only later did these
two streams diverge. In his 1931 article Cultural Conflict and Misconduct Wirth explored
cultural deviance in a criminal context. Theorizing that law was the expression of the wishes of
the dominant class he opined “when culture is homogeneous and class differences are negligible,
societies without crime are possible” (p. 485). The remedy for crime was assimilation which
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was thought to reduce crime as immigrants and societal outcasts began practicing a moral code
more synchronous with the mores of the dominant culture. Sellin (1938) further refined this
reasoning, adding that culture conflict was essentially a conflict of conduct norms which
occurred as a group attempted to differentiate itself within a cultural system or area, or as the
result of contact between the norms of different systems or areas. In his study of gangs Miller
(1958) noted that deviance was not the result of a delinquent gang subculture but rather reflected
the values of the lower class, “a long-established, distinctively patterned tradition with an
integrity of its own” (p. 5). Lewis (1966) found that poor communities exhibited
“disengagement from the larger society, there is a hostility to the basic institutions of what are
regarded as the dominant class…[t]here is hatred of the police, mistrust of government” (p. 23).
The implication was that poor communities experienced anomie and, when coupled with a low
levels of internal organization, “gives the culture of poverty its marginal and anomalous quality
in our highly organized society” (p. 23). This thinking helped to bridge the gap between
anomie, subcultural, and social disorganization theories by explaining how subcultural values
arose in conditions of anomie and neighborhood disorganization and created conditions fostering
violence.
The southern subculture of violence hypothesis proposed by Hackney (1969) and Gastil
(1971) hypothesized that higher rates of homicide in the south may be due to high levels of gun
ownership, a predisposition to violence, and a culture of honor and retribution. This subculture
was exported to the north during the African American diaspora and took root in urban
communities which, according to the hypothesis, explained differential rates of violence in the
south and in black, northern communities. Research quickly arose suggesting the data and
conclusions were flawed (Loftin and Hill, 1974) and cast doubt upon several of the fundamental
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premises (O’Connor and Lizotte, 1974). Blau and Blau (1982) studied data from the 125 largest
standard metropolitan statistical areas (SMSAs), hypothesizing that urban violence was a product
of differences in racial and socioeconomic inequalities. They found criminal violence was more
prevalent in the south (southern subculture of violence), was positively related to the proportion
of African Americans (ghetto subculture of violence) and was positively related to poverty
(subculture of poverty). However, upon controlling for socioeconomic inequality they
discovered that southern location no longer influenced rates of violence and that the connection
between percentage of blacks in a community and homicide was greatly reduced. Their
conclusion was that inequality, rather than subculture, impacted violence and that if a subculture
of violence did exist it was better explained by economic inequality. Challenging Lofton and
Hill’s focus upon states as units of study, Messner (1983) used 204 SMSAs as his unit of
analysis. Unlike Blau and Blau this study found location in the south and proportion of African
Americans to have a positive effect on homicide independent of poverty. Outside of the south,
racial composition was found to have a strong correlation with homicide while in the south it did
not, leading the author to note “perhaps racial differences in value orientations toward violence
are greater in non-southern regions than in the south” (p. 1006).
There were three fundamental flaws with the research to date on the southern, black and
poverty culture explanations of violence, concluded Parker (1989); first, neither the south nor
African Americans were homogeneous in lifestyle and values, second, the pejorative indictment
of urban minorities was unfair and racist, and third, these studies ignored the role of institutional
racism that produced the conflations between violence and race. The author noted that a
subculture of violence, if one existed, would “be shared by a small enough group of individuals
that evidence of its existence would be unlikely to show up in surveys, or in macro, aggregated
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studies of cities or metropolitan areas” (p. 1002) and that more innovative methodological
approaches would be required to find them.
More promising research on the subculture of violence addressed structural conditions,
implying that culture alone was not sufficient to explain violence. This research recognized that
“in structurally disorganized slum communities it appears that a system of values emerges in
which crime, disorder and drug use are less than fervently condemned and hence expected as part
of everyday life” (Sampson and Wilson, 1995, p. 50). Much of the research in this areas has
been ethnographic and has explored topics including the subculture of Puerto Rican crack dealers
in New York City (Bourgois, 2003), homeless heroin addicts (Bourgois and Schonberg, 2009),
marginalized street vendors and hustlers of New York City (Duneier, 1999), street gangs in a
high-rise Chicago housing development (Venkatesh, 2008), and the underground economy in
Chicago’s south side (Venkatesh, 2006). They described life on society’s margins from the
viewpoint of those experiencing structural disadvantage, capturing the challenges of living
between two cultures, their own and the dominant culture who made the rules. Thus there was a
substantial amount of qualitative and ethnographic literature affirming the subcultural
explanations of violence.
Anderson (1999) described the complex interplay between these often competing values
systems defining them as “street” values and “decent” values. His proposed code of the street “is
sanctioned primarily by violence and the threat of violent retribution” (p. 134) and became more
normative as greater numbers of urban youth adopted the code. The neighborhood was impacted
when residents were “encouraged to choose between an abstract code of justice that is disparaged
by the most dangerous people on the streets and a practical code that is geared toward survival in
the public spaces of their community” (p. 134). It was the structural inequities that gave rise to
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and maintained the subcultural code of the streets and made it possible to partially explain
differential rates of homicide in some communities.
In St. Louis Kubrin and Weitzer (2003) found that neighborhood disadvantage correlated
strongly with retaliatory homicide and that retaliatory street killings reflected street codes. They
concluded that encounters resulting in retaliatory homicides were shaped by: disrespectful or
challenging exchanges, community tolerance for lowered social control, and a reluctance of the
community to call police. They proposed four types of retaliatory homicides related to street
culture: retribution for disrespect, insults toward female significant others, a policing vacuum,
and community/family support for retaliation. Kubrin (2005) also found that street codes
transcended place and were transmitted via pop culture especially prominent rap music where
violence was portrayed as a vehicle for establishing social identity, respect and social control.
Violent behavior has also been shown to be an instrumental tool for developing street
credibility and impressing peers (Wilkinson, 2003). Adopting street codes at an individual level
has been shown to be useful as a predictor of violence for African American youth (Stewart,
Simons & Conger, 2002) while also placing them at greater risk for violent victimization,
especially in high-crime neighborhoods (Stewart, Schreck & Simons, 2006). There was a
cyclical aspect to neighborhood violence; using violence to prove one’s strength and street
credibility resulted in retaliation as the offended party enacted retribution, creating a vicious
cycle of dominance and victimization (Berg, Stewart, Schreck & Simons, 2012). Widespread
street culture adoption by a neighborhood has been shown to predict violent delinquency and to
enhance adoption of subcultural values (Stewart and Simons, 2010). These studies connected the
prevalence of subcultural street codes and neighborhood violence.
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There was also a connection between neighborhood social controls and subcultural
values. When neighborhood residents were both strongly attached to their neighborhood and
satisfied with the police they exercised more informal social controls (Silver and Miller, 2006).
When trust in the police was poor, legal cynicism developed, something Kirk and Papachristos
(2011) defined as “a cultural orientation in which the law and agents of its enforcement are
viewed as illegitimate, unresponsive, and ill-equipped to ensure public safety” (p. 1191). The
result was behavioral choices that ran counter to dominant norms. A community experiencing
high levels of legal cynicism was also less likely to cooperate with the police when it came to
arresting offenders for three reasons: fear of retaliation, experience with offenders being quickly
released, and because those being arrested are a source of protection and/or goods in the informal
economy (Kirk & Matsuda, 2011). These studies proposed that neighborhoods high in collective
efficacy were less likely to adopt subcultural values oppositional to dominant norms.
While earlier thinking about subcultural theories seem to have lost both favor and
momentum to explain violence in certain impoverished communities, more recent studies that
have bridged the structural-culture divide have received some empirical support. Although
broad, sweeping subcultural hypothesis such as the southern honor subculture of violence and the
subculture of poverty may have limited value, Anderson’s street codes have shown promise for
to explain neighborhood violence. As noted previously, early attempts by the Chicago School of
Sociology’s to explain violence via social disorganization relied heavily upon cultural elements
to create the theory. The divide between the two may be artificial and forced, as evidenced by
the ethnographic work of Venkatesh (2006) and the theoretical partnership between Sampson
and Wilson (1995). Together the two theoretical traditions may prove to better explain
neighborhood violence.
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A more comprehensive theoretical formulation may require the addition of anomie. The
importance of social disorganization’s concept of collective efficacy is its ability to explain how
disadvantaged communities lose cohesion and fail to exert informal controls to curtail violence.
Street codes help explain the apparent paradox of a community that fails to exercise informal
controls reflecting dominant norms while embracing those counter to them. Anomie theory
helps bridge the two by explaining the rejection of dominant norms by those who value
culturally sanctioned goals but have limited means and hopes for their attainment. Anomie leads
to a street culture running contrary to dominant cultural norms, thus eroding the power of those
who would exert informal controls in ways that enhance collective efficacy.
One informant, relating a story about growing up in Hollygrove, shared how when he was
younger “every mama was your mama.” Caught doing something wrong one ran the risk of
being disciplined more than once before reaching home. Contrasting then to present-day
Hollygrove, he opined it now is “all about the money,” that monetary success at all costs has
become the prevalent norm. Then he described a neighborhood with deeply entrenched values,
where violence erupts when people come to the neighborhood who “aren’t from back here.”
This informant managed to connect collective efficacy, IAT and subcultural theories to explain
Hollygrove’s violence and homicide in a single interview.
Each of these theories has some potential to explain why homicide occurs in
disadvantaged neighborhoods. Each of them has empirical support. While none of them may
explain neighborhood-level homicide alone, some combination of the three may.
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Chapter 4
Studying Neighborhood-Level Homicide from a Qualitative Perspective

As the literature review showed there has been extensive research done from a
quantitative perspective while it was difficult to find qualitative studies of neighborhood-level
homicide. Quantitative, macrosociological studies explained variations between neighborhood
homicide rates, but further research was needed to explain conditions leading to homicide within
individual neighborhoods. To better explain New Orleans’ high homicide rate required drilling
deeper into the subject matter by exploring the views of those whose lives were daily impacted
by the phenomenon. Thus this study used qualitative and ethnographic methods to adapt macro
theories to a mezzo (individual neighborhood) level in an effort to bridge this gap in the
literature. The study attempted to connect macrosociological perspectives of violent crime to
neighborhood views regarding its etiology in order to better understand homicide at the
neighborhood level and thus explore how homicide might be mitigated. The study explored
Social Disorganization theory’s concept of collective efficacy, Institutional Anomie Theory’s
explanation of what motivates offenders to eschew socially-sanctioned means of monetary
pursuits, and Subcultural theory’s understanding of a counterculture in a neighborhood of
concentrated disadvantage in an effort to apply these theories at a neighborhood level.
Understanding a phenomenon like neighborhood-level homicide in some depth requires
developing a “complex, holistic picture” (Creswell, 1998, p. 15) derived from the lived
experience of those whose lives have been impacted by it. Getting to this level requires
gathering “information that is difficult to obtain through more quantitatively-oriented methods of
data collection” (Guest, Namey, Mitchell, 2013, p.1). Qualitative research seeks to uncover the
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meanings that individuals ascribe to the phenomena, requiring researchers to “rely as much as
possible on the participants’ views of the situation being studied” (Creswell, 2014, p. 8). To
better understand homicide at the neighborhood level requires a study that could bridge the gap
between macro studies about neighborhood-level homicide and the lived experience of those in a
high homicide neighborhood whose lives are daily being impacted. This study used a qualitative
and ethnographic approach to connect the lived experience of neighborhood violence to existing
theories in an effort to better understand how it occurs and what might be done to mitigate it.

Research Design
Ethnography is a qualitative research design with roots in cultural anthropology
conducted in the early 20th century (Creswell, 2014). Park, Burgess and McKenzie (1925)
concluded that neighborhood-level crime occurred due to the lack of cohesiveness of socially
disorganized neighborhoods. Out of this research several ethnographic studies emerged to
describe the phenomenon (Shaw, 1930; Cressey, 1932; Sutherland, 1937; Whyte, 1943). The
importance of ethnography, according to Creswell (2014) is the focus upon a culture-sharing
group even when the group is bounded and small, such as a single urban neighborhood. Using
an emic perspective, or “taking on the point of view of those being studied” (Babbie, 2013, p.
301), this study followed the ethnographic tradition of telling the story of neighborhood
homicide as viewed through the eyes of residents of the Hollygrove community, a New Orleans
neighborhood that resembled the socially disorganized communities of Chicago studied by the
urban sociologists of the early- to mid-twentieth century.
Beginning with a single homicide that occurred near one of the neighborhood’s crime
hotspots, the study used snowball sampling to gradually expand outwards in concentric circles
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that resembled the Chicago School of Urban Sociology’s concentric zones of the city. Those
closest to the murder, many of whom live in the adjacent blocks from where it occurred, formed
the second circle, viewing the homicide from a personal perspective but once-removed. Others
in the neighborhood formed the third circle, those whose lives were impacted both by the
specific homicide and other homicides that occurred throughout the neighborhood. The fourth
circle consisted of neighbors and neighborhood leaders who understood the neighborhood and
had a wider perspective on neighborhood conditions. Finally, city officials who understood the
community were interviewed, including law enforcement officers, political figures and civic
leaders to add an even broader perspective of the neighborhood.

Individual Homicide
Adjoining Block
Neighborhood Residents
Community Leaders
City Officials

Figure 1: Concentric Circles of Interviews in Study
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Figure 2: Social Disorganization Theory Zones.

Methods
Because a neighborhood social milieu has many elements that are visible primarily to
insiders, data collection must begin there (Guest, Namey and Mitchell, 2013). To gather insider
knowledge this study employed qualitative research interviewing and focus groups as a method
to “understand themes of the lived daily world from the subjects’ own perspective” (Saldana,
2009, p. 24). Kvale and Brinkmann (2009) posited that “interviewing is an active process where
interviewer and interviewee through their relationship produce knowledge” (p. 17). There were
two types of data collection used in the study: individual, in-depth interviews and focus groups.
All of the interviews and focus groups were semi-structured and began with a prepared set of
questions but allowed for latitude to veer from scripted questions to explore emerging issues in
more detail. They ranged from 45 minutes to 1.5 hours in duration. The use of focus group
interviews to supplement the individual ones, according to Kvale and Brinkmann (2009), offered
added potential to create spontaneous expression and deeper emotion through group interaction
as contrasted with individual interviews which tend to be more cognitive (p. 150).
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In addition to interviews and focus groups, photographs were used to help convey depth
and detail. Bourgois and Schonberg (2009) pictures of homeless addicts, while Duneier (1999)
used pictures of sidewalk-based street vendors in New York, to help readers connect to the
ethnography and better understand their project. All of the photographs in the study were taken
by the researcher. None of the photographs identify study participants in order to protect their
anonymity.
The final research method was crime scene observation. Creswell (2013) noted that the
advantage of observation is the ability of the observer to use all five senses to collect data. The
researcher observed an investigation of a shooting, spoke to neighborhood residents present
when the shooting occurred, and discussed the scene with police detectives who were treating the
scene as a homicide investigation because they expected the victim to die from his wounds.
Observation also included visiting scenes of previous shootings where makeshift memorials to
deceased victims had been erected. Observation of an active investigation provided greater
depth of understanding of the process police used, allowed the researcher to better understand the
interaction between the police and the neighborhood members who were bystanders at the time
of the shooting. It also presented a unique, intimate experience with the family members who
lived nearby and to whose home the victim ran and collapsed after the shooting. Finally, this
observation offered perspective regarding how control of space changed hands when crime scene
tape was used to limit the ability of local residents to enter the two-block stretch where the
shooting was being investigated.
Snowball sampling was employed to identify potential informants. Babbie (2013)
defines snowball sampling as “a process of accumulation as each located subject suggests other
subjects” (p. 191). He cautions that the procedure results in samples with questionable
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representativeness and notes that it is best utilized for exploratory purposes. While this study
explored the lived experience of neighborhood homicide from the perspective of those closest to
it, the findings also suggest explanations regarding what happens at the neighborhood level to
foster conditions of either higher or lower homicide.

Data
At the core of the study were 25 in-depth, semi-structured interviews that began with a
single murder near a neighborhood crime hotspot, a corner where several murders have taken
place, including that of Brandon Aggison. The interviews then expanded outward to secure the
perspectives of residents throughout the neighborhood. Neighborhood interviewees ranged in
age from a male in his early 20’s, to senior citizens who had lived in the neighborhood for many
years. To provide broader perspective, several interviews were conducted with non-residents,
including two high-ranking police officials, two political appointees of the Mayor, and the
neighborhood’s city councilperson. Three resident focus groups were conducted: the first with a
group of three male males in their early 20s, a second with a group of seven neighborhood senior
citizens, and a third with a group of six community leaders actively engaged in community
development. With the exception of three participants in the community leaders focus group, all
resident voices were African American. Seventeen photographs of the community were included
to add depth and perspective on the data. These included three crime scene pictures taken to
show both an active investigation of a shooting and a makeshift memorial to a homicide victim
as well as pictures of the neighborhood to better illustrate the neighborhood’s physical space and
to add depth to the written description of the community.
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The initial interview took place with the surviving family member of a homicide victim, a
widow in her mid-20s whose common-law husband was shot and killed leaving her to raise their
5-year-old son as a single mother. She was a classmate of Brandon Aggison, currently resided
one half block from the corner where he was killed, and was also raised in a home across the
street from the corner store where he was shot. The researcher’s existing work in the community
brought him into contact with many acquaintances who lived within a block or two of that corner
and those residents formed a second circle of interviewees. Suggestions by these interviewees
led to another circle of resident interviews representing those who lived farther from the corner
of Brandon Aggison’s shooting and which provided a fuller perspective of the neighborhood.
The researcher’s connections to multiple community leaders with a deep knowledge of the
neighborhood provided a final set of interviews.

Table 3: Race, Gender, and Age of Study Participants
Race
Individual
Interviews
Focus
Groups

Gender

Age

Black White Male Female

18-29

30-39

40-49

50-59

60+

88%

12%

68%

32%

20%

20%

20%

24%

16%

81%

19%

31%

69%

25%

13%

6%

6%

50%

Validity and Reliability
Creswell (2014) concluded that validity in qualitative research required checking for the
accuracy of the data, and posited eight primary strategies to assure valid data. This study used
three. First, data was triangulated through the use of multiple sources that were converged to
build valid themes. Data sources included interviews with both residents and outsiders with a
stake in the community, statistical data from multiple sources, and participant observations in
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multiple settings and at varied times. Second, the data gathered was checked by informants by
allowing them to read transcripts of their interviews. This occasionally involved calling or
meeting with interviewees to verify or add further information to their statements. Finally,
because this was a dissertation, there was oversight of the study at every stage by the committee,
assuring a deep level of accountability and regular auditing of the data, findings, and
conclusions.
Creswell (2013) found that reliability could be assured by taking detailed field notes, by
using a high-quality recording device, by transcribing the interviews carefully and in a manner
that reveals conversational pauses and overlaps. He also stressed checking transcriptions to
assure there were no obvious transcription errors and avoiding coding drift by creating memos
defining codes and the process by which they are used (Creswell, 2014). Throughout each
interview and observation, the researcher maintained detailed notes. Interviews and focus groups
were recorded using an Olympus WS-802 digital voice recorder. Verbatim transcriptions were
completed by the researcher and two paid assistants; whenever there were questions about the
accuracy of the transcriptions the recordings were reviewed to assure accuracy of the
transcriptions. Finally, data were hand-coded in the margins of the transcription and checked
against field notes to avoid coding drift and errors.

Data Analysis
All interviews and focus groups were recorded on an Olympus WS-802 digital voice
recorder and transcribed verbatim by the researcher and two paid assistants. Observations of the
community and crime scenes were collected in a notebook with room in the margins for later
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coding or for thoughts that occurred after it was concluded. Each of the interview transcripts
were printed to allow them to be hand-coded by the researcher.
Coding has been described as the process of “aggregating the text or visual data into
small categories of information” (Creswell, 2013, p. 184). Saldana (2013) proposed a two-pass
coding system consisting of a first set of broad codes generated during a first coding cycle,
followed by a second coding cycle that narrows the number of codes as the researcher identifies
similar and common codes. He suggested that the second cycle of coding should combine codes
to generate themes, or broad descriptors, drawn from the codes that more fully explain the data.
These themes can then be connected to the existing literature in an effort to extend existing
theories or suggest new ones.
The interviews and focus groups were hand-coded using deductive, inductive and in-vivo
codes (Saldana, 2013). Line-by-line coding generated a massive number of first-pass codes. A
second pass found numerous similarities and allowed the researcher to see commonalities and
thus reduce the number of codes. These were organized into five key themes: the community’s
clash of values, the Keeping It Real subculture, the connection between drugs and violence,
mistrust of outsiders/neighborhood boundary issues, and grassroots solutions to neighborhood
homicide. These themes were connected back to the existing literature to help contextualize the
findings within existing understandings of neighborhood-level violence and homicide and to
advance existing theoretical understandings of neighborhood-level homicide. Several of the invivo codes became chapter titles and/or section headings.
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Role of the Researcher
I spent two periods of my life in the community to be studied. My family moved to
Hollygrove during the summer after my 7th grade academic year and maintained a home there
until my father’s death 36 years later. I returned to the neighborhood after a 19-year sojourn in
Chicago and began working as a community organizer and developer. Throughout the next 16
years I was privileged to be part of innovative change, much of it taking place after Hurricanes
Katrina and Rita. These experiences served both to deepen my ties within the neighborhood and
to pique my concern for the high number of homicides among young, African-American males
in the community. Some of them were friends of mine, many were acquaintances and all of
them made an indelible impact upon my thinking. This is what motivated me to return to school
and the reason I chose this topic and this neighborhood for my dissertation research.
My perspective was both as an insider and an outsider. While I grew up in the
community and had maintained ties there all my life, I was white. Hollygrove is
overwhelmingly African American. Thus I was frequently described as “the white guy.” My
longstanding work in the community had brought me a level of respect and access that most
white males were rarely afforded. My childhood in the community provided a bi-cultural
perspective that few whites ever experience. Yet, at the end of the day, I was still white and
there was a divide that I would never fully cross.
Finally, my work in the community predated my academic studies at the University of
New Orleans. I was first a community member and only later have I become a researcher. Thus,
while I brought a unique, insider’s perspective to the research, it was a perspective that
necessitated careful bracketing to maintain distance from the research and to assure my personal
perspective on the community did not interfere with the validity of the findings.
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Chapter 5: Setting
A Trip Down Olive Street

Figure 3. Google Maps (2016) Map of
the Hollygrove Neighborhood.

Hollygrove’s Olive Street represented the best and worst of New Orleans. A grand,
inviting entrance was marked by a canopy of mature live oak trees and two magnificent
buildings from a former, more opulent era of New Orleans’ history. The entry concealed the
disinvestment that lay beyond. The first four blocks were the domain of a white middle class
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who resided elsewhere, driving into the community to use the post office, shop at a pocket farm
with an attached market, and use recreational facilities. After that it suddenly changed into an
inner-city neighborhood comprised of a hodgepodge of residences, many of which were
abandoned, vacant lots, a corner store, a second neighborhood park and then a dead end at
Airline Highway. An entire city’s issues were writ large on this one street.
You enter the neighborhood from Carrollton Avenue, one of the city’s major arteries,
passing between the Waldo Burton Boy’s home and the Carrollton Branch of the United States
Postal Service. The Waldo Burton was “endowed and built in the 1920s by cypress lumber
businessman and philanthropist, William L. Burton (1847-1927) who wished to establish an
enduring memorial to his only child, William Waldo Burton” (Waldo Burton Memorial Boy’s
Home: Tulane University Special Collections). Constructed in the 1920s as an orphanage for
boys it was an imposing, grand two-story structure with an expansive green front lawn, an ornate
wrought iron fence, and stately Live Oak trees along the circular driveway. The property
spanned one city block in width and two deep. The rear yard was equally lush but could not be
observed from Olive Street due to the high, chain link fence with a privacy screen that shielded it
from view.
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Figure 4. Front entrance of the
Waldo Burton Memorial Boys
Home.

Figure 5: Rear yard of the
Waldo Burton Memorial Boys
Home

On the other side of Olive Street was the Carrollton Branch post office. Claude, in his
late 80s, remembered when it was the Cloverland Dairy, “the largest dairy in the South”
(Cloverland Dairy Products, Inc. website). At one point in its history it employed noted New
Orleans trumpeter Louis Armstrong (Armstrong, 1993, p. 25). It would later become home to
the Sealtest Dairy before becoming the post office in the 1980s. While much of the dairy was
razed by the postal service, the façade remained, constructed with glazed white tiles and arched
windows. Behind the post office, which extended two blocks down Olive Street, was parking for
delivery vehicles and an overgrown vacant lot surrounded by a chain link fence topped with
barbed wire also owned by the federal government and used by the Carrollton Playground for
parking. The post office and the boys’ home were magnificent structures facing the main avenue
that belied the neighborhood’s issues farther along the street.
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Figure 6. The Carrollton Branch
of the Post Office, site of the
former Cloverland Dairy.

Behind the Burton Home was the Carrollton Playground, also known as Lincoln Park. It
was a series of athletic fields used primarily by the children of affluent, white families for
baseball and soccer. Several residents described this as the “white park,” one that was off limits
to most neighborhood residents. It was operated by the Carrollton Booster Club whose
leadership, with the exception of one African American, was white according to their website.
There were several smaller baseball diamonds behind chain link fences, one larger ballpark
complete with stands and a concession area. When the fields were being used there was a
constant police presence monitoring them to maintain safety, notifying the surrounding
community that they were being observed and were not welcome. While the boosters have
attempted to engage the community in their programs by offering scholarships for youth to
participate, those overtures had been rebuffed. Neighborhood youth noted they feel more
welcome, at Conrad Playground which lay six blocks further down Olive Street.
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Figure 7. The Carrollton
Playground.

Figure 8. The Hollygrove
Market and Farm.

Across from the playground was the Hollygrove Market and Farm (HGMF). It occupied
property that was once a gardening supply store and plant nursery but was abandoned after
Katrina. It was originally conceived to address two neighborhood issues: health problems related
to poor diet and Hollygrove’s lack of grocery stores. It was a one-acre pocket farm that both
grew produce and imported it from local growers. Many came to the market from throughout the
city, few from Hollygrove. HGMF had attempted to engage the community by providing
discounts to local residents, cooking and nutrition classes, meeting space, and jobs for local
residents. Like the ball fields across the street, however, the market served a primarily white
clientele.
Next to the HMGF was Phase III Body Shop and Wrecker Service, a black-owned
business whose owner told me the business had operated there for 36 years. The body shop was
always busy with cars parked along Olive Street awaiting repairs. Phase III stood out in these
first few blocks because it primarily served an African American clientele. Even this space was
contested, however. The Booster Club worked with the city to make traffic on Olive Street
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travel one way, from Carrollton Avenue into the neighborhood. The boy’s home, post office,
market and ball fields were continuous; there were no side streets that crossed Olive in these first
four blocks. Accessing Phase III legally required traveling out of the neighborhood to Carrollton
Avenue and then back into the neighborhood at Olive Street. Many residents ignored the
directional signs and travelled the wrong way to get there.

Figure 9. The Phase III Body
Shop.

Figure 10. The Public Storage
Facility adjacent to Phase III.

One final portion of the first four blocks, situated on the remnants of an old railroad that
once traversed diagonally through Hollygrove, was a Public Storage facility. Owned by a
Glendale, California company the facility provided storage lockers for rent. The property was
enclosed with a chain-link fence topped with barbed wire. The road rose as one crosses Joliet
Street, where the tracks once were elevated. Across this former track bed lay the rest of
Hollygrove.
One resident of the neighborhood remembered it as a formerly mixed neighborhood
comprised of working-class Italians and African Americans. Several referred to the part of
Hollygrove closest to Carrollton Avenue as the white part of the neighborhood. The first four
blocks of Olive Street, with the exception of Phase III, showed evidence of this racialized past.
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One prominent feature marking Olive Street were the high voltage electrical lines running
through the community. There were two to three of these on every block on the left side of the
street. Many of them had been tagged with graffiti. There were also no curbs when one crossed
Joliet Street and because Olive Street is higher than many yards this caused flooding. Curbs
would direct the flow of water to the drains, without them water flows into the adjacent yards.

Figure 11. A view of Olive
Street crossing the abandoned
railway. The Greenline begins
on the left.

Figure 12. An abandoned house
across from the Greenline.

Between Joliet and Leonidas Street there were only four houses, all on the right side of
the street. Two of them were currently occupied, one had been under construction since Katrina
and one was abandoned, blighted and in imminent danger of collapse. Across the street, running
diagonally away from Olive Street at Joliet, lay the abandoned railway and vacant land. In
recent years the Sewerage and Water Board (S&WB) buried drainage pipes underneath the
railway, leveling its once-raised path to street level. The S&WB ceded the first two blocks to the
neighborhood for the creation of The Hollygrove Green Line. The Carrollton Hollygrove
Community Development Corporation collaborated with Tulane University’s City Center to
develop this into a linear park, with an orchard of fruit trees and an innovative water retention
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project that drained rainwater into a large retention pond planted with native plants chosen for
their ability to absorb water. The first section of the Green Line, at the corner of Joliet and Olive
Street, was paved with blacktop and surrounded by a chain link fence topped with barbed wire.
The next cross street was Leonidas, where public transit bus line traversed the
neighborhood. On the left sat a vacant home, a brick structure facing Leonidas that once was the
family home of the Macaluso family. This Italian family, once prominent citizens of the
community, owned a number of homes in the adjoining area which were mostly vacant since
Katrina. Behind it a vacant land parcel stretched to the next cross street, also owned by the
Macalusos. On the right are two four-plex apartment buildings, abandoned since the storm.
Much of that block was vacant land as well. These buildings were two of four on that block, also
owned by the Macalusos; one was once the home of Lil Wayne, a Grammy Award winning rap
artist. The buildings were weathered with boarded windows, their carports consisted of steel
posts as the roofs were missing. On this block the streets began to show significant disrepair
with current potholes and evidence of frequent, hasty patches elsewhere. In these first two
blocks there were only two occupied homes, the remainder were vacant and blighted with the
exception of one that had been slowly constructed in the ten years since the storm.
Between Leonidas and Eagle Street the number of homes increased. To the right vacant
lots, where blighted houses were razed, sat like parentheses at both ends of the block. Between
them were four single houses, all occupied. To the left were two double shotgun houses, two
single-family homes and two four-plexes, also occupied. The most notable feature of this block
was the sewer lift station jutting out into the street. Above ground it is a nondescript cinderblock building about five feet square and seven feet high; below ground was a massive pump,
two stories below the street, which served to move sewerage on its route to the treatment plant at
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the edge of the neighborhood. For many years after Katrina a temporary pump blocked half the
street, periodically leaking raw sewerage into a vacant lot and leaving a malodorous stench
impacting the nearby neighbors.

Figure 13. The vacant former
home of the Macaluso family.

Figure 14. Abandoned 4-plexes
across from the Macaluso home.

The blocks of Olive Street between Eagle and General Ogden, then between General
Ogden and Hollygrove, had been the location of multiple homicides. On the left side a Habitat
for Humanity home, newly constructed, began a stretch of shotgun doubles, ending with a vacant
lot where an abandoned home was once used for drug sales until the neighbors successfully
petitioned the city to raze it. On the right a two-story four-plex was followed by a single home,
vacant land belonging to St. Peter’s A.M.E. church, two doubles, an abandoned, blighted home
and then the Olive Superette. This corner was the impetus for this study, the place where
Brandon Aggison was shot.
The Olive Superette was a one-story, brick structure at the corner of Olive and General
Ogden, opening to Olive Street. On the sides of the building were advertisements suggesting the
store was a “Fresh Meat Market,” along with a widely-ignored “No Loitering” sign. Another
sign, protruding from the store so it could be seen from both streets, stated “Olive Food Store &
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Meat Market, Hot Food.” While it did provide an array of grocery items, the bulk of its sales
appeared to be alcoholic beverages and drug-related paraphernalia. Seven men were standing at
the entrance of the store, most drinking; all but one walked inside the store when told I was
taking a picture of the store. The street outside was littered with trash, despite the nearby trash
receptacle.
While writing this chapter on setting, I received a phone call that another shooting had
occurred there. Approaching the corner, I saw that the NOPD had stretched police tape across a
1-1/2 block radius of the shooting and residents were gathered outside the tape watching the
police collect bullet casings. The ambulance had recently left the scene with the victim, a young
African American man in his twenties. One of the men sitting outside the tape greeted me by
name and told me that the victim was his nephew, a man that I knew. While no one seemed to
know the aggressor, several had observed the shooting. They told me that a car stopped near the
intersection, a black male got out, pulled a gun and shot the victim four times with a pistol in full
view of all on the corner. This occurred around 1:30 PM, in daylight, just beyond range of the
video camera on the side of the store. Many of the residents thought the shooter knew the
position of the camera and intentionally avoided it.

Figure 15. The Olive
Superette.

Figure 16. Crime scene memorial for
Iceman.
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Crime scenes are the domain of the police investigators. Sections of the neighborhood
become temporarily inaccessible to locals as the police assert their authority to claim the
territory. Bert, who was a participant in this study, walked over from his house inside the crime
scene to tell me that his toilet had been shot and had leaked all over the bathroom floor. He
asked me to come with him to see it, lifting the tape and escorting me inside. One of the
detectives stopped us and ushered us back beyond the perimeter of the yellow tape, telling Bert
that he was allowed inside the tape but I was not. Another detective, an acquaintance of mine,
walked over to talk with me about the importance of protecting the scene. The detectives were
treating it as a homicide scene believing the victim would not survive. Several of those gathered
outside the tape, neighborhood residents, were angry about being restricted from crossing the
tape. Because I was white and dressed in a suit it appeared that I was treated with a different
level of respect than they were.

Figure 18. Police tape marking the
crime scene, November 2, 2016 at the
Olive Superette.

Figure 17. Detectives investigating the
scene of a shooting at Olive and
General Ogden, November 3, 2016.

Once the tape was removed I was able to travel to the yard in front of a friend’s house
where the victim had collapsed. A neighbor had come with a shovel to remove the blood pooled
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on the dirt in front of their porch. Several other neighbors were gathered on the porch and told
me that the victim had been standing next to a young man who was part of the 20-something
male focus group in this study, someone I knew well. It was the second time in the past several
years that someone standing next to him was shot in broad daylight. One of the neighbors on the
porch had held the victim, urging him to stay alive because his brother had also been shot and
killed and the family could not handle another shooting death. Also on the porch was Arianne,
another participant in this study who had lost her husband to gun violence and was a classmate of
Brandon Aggison; at this moment the study had come full circle with two shootings at the Olive
Superette, one at the beginning and the other at the end.
The block between General Ogden and Hollygrove Streets had been the site of several
homicides as well. Morris Smith, known in the neighborhood as Iceman, was killed on this
block on December 12, 2012. This drug-related shooting also occurred in the daytime, in front
of a vacant, overgrown lot. Iceman had been released from federal prison for drug trafficking
nine months previous. A newspaper article reported that the shooter’s brother had stolen drugs
from him and was afraid that he would talk to the police about the incident (Purpura, 2015). For
several years afterwards a collection of stuffed animals was duct-taped to the telephone pole in
front of the lot as a memorial.
The left side of the street on this block was a combination of seven single and double
homes and a mixture of renters and homeowners. There were two vacant lots, the one where
Iceman was killed was overgrown and poorly maintained, the other had been converted into a
garden by the adjacent homeowner. One of these homes had been abandoned since Katrina and
was in an advanced state of disrepair. The right side of this block began with two units
constructed immediately before Katrina to be used as Section 8 rental housing by a white man
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who lives outside of the neighborhood. The first is a four-plex unit, too large for the lot upon
which it was constructed; one unit was vacant with plywood over the door. This building had
been a source of tension for some in the community when a drug dealer lived there. Its location,
across General Ogden from the Olive Superette, situated it near a source of customers for both
the corner store and the drug dealer. Several residents approached the landlord and notified him
of the activities of his tenants which resulted in the drug dealer’s eviction. The next unit was a
double, painted to match the four-plex and owned by the same landlord. An overgrown vacant
lot stood between it and the next home, a pink modular unit built after Katrina by the young
family who owned it. The next three units were also homeowner occupied, all by elderly
residents who had freshly painted them. An overgrown vacant lot ended the block.
After Katrina such an array of vacant homes and lots, intermixed with occupied units,
became known as the “jack-o-lantern” effect. The comparison was to a carved Halloween
pumpkin where the teeth had gaps between. This block, along with the remaining four, were
excellent examples of the jack-o-lantern effect.
Upon crossing Hollygrove Street to the left was the home of a recently-deceased
matriarch of the community. Her home was a modular, built by students at a trade school in
New Hampshire and erected upon pilings using a crane that swung the two halves of the home
into place. The home where she previously lived was next door and was decaying; both were
vacant. Two homeowner-occupied singles and a vacant lot were followed by an occupied single,
a one-story, four-unit cinderblock apartment and a red-brick two-story home that once was the
residence of a local physician who operated a blacks-only clinic in the neighborhood during the
Segregation Era. On the right side of Olive Street was a futuristic-looking yellow home
constructed after Katrina by a neighborhood pastor and his wife. The next home was a single,
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brick home abandoned since Katrina. Two singles followed, the residences of elderly
homeowners. Completing the block was an overgrown lot and an abandoned eight-unit
apartment building.
Hamilton Street crossed Olive at this point, an artery used by many to travel through the
neighborhood to the suburbs, allowing motorists to avoid heavy traffic on Carrollton Avenue.
On the left side of Olive was an abandoned brick single followed by an abandoned eight-unit
apartment building. Two vacant lots, both recently mowed, were followed by the only occupied
home on the block. Across the street was Conrad Playground, also known as Frederic Square.
Unlike the Carrollton Booster playground six blocks away, Conrad was a place the neighbors felt
welcomed. It consisted of a large baseball diamond with bleachers on Olive and Hamilton, a
yellow field house with a concession stand, a basketball court covered with a metal roof, and a
small playground for children. Both the baseball diamond and the basketball courts were lighted
at night. The playground was built by a collaborative effort between Trinity Christian
Community and KaBoom in 2011. The park had a supervisor and offered programs for the
community. New chain link fences surrounded the park as did trees planted by volunteers after
Katrina. The park previously experienced significant flooding after heavy rains but a storm
water management project by Tulane University City Center and the Carrollton Hollygrove
Community Development Corporation had ameliorated it. The park was inviting and played host
to many community functions, including the recent Night Out Against Crime and a religious
revival conducted by St. Joan of Arc Catholic Church.
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Figure 19. Conrad Playground.

Figure 20. Olive Street ends at the
railroad track.

The park symbolized the divide between the first four blocks of Olive and the remainder.
While Carrollton Playground was almost exclusively the domain of white New Orleanians
traveling to the neighborhood from elsewhere, Conrad was almost exclusively used by African
Americas from the community. Claude, a study participant in his late 80s, remembered when the
park was off-limits to blacks during New Orleans’ segregation years, “when we was comin’ up,
we couldn’t go on the playground. We’re black, and you couldn’t go in there. Well, we used to
go over there and jump then fence when there weren’t nobody there and play ball, and the police
would come and run us out of there because by being black we wasn’t supposed to be in there.”
He would later become president of the park’s booster club, using his contacts with Shell Oil to
build the bleachers and equip the field house with park equipment. While Conrad had changed,
the racial divide still existed elsewhere in Hollygrove.
One block away from the park, on Hamilton, was the Carrollton Hollygrove
Multipurpose Center, a newly-constructed community center dedicated in November of 2015. It
was once the site of the Robinson Clinic, a hospital that offered a wide array of medical services
to African Americans who couldn’t receive treatment elsewhere due to segregation. Claude
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remembered the clinic as a place where “whether you had any money or not, Dr. Robinson was
gonna take care of you.” The clinic, also a reminder of Hollygrove’s racialized past, was
converted into a senior center after its closure. The original clinic building was razed after
Katrina and its replacement was constructed using FEMA funds.
The final two blocks of Olive, before the street reached a dead end at the railroad tracks
abutting Airline Highway, were almost equally divided between blighted and abandoned
structures and livable dwellings. Crossing Mistletoe, looking to the left was a double, a single
unit occupied by a homeowner, a home undergoing renovation, two blighted structures, a single
and a home that had been under renovation since Katrina. On the other side of the street was a
single, an overgrown vacant lot, a newly constructed single, a blighted home that has collapsed, a
single and a vacant lot. The neglected structures on this block stood in strong contrast to the
habited units. Overgrown grass, cracked sidewalks and broken windows marked the blighted
units, while the occupied units were well-maintained and showed pride of ownership. As I drove
down the block young boys were playing basketball in front of one of the homes, the
grandchildren of the retired postal worker who owned it. Claude lived on this block, and he
could often be seen on the porch watching Conrad Park across the street. A proud, elderly
homeowner possessing a strong commitment to the betterment of the neighborhood, he was one
of the first to return and rebuild his home. From his porch one could also see significant blight,
testament to others who lacked his commitment to the neighborhood and, via neglect of their
properties, negatively impacted his quality of life.
The final block of Olive Street, crossing Cherry, was only a half block, made triangular in
shape by train tracks that run alongside Airline Highway. On the left was a double rental unit,
followed by a renovated single home, a blighted home with a semi-truck’s tractor parked in a
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small driveway and two vacant, overgrown lots on each side of an occupied single. On the other
side of Olive were two homes that appeared to be in imminent danger of collapse. The tracks at
the end of the street were elevated and prohibited further travel. Beyond those tracks, across
Airline highway, lay the Metairie Country Club, self-described as “a haven of leisurely social
elegance” (Welcome to the Metairie Country Club, 2016). Those tracks, coupled with a drainage
canal along the parish line, blocked two sides of the community and prevented either ingress or
egress. The major arteries on the remaining borders of the neighborhood, I-10, Carrollton
Avenue, Earhart Expressway and Claiborne Avenue also encumbered vehicular traffic from
Hollygrove.
The railway beds at either end of black Hollygrove served to delineate the
neighborhood’s separation from white New Orleans, vivid symbols of the marginalization of this
neighborhood. The Monticello drainage canal and the major surrounding arteries also limited
residents’ ability to move in and out of the community. It was as if the neighborhood had been
separated from the rest of the city, designed with visible reminders to those living there of their
place and status.
Freeman (2006) described inner city neighborhoods like Hollygrove as “neighborhoods
excluded from the mainstream of American life” (p. 188), places set apart by the abandonment of
those with means and businesses that served them. This occurred twice in Hollygrove. First, the
white flight of the 1970s transformed Hollygrove, leaving behind abandoned businesses,
producing a plethora of absentee landlords and changing the racial mixture of the neighborhood.
A second flight occurred after Katrina when a portion of the residents chose to abandon their
flood-soaked homes and relocated elsewhere. Olive Street’s vacant lots and abandoned homes
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served as reminders of these twin exoduses and of its marginalization relative to more prosperous
neighborhoods.
Massey and Denton (1993) concluded that marginalized neighborhoods like Hollygrove
represented “the key institutional arrangement ensuring the continued subordination of blacks in
the United States” (p. 18). Later Sampson (2012) would further note that “racial inequality in the
American city cannot be understood absent a direct consideration of the role of spatially
inscribed social advantage and disadvantage” (p. 372). The first four blocks of Hollygrove, were
an almost exclusively white-controlled domain complete with private police patrols to insulate it
from the challenges that Hollygrove residents faced daily. Just beyond the tracks at the
neighborhood’s conclusion was a bastion of privilege, the Metairie Country Club. In between
were the social ills wrought by years of segregation and subsequent neglect. Olive Street bore
witness to the institutional arrangements of New Orleans that isolate communities like
Hollygrove, leading to social disadvantage and perpetuating racial inequality.
Wacquant (2008) posited that a grave mistake in theories of urban slums had been the
transformation of sociological conditions into psychological traits. Rather than understanding
neighborhoods like Hollygrove via policy decisions that relegated African Americans to
decaying neighborhoods, these theories pathologized the victims. In this scenario Hollygrove
was a bad neighborhood because bad people lived there. Olive Street served as an example that
the reality is more complicated. While Olive Street did have one corner that was statistically
more dangerous than others, it also had places of privilege like the Carrollton Playground, places
of innovation like the Greenline, places of abandonment like the lots and vacant homes, places of
structural neglect like the sewerage lift pump leaking into a vacant yard, and places of security
like the occupied family homes newly constructed since Katrina. In short, Olive Street served as
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a visual reminder that neighborhoods are complex places requiring closer scrutiny if we are to
better understand the dynamics that give rise to violent crime. The following chapters describe
how neighborhood residents view their lives, their neighborhoods and violent crime.
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Chapter 6: Findings
Hollygrove’s Clash between Prosocial and Subcultural Values

In Hollygrove there was a strong sense that community values were changing. On the
one hand was a recognition that traditional values were important. On the other was the reality
that these values were at risk of not being transmitted by a new generation of parents ill-equipped
for the task of parenting. In addition, grandparents were raising a second, and sometimes third
generation of children during a time of life when energy and motivation were flagging. While
traditional values continued to be widely acknowledged as important to the well-being of the
community, there was a strong fear that a younger generation had failed to adopt them. The
subsequent clash of values was thought to be important to the understanding of neighborhoodlevel violence.
Elderly residents were especially concerned that values long considered central to
neighborhood stability were not being instilled in or espoused by a younger generation. One
community leader explained it this way “when we were growing up we had, it was a value
system that was shared by a larger community” while a senior noted “the neighborhood has a lot
more people who don’t have those values than before.” The perceived failure of these values to
be effectively transmitted to younger generations had many seniors concerned. This chapter
addressees the tension between long-established, prosocial values of the older residents of
Hollygrove as they conflicted with newer values of a younger generation.
Of the 20 values reflected in the data, five were most frequent while others appeared to
be outliers mentioned only once or twice in the interviews. The most prominent were that
prosocial values transmission was lacking, that the ethic of caring neighbors had waned,
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recognition that the perceived work ethic which built the neighborhood was disappearing, that
pride of ownership was being lost, and that there had been a demise of prosocial conflict
resolution skills. In the following sections these values are discussed.

A Lost Generation: Failing to Transmit Prosocial Values
Hollygrove residents understood the importance of prosocial values to be an important
key to neighborhood safety. At the same time many expressed anxiety that these values were
neither being adequately transmitted to nor adopted by younger generations. They connected
this phenomenon to Hollygrove’s violence.
During a focus group conducted with neighborhood senior citizens one commented, “It is
a lost generation,” suggesting that older, prosocial societal norms written about by Lynd and
Lynd (1959) were no longer being embraced by a younger generation. A middle-aged
neighborhood entrepreneur who relocated his neighborhood business from the community after
Katrina thought this began “when the 80s came along and children started having children and it
was like some kind of communication gap.” Comments like this were widely reflected by the
data and indicated a concern that modern childrearing practices were failing to impress upon
children the importance of values considered important. Study participants connected this to the
advent of teen pregnancy and younger, less prepared parents. A former police chief noted
“families have got to start raising and taking care of their children and families have to force
their children to comply to what has been now at least 2000 years of good social skills.” A
former drug dealer, now in his late 50s called it “a downhill generation gap” where a sort of
entropic effect had occurred as prosocial values had lost their import simultaneous to the
neighborhood’s increase in violence.
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This was not solely the sentiment of older residents. A single mother in her late 20s
whose spouse was killed in a neighborhood shooting reflected this understanding as she
considered her younger sister’s parenting of preadolescent sons saying “she just let them go and
let the streets raise them” and “they going to be the next generation, they going to be standing on
the corner and they going to be the next bad boys.” Discussing what differentiates between those
who sell drugs and those who do not, a male in his early 20s concluded it was because “you was
raised up good, you had guidance.” Another male, a single homeowner in his 20s, noted “they
have to have values instilled in them at a young age.” Thus there was a broad sense that
something had changed in Hollygrove, that children lacked the values necessary for success.
The years between birth and five were considered to be a key period in values
development by community members. One grandmother, who ran a licensed neighborhood day
care center, addressed community attitudes toward young, teen males this way, “people complain
about the teenagers, but who raised the teenagers” adding “if you grow to 10, 11, 12 and you
haven’t gotten it in those first five years, you gonna look at a child that is hardened.” She
concluded that adults needed “to focus on spending more time with kids.”
A key concern for many was the age of those raising children. One senior remarked
“young ladies started having these babies early in life and they didn’t know how to take care of
them and children raised themselves.” It wasn’t just mothers that received such criticism, one
20-something male added that “daddies don’t want to take care of them.” A man in his 70s
thought that “one of the biggest factors is single parent families” and “absentee daddies.”
Residents also expressed concern about the longevity of this phenomenon. A former
neighborhood resident, now a key city official, observed:
when you have a grandmother that’s 35 or 36, alright, the daughter is what 16, okay, and
then the child is two or three. Alright then you got the grandmother that’s now 40, the
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daughter is 20, and the child is like 6 or 7, the grandmother’s probably stopped in high
school to have the baby but she didn’t go back or, you know, unfortunately had a very
minimum wage job, and didn’t take any kind of means to get out of that so they caught is
this system and all they know is the streets.
Because values transmission was thought to occur primarily through families, residents
considered the youthfulness of parents to be a key in the failure to pass prosocial values to the
next generation.
Residents also expressed concern for grandparents upon whom parenting duties
sometimes fell due to parental neglect. One senior thought some grandparents were “being held
hostage by their own grandchildren,” while another pointed out:
a lot of children have parents that’s in prisons, a lot of ‘em parents are dead, because of
the shootings and they have grandparents and relatives taking care of these kids and a lot
of ‘em is not doing what they’s supposed to be doing with these kids.
A community leader related a conversation with one grandparent living with four generations of
offspring this way:
she just accepted it as status quo, that’s just the way it is. I said I couldn’t have my
grandkids, um, you know walking across the store while there’s a drug deal going down
and I know it’s going down, I just couldn’t do it. She hunched her shoulders, you know.
The grandmother being described was in her late 70s. She had suffered a series of debilitating
losses including a heart attack, losing her home to Katrina, the imprisonment of her daughter, all
while attempting to hold her large family together. Her exhaustion was palpable.
Newman (1999) wrote “Focusing on the deviant cases, on the whoring mothers, the
criminal fathers, the wilding teenagers, and the abandoned toddlers merely confirms a knowing
helplessness or worse: a Darwinian conviction that perhaps we should just ‘let it burn,’
sacrificing the present generation in the hope of rehabilitating future ghetto dwellers” (p. 187).
Hollygrove residents, when considering the failure of the present generation to adequately
transmit prosocial values, appeared to reflect this pessimism. Addressing the current state of
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community values, they expressed the widespread opinion that much of the responsibility for the
community’s demise was rooted in a generation of children that do not reflect the values of
previous generations, values considered to be paramount to community well-being. Despite this
sentiment, these values continue to be espoused across the spectrum of generations, although not
without conflict. Throughout the remainder of this chapter four of these conflicted values will be
discussed through the voices of the community.

A Place Where You Can Trust Your Neighbors: The Importance of Caring
Sampson (2012) defined collective efficacy as “social cohesion combined with shared
expectations for social control” (p. 27). Dr. T, a 30-something male physician who intentionally
relocated to the community to be part of its revival, described it as “a place where you can trust
your neighbors.” Many Hollygrove residents appear to long for a nostalgic past where neighbors
cared for each other, where doors could be unlocked, and where norms were shared and
practiced. There was widespread conviction that this was missing, but that there may be a
revival of sorts that had begun to occur. Meanwhile there was a tension between the ethic of
caring neighbors described by older residents and the self-preservation valued by younger
residents.
As we sat on his porch at sundown a neighborhood rapper in his 20s described street life
as a value he described as “you bout yours.” This sentiment is part of a street code that younger
residents term “Keeping It Real” which will be described at length in the next chapter. This
particular value, minding one’s own business while ignoring others, is important to this section
as it conflicted with Sampson’s concept of collective efficacy. It was echoed by Eldridge, a
young homeowner in his late 20s, who noted the conflict between ‘being bout yours’ and the
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value of neighborliness by noting “it’s hard, it’s like you got people that don’t want someone
else in their business” adding “everybody got that it’s all about themselves type of viewpoint”
while personally espousing the view that “we got to look out for each other.” Claude, a lifelong
resident of the neighborhood provided the conflicting view, held by many seniors like him,
“Everybody’s hooray for me and Daniel! I think the society has changed. We don’t have that,
that maybe the love for one another and most of all respect.”
Like Eldridge and Claude, those with a longer perspective on the community could recall
a time when collective efficacy was the norm. Charles, a reformed drug dealer in his late 50s
remembered when “Hollygrove was like one big family,” where “everybody was close knit”
while Tamika, a 40-something, recalled her childhood in the neighborhood as a time when “you
kinda knew everybody” as contrasted with the present when “everybody is kinda to themselves.”
Angela, a lifelong resident had lived in the center of the neighborhood all her life and saw
firsthand the deterioration of the street in front of her home during the heyday of the violence.
Now in her 60s she nostalgically described a Hollygrove where “it was not necessary to lock up”
and when “we used to sleep on the front porch sometimes.” The crime in her block, although it
had lessened recently, made that impossible, as evidenced by her assertion that “now you cannot
do any of that.” She thought that crime had a deterring effect on the neighborhood’s ethic of
mutual concern and people had become “frightened from helping other people.” The fear that
Angela described was more prominently expressed by those who lived closer to crime hotspots.
Other parts of the community, especially those with high homeownership and distant
from high-crime locations still subscribed to the older value of neighborliness. Dr. T described
these as places where there are “neighbors that speak and care about each other and look after
each other.” He thought this happened when residents had “been there long enough to care about
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each other.” The contrast between Dr. T’s and Angela’s comments indicated that those living
more distant from neighborhood violence hotspots exhibited the value of caring while those
nearer them were more prone to live by subcultural values.
The conflict between minding one’s business and caring for the community was
perceived to have ramifications for neighborhood safety. A focus group of community leaders
addressed the challenge by suggesting that “community involvement has played a big part in
Hollygrove” and “engaging people” was the way to produce positive change. One police official
further added that the recent successes in reducing crime were due to “the great work of the
community” and noted “the only way that the masses can get rid of the few people that are
terrorizing the neighborhood is to stand up and say, ‘We’re not going to do that anymore’.” Dr.
T thought also this value needed to be more widespread, that “it’s just getting out to the
community that everybody has a part to play.” One city official in the Mayor’s office proposed
the key to neighborhood safety lay in “the ability for a neighborhood to set norms about
appropriate behavior and you don’t do certain things here.” This happened, he noted, when “a
neighborhood working in concert can, in all the ways cultures are reinforced, through their
language, through their shared behaviors, values, and all the rest, say this is not something that is
happening here.” These voices reflected Jacobs’ (1961) thinking that eyes on the street were an
important facet of neighborhood safety, while minding one’s own business was detrimental.
The complete destruction of the neighborhood following Hurricane Katrina forced a reenvisioning of the community during which a community development association was founded,
a neighborhood association became active, city officials were engaged, and outside resources
came to the community through a variety of means. The result was the engagement of residents,
mostly seniors, who began working to re-establish collective efficacy. The successes that
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followed included a significant reduction in neighborhood violence between 2012 and 2015. A
sense of optimism had begun to take root, suggesting that caring relationships in the
neighborhood had re-emerged. At the same time several expressed concern that seniors could
not sustain the efforts and thus the value of caring neighbors must be adopted by a younger
generation. In the words of a current police official “Hollygrove had a reputation and probably
rightfully so—as a very violent neighborhood. Only in recent times, only I would say, only in
post-2012, post-2010, has it really, the violence really dramatically dropped off compared to
what it was.” Yet he cautioned “it’s really hinging upon like, you know, community leadership;
and is that gonna sustain? Some of the community leaders are, you know, a little older.”
While resident efforts to re-engage the community had borne some success, the tension
between self-preservation and an ethic of caring for neighbors continued. The work required to
re-establish diminished prosocial values was daunting. Although hard work was not foreign to
the oldtimers in the community, there was strong sentiment that this value was another that had
not been effectively transmitted to the younger generation.

Raised to be Productive: Valuing Hard Work
While older residents thought hard work was an important facet of neighborhood safety,
younger residents described structural impediments limiting their ability to engage in the formal
economy. This led to a second values clash in the community one between hard, legitimate work
in the formal economy and the alternative pathways to economic success through the informal
economy. Older residents viewed younger residents as lazy and lacking commitment to
education. Conversely younger residents described an inadequate educational system coupled
with structural forces that limited their ability to find gainful employment in a changing
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economy. Waquant (2008) described the modern urban ghetto as one that was segregated on the
basis of race and class in the context of the retrenchment of the labor market and welfare state
from the urban core and the subsequent deployment of the omnipresent police force. Wilson
(1990) chronicled the conundrum faced by inner city males as the availability of livable wage
jobs requiring less than a college degree shifted away from the urban core replaced by low
paying service sector employment. Thus what appears to be laziness to longtime residents is
seen by the younger generation as structural impediments to engagement in the formal economy.
In a focus group of young males one railed “you gotta think about how we got to the
ghetto, like somebody put us here” while another added “we could sit up here and talk to you for
300 and 400 years, however long it took to put black people in the position they in right now.”
The harsh reality of urban joblessness was exacerbated by racism, as epitomized by another’s
criticism, “when they try to do better and stuff like, then it’s like man, we not about to hire you,
it’s like, damn, I just filled out for this job, I’m a dishwasher, the white man filled out and went
straight to the bar” or “once I become white I’m normal, I’m what this country was made for.”
One solution, espoused by the group was to avoid the formal market and participate in the illicit
economy, “why would I go to work when I could make this much money on the corner” and
“selling drugs is the first thing we see that can give us money like that (snaps his fingers) like at
a constant pace.”
Despite these sentiments, the group expressed conflicting views about participation in the
informal economy, stating “the young guys don’t want to work for what they want, they want to
take it” and “that’s the problem with my generation, they don’t want to work for nothing.” They
were not alone. Also expressing the conflict was Tameka, the 40-something homeowner who
recognized the importance of the value of hard work juxtaposed with the lack of jobs for
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neighborhood residents. She stated, “Whatever it is, you have to work for it. Nothing is given to
you. Not back then, not now, not ever. You have to work for it but if you can’t find a job where
can you get these things.”
The senior citizens were less understanding. Their adherence to the value of hard work
for individual and collective success was captured by Claude, an 80-something retiree who
helped numerous men find jobs in his career as a supervisor. He noted “when you work, you can
respect yourself” and “when you get it yourself, you can feel proud. I worked and got this for
mine.” Claude told me that he worked two jobs in his youth, leaving a job at the paint factory to
work nights as a hotel bellboy in order to provide an education for his children. Zora, a 60something day care provider thought that “things has to be worked for” and that people need to
“get off our butts and do what we need to do.”
Seniors viewed the younger generation as lazy, implying they had no desire to find
employment. One member of the senior focus group stated “they don’t want to work” echoing
the sentiments of Charles, the former drug dealer, who stated “the younger generation, they don’t
do nothing” adding “they want to have an easy life, an easy income.” He contrasted that with the
way he was raised, adding “if you’re brought up properly, to be productive, that would stop…all
that drugging.” It was difficult for them to understand the younger generation’s lack of value in
hard work believing that the younger generation had chosen to “sit down under the moon instead
of trying to improve theyself” and “sit around the porch from one to the other, from morning to
evening.” A senior official in the city’s Department of Aging shared their sentiment noting,
“they want to get by and that’s it.”
Still other seniors blamed the welfare system. One focus group member thought the
younger generation was content to “let somebody else take care of their family” implying that
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somebody was the federal government. Another stated young people “just wanna sit down,
receive government money, receive government food.” A third judged the government’s public
assistance priorities to be misguided when she said “the government taking care of them and the
poor seniors suffering trying to make it.” Charles provided a more moderated view of the public
assistance system proposing that “welfare is good because it helps you get on your feet but if you
get comfortable with that you don’t have to do nothing.” There was widespread thinking that
welfare should be temporary lest it negate the importance of hard work for attaining personal and
social good.
Most presumed that hard work was necessary for the success of the community. The
informal economy, a subject of a later chapter, was seen as either an unfortunate, but necessary
alternative means of income or as an excuse for laziness by those who do not value hard work.
While none in this study thought the illicit marketplace was good for the community, the
younger generation expressed greater sympathy for those whose lives depend upon it given the
structural impediments to participation in the formal economy. Welfare was widely panned as a
cause for failure to espouse the value of hard work. Ultimately, while Hollygrove residents
connected hard work and success, they disagreed about why some do not work; older residents
attributed it to laziness and welfare dependency, while younger ones connected it to poor
education and structural impediments to labor force participation.

Homeowners Care More: Pride of Ownership
Hollygrove’s homeowners described a third value, pride of place, which they connected
to valuing and protecting the community. Wiese (2004), writing about homeownership in the
black South, proposed that homeownership represented “evidence of permanence, a marker of
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achievement, and the satisfaction of a long-deferred dream” and that African American
communities were considered by many to be places of “social comfort and cultural affirmation if
not racial pride, a ‘safe place’ in which to nurture families and educate children, a symbol of
resistance to white supremacy and a foundation for politics, if not economic and racial power”
(p. 8). One community leader captured this value noting, “when you value even just the road
that you live on, the house that you have, the flowers that you grow in your own garden, that
kind of stuff, like I think it changes your whole perception of everything.”
There was also the sense that younger, more transient residents who rented, especially
those who used Section 8 housing vouchers, did not share this pride of place. One senior focus
group member epitomized this concern:
In the neighborhood where you have homeowners, working people, retired people,
they’re quiet. But when you get the young people start migrating in after somebody die
and the house is for rent, somebody found out about doing Section 8, they go in and make
all the necessary adjustments, you move a family in, 4 or 5 children, that’s when it starts
coming, the neighborhood starts going down. So, with just a working class of people
there, the senior citizens there, it was quiet. Because everybody knew everybody,
church-going people, but when they start getting younger people move in the
neighborhood, moving in from outside, that’s it.
This comment expressed the concern of many homeowners of all ages about the encroachment of
rental properties. There was a fear that a tipping point was imminent with potential to upset the
balance between the long-term stability of those with an ownership stake in the community as
contrasted with those who are less residentially stable. Residents thought that a critical mass of
homeownership was an important component of neighborhood safety.
Pride of ownership was best described by Claude as he recalled the day he purchased his
home:
I think by being a property owner, you’re gonna protect what you work hard to get, you
know. You take back when we bought this house. I bought it from my brother-in-law
because it was a family piece of property. I think I paid $15,000 for the house. And
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man, that was one of my proudest days when I, when my wife and I signed the papers.
We had, this was our house. It’s, you know, that’s—that’s something to motivate you,
self-motivation. Yes, indeed. That’s, when you’re hustling to get something and you
know eventually it’s gonna be yours. And that was during the time when people was
proud when they owned something, and when they, especially when they bought an
automobile, even a second-hand automobile. You were proud of that.
Several blocks away, across from a corner store shuttered since Katrina which was a noted crime
hotspot, Charles commented on what he thought to be a diminished pride of ownership, “because
I know everyone, I would see how this neighborhood is deteriorating and people are not taking
care of their homes back here, taking care of their properties and don’t have pride in the
neighborhood or for the community.”
Ernest, a community businessman, took a more militant approach to this values clash. To
him ceding his block to those who didn’t share his pride of ownership was like losing a battle,
where the more violent places in the neighborhood had waved a white flag and given up:
The parts that’s dangerous, they’re the parts that’s been surrendered. I mean that nobody
fighting for it, they’ve surrendered. That block surrendered. I had a block I ain’t
surrendered my block until I left. I used to round up all my neighbors when I do, we got
a whole lot of block now, I can’t guarantee that block but we can secure this block for our
children. Just keep them off the next block, we got our block and then go talk to them
about securing they block. It was working for a while, you know just be firm, “Look,
you can’t stand here, I understand you can stand at the park over here, Conrad Park, there
are other places you can go, but you cannot sit here and congregate in front of my house
and please do not sit on my steps. You gotta move.” You gotta do that every day for like
two years til we got our block back.
This value reflected economic realities, according to a police official who said “the more,
I guess material things people have, they’re less likely to want to lose them.” He forwarded this
equation, “as the economics of an area increase, crime goes down.” He was not alone; Daneta, a
single mom in her late 20s remarked that people with means who are “already set and maybe
owning their houses and whatever the case may be, it’s just that they’re living in a different place
from where these young black kids are out there,” suggesting that, although she is not a
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homeowner herself, those who have purchased their home have a different set of priorities and
are more protective of their space.
Many in this study thought that those who don’t own their home have a lesser stake in the
long-term well-being of Hollygrove. This may be exacerbated by the fact that a significant
number of homes were abandoned after Katrina by those who moved away. This, too, is
connected to a feeling of danger. Dr. T noted there are “some of the different parts of
Hollygrove that haven’t been kept up as much, they give off a certain, certain, you know when
you look at them you’re like, ugh, this is a rougher place.” He refers to this as “a visual
representation of what’s going on in the block.” These sections of the community were
considered by several respondents to be the domain of renters and absentee landlords who did
not share the pride of place that longer-term homeowners embraced.
Patillo (2007), in her study of Chicago’s south side neighborhoods, concurred with these
voices noting that “What homeowners share is a financial investment in their homes and a desire
to protect it” (p. 14). Not everyone had sufficient means to purchase a home or was fortunate
enough to inherit one. The challenge Hollygrove residents faced is transmitting the pride of
place to those who were not able to own their place of residence. The neighborhood had
experienced a drop in homeownership in the last 10 years, from 54.2% to 50.7% (Greater New
Orleans Community Data Center). During the same period vacant housing units increased from
10.9% to 32.9% (Greater New Orleans Community Data Center) driven in part by housing units
abandoned after Katrina. The loss of homeowners on the one hand and the increase of vacant
dwellings may have exacerbated community fears regarding pride of place. In the words of one
police official:
You know, how many haunted house–looking buildings, structures do you have back
there, you know what I mean? So until Hollygrove can knock those buildings down—and
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not only knock ’em down but I mean, having abandoned lots everywheres, even if the
grass is maintained, still doesn’t give a person the impression of a healthy neighborhood,
you know what I mean? I wouldn’t wanna live in a neighborhood that had abandoned lots
every, you know, like almost like a jack-o-lantern effect…
The changed in neighborhood ownership patterns left homeowners with two options: either find
innovative methods of converting the vacant homes and lots into homeownership opportunities
or develop means to transmit pride of place to renters.

They Use Violence to Solve Problems: A Lack of Prosocial Conflict Resolution Skills
Hollygrove’s final major values clash was between those that adhered to prosocial values
concerning how conflicts are resolved and those who used violence to resolve it. Many residents
observed a dangerous decline in the way younger community members resolve conflicts, that
prosocial methods of conflict resolution had been abandoned for violent ones. Dr. T described it
by noting both the loss of ability to verbally resolve problems and the increasing lethality of
conflict resolution strategies:
Growing up, which I’m sure was the same way for you, it was never about a gun. It was
always you fight, the next day you talk it out, you’re fine. Now it’s totally different, you
do something to me you’re going to lose your life. It’s weird to me because if people
really appreciated life they wouldn’t resort to that. That’s the big problem right there.
Tamesha, a college student in her early 20s, connected Hollygrove’s violence to “how people
handle their problems” noting that lack of conflict resolution skills had created a context where
violence became acceptable. Ernest described advice he gave to peers who had violent
encounters with their significant others:
If I ever talk to a friend of mine and I find they done struck or hit their girlfriend or wife,
then I tell them, “Well that’s not as much an anger problem, that’s an intellectual
problem.” I say, “Because if she’s moved you to blows with word, that mean you ran out
of words. You got physical. So she’s a little bit too intellectual for you, so you either
need to come up to her level or let her go, cause she’s not going to come down to yours.
You either got to step up or step off. That’s the only two.
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Like Dr T, Tamesha and Ernest, many thought there were prosocial ways to manage conflict
besides violence.
Elijah Anderson (1999) referred to this clash as one between as the street and decent
codes. A former police chief addressed the street code of conflict resolution this way: “New
Orleans has had an abnormally high murder rate since 100 years. There’s some part of our
culture that recognizes that violence is a way to dispute, mediation dispute that I’m not really
seeing in other places.” Anderson (1994) captured the two sides of this clash concluding it
represented “two poles of value orientation, two contrasting conceptual categories” (p. 35). This
oppositional code of violence and aggression “springs from the circumstances of life among the
ghetto poor—the lack of jobs that pay a living wage, the stigma or race, the fallout from rampant
drug use and drug trafficking, and the resulting alienation and lack of hope for the future”
(Anderson, 1994, para. 1).
Hollygrove residents saw the growing acceptance of violence as a conflict resolution
tactic through three lenses: deeply entrenched poverty, normalization of violent strategies, and
the emerging perception that the use of handguns had become a viable conflict resolution
strategy. Zora, the 60-something day care provider, reflected upon the first of these stating “if
you have a poor class of people in a neighborhood, naturally you’re gonna have more anger.”
The focus group with males in their early 20s yielded another reflection upon structural
inequities as one pointed out “the worst thing for a black man who already who lost everything,
feel like he don’t have nothing to lose” while another noted “it’s hard for us to keep our head
held up high when we get held down.” The anger they experienced had few appropriate outlets
leading another to state “we broke, all of us got problems, we sit around and talk about our
problems all day and we only know a few ways to solve ‘em.” One community leader connected
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this anomic condition to neighborhood violence noting, “if you allow yourself to feel this anger
and if you allow yourself to feel you have no dignity, it would destroy you.” She understood
neighborhood violence to occur when some residents enacted their emotional distress through
destructive behaviors directed toward the community rather than the systems that caused it.
Many residents observed that violence as a conflict resolution strategy had a long history
in the community and was considered to be acceptable. Charles, the former drug dealer,
remembered a time in Hollygrove’s distant past when “you’d have a fight and then you’d go out
to Conrad and play football” or “you’d have a fist fight and that’s about it.” Kobe, a college
student in his early 20s shared this nostalgic view of the past, even though he was too young to
remember it:
I mean at least from what I hear they used to settle it fighting, fist-fight, you know. Even
when I was younger that was kind of, still kind of a thing, you know? Fight. If you fight
someone and y’all fight, I mean y’all both live and fight and you may have a bruise or a
black eye or something but you’re living and go back to your family, you know, and it
helps, it pretty much helps you know get that dirt off your chest if you will, that’s what
we used to say, “Get that dirt off your chest.” And, um, and it’ll be it, that’ll be it, it’s
over with now.
These views normalized neighborhood violence as a means for resolving conflicts, contrasting
the older method of fist fighting with more lethal forms used currently. They pointed to a
perception that nonviolent options, at least for males, were considered insufficient solutions.
When a neighborhood male failed to physically defend himself he was considered a punk, which
is an expression used to describe one who was effeminate and prone to victimization. Anderson
(1994) pointed out that in the street codes of the inner city, backing down from conflict had the
potential to “leave one’s self esteem in tatters” and thus “people feel constrained not only to
stand up and at least attempt to resist during an assault but also to ‘pay back’—to seek revenge—
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after a successful assault on their person” (para. 27). In a neighborhood context where violence
was normalized, prosocial conflict resolution alternatives were neglected.
In recent years the methods of violence used to resolve conflicts had become more lethal.
One city official commenting upon this shift noted “when I was growing up, you settled it with
your fists. Now you settle it with a 9mm.” Another noted “There’s a common refrain that I hear
from people is oh we, it wasn’t so bad back in the day, people would just fight it out or maybe
someone feels really bad, someone gets stabbed but now it’s so much worse people take their
life. Well all that really points to is a difference in the tool.” This was also reflected in the 20something male focus group when one remarked “those oldtimers back in the day will tell you,
man, we never shot guns, we fought to solve our problems. We never, once my generation came,
after the 90s, the 2000 generation, they was using guns for everything.” Throughout the
interviews there was common sentiment that something had shifted, that the tools used to resolve
conflict had become more deadly.
Despite the normalization of violence as conflict resolution strategy there was a
recognition that prosocial methods of conflict resolution are better for the neighborhood. Robert,
whose choice of violence led to a prison term, told me:
The few times I’ve been involved in them (lethal altercations) it just goes from a talk to a
fuss to blunt out fussing and disrespecting each other to where it’s, alright I be right back
or you ain’t gonna, you know. If people sit there and think, you take five minutes out to
think of the consequences of what you about to do, I would guarantee you wouldn’t do it.
I say that all the time. I say, man, if I had just thought about the consequences of my
actions and what I’m about to do right now, I wouldn’t even be in here.
He recognized that his choice to use guns to resolve conflict negatively impacted his life and
harmed the community. A former resident, now in city government, suggested “it’s a macho
thing, it’s people want to (shoot), instead of having a disagreement and settle an argument
through words.” These comments reflected the voices of several others who understood that less
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lethal conflict strategies would make the neighborhood a safer place and improve the life chances
for community residents.
The conflict between prosocial values of nonviolent and violent conflict resolution
strategies mirrored the conflict between street and decent codes about which Elijah Anderson
had written. He concluded the two orientations “socially organize the community, and their
coexistence has important consequences for residents—especially children. Above all, this
environment means that even youngsters whose home lives reflect mainstream values—and the
majority of homes in the community do—must be able to handle themselves in a street-oriented
environment” (Anderson, 1994, para. 2). Those subscribing to prosocial values understood that
conflicts could be resolved through dialogue while street values normalized physical and lethal
means. The conflict between these two sets of values helped to explain the challenge that many
younger residents experienced as they struggle to negotiate the street subculture inside the
neighborhood and the world of decent values beyond Hollygrove’s borders.

Summary
Throughout the rebuilding of Hollygrove, in the years since Katrina, there had been an
attempt by neighborhood residents to re-establish the primacy of prosocial values. This charge
was led primarily by the seniors, those who could recall a time when Hollygrove was a much
different neighborhood. This hopefulness was tempered by a recognition that times had changed
and that many neither shared their optimism nor subscribed to the values of the past, expressed in
the words of Claude who said “their life values are not what they were when I was growing up.”
In some ways the neighborhood was at a crossroads, possibly a tipping point, as epitomized by
the ratio of homeowners to renters, an almost evenly-divided split. On the one hand Hollygrove
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had experienced a revival of sorts: crime was lower, a neighborhood bar long seen to be a
hotspot for crime had been closed, there was a new school and a new community center, the
police and politicians had taken a renewed interest in the neighborhood, property values seemed
to be increasing—an increase in social capital. On the other hand, many of the forces that led to
its pre-Katrina violence appeared to have a continued, albeit less-powerful influence.
The clash of values in Hollygrove was in many ways a conflict between older and
younger residents. Those who lived through segregation and worked to create neighborhood
pride recognized that interdependence and shared values were important to Hollygrove’s
viability in the face of the structural inequities that limited opportunity for them. They desired to
see these values transmitted to the next generation, understanding that the community’s future
depended upon them.
Meanwhile the younger generation, experiencing ongoing marginalization, had difficulty
understanding the relevance of these values in their current context. Adoption of prosocial
values by an older generation did not create equality of opportunity for their parents or
grandparents and had not for them. Although younger residents recognized the importance of
prosocial values, they did not function adequately in their experience. This gave rise to the clash
between the two values orientations.
The rejection of prosocial values by younger residents was enacted in three spheres.
First, an oppositional subculture arose in the community where countercultural values came to
dominate neighborhood street life. Second, an underground economy developed to combat their
limitations from participation in the formal economy. Finally, failure to adopt prosocial values
when combined with either or both of the two preceding spheres limited younger residents to the
neighborhood in an atmosphere of mistrust for those beyond its borders. Ultimately this clash of
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values was key to understanding homicide in Hollygrove as it formed the base for the
neighborhood’s transition from a working class haven of African American aspirations to one
widely perceived to be dangerous and crime-ridden.
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Chapter 7: Findings
“Keeping It Real”: Life outside Prosocial Values in Hollygrove

The values clashes described in the preceding chapter were not idealistic, philosophical
constructs for residents of Hollygrove; they were traversed daily by those who negotiated the
neighborhood’s complex relationships. Oppositional values manifested themselves in a
subculture several young residents termed “Keeping It Real,” an environment where those
outside the mainstream found refuge. Kirk and Papachristos (2011) defined such a subculture in
terms of its cultural orientation; when cynicism toward power structures was high, they found
residents were more likely to reject prosocial values and to embrace street subculture. Anderson
(1994) described the impact of this values clash in neighborhoods like Hollygrove:
The rules have been established and are enforced mainly by the street-oriented, but on the
streets the distinction between street and decent is often irrelevant; everybody knows that
if the rules are violated, there are penalties. Knowledge of the code is thus largely
defensive; it is literally necessary for operating in public. Therefore, even though
families with a decency orientation are usually opposed to the values of the code, they
often reluctantly encourage their children’s familiarity with it to enable them to negotiate
the inner-city environment (para. 3).
The ability to negotiate between these often conflicting values orientations required both a
knowledge of and an ability to enact street savvy. The consequences for deviating from these
codes can be difficult, if not lethal, for those living in Hollygrove.
From his shop in Hollygrove Ernest was one who lived between these two worlds. His
work screen printing t-shirts saw a booming business for a time from those who wished to
memorialize victims murdered in the violence associated with the subculture. He described the
interaction of those competing worldviews as “culture killing society” where “society really
exists and culture is fabricated.” For Ernest society represented mainstream culture, what
Anderson (1999) termed Decent Codes, the values of the dominant society that must negotiated
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for success outside of Hollygrove. Culture, on the other hand, represented Anderson’s Street
Codes and were thought by Ernest to be detrimental to the neighborhood’s well-being. He
contended that “the culture that the hood creates totally diminishes it (the neighborhood).”
The street culture of Hollygrove had been popularized in a variety of ways. One
entrepreneur designed a brand to emblemize it. The 0017th logo, which signifies Hollygrove’s
political ward designation, was seen on hats, bandannas, t-shirts and was a popular tattoo to some
residents. The logo featured prominently in a rap video entitled The Zoo by Hollygrove Keem
and Jay Jones that could be watched on the 0017th website (www.0017th.com, n.d.).
Ernest, whose work brought him into frequent contact with the purveyors of the 007th
brand, saw a downside to the brand. For him ‘Keeping It Real’ glamorized a lifestyle that
limited one’s life chances beyond Hollygrove’s boundaries. Reflecting on the divide between
the worldview of larger society and the subculture he expressed his concerns
It’s only called being real until the moment when it get real. You see that’s fake, that’s
culture, it’s culture killing society. Society is real. Society is, you shoot somebody you
go to jail.
The challenge for those immersed in Hollygrove’s subcultural worldview in his words was “you
become the culture,” which limits opportunity because:
you have to deal with society as a whole. I mean you deal with that, that’s two different
worlds. They have no understanding of that because they live their whole life in that
culture and when they get to the society thing, it depletes them.
Ernest’s comments reflected the challenge that residents of Hollygrove faced, they lived between
two worlds, which Ernest termed society and culture.
This chapter is subdivided into five sections. It begins with a description of what life is
like on the streets of Hollygrove, a concept that was described as being ‘outchere’ or out here in
the subculture. There were three subthemes residents used to explain this, the notion of being
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stuck on the streets with few options, the elements of anger and power that accompany life on the
streets, and an understanding of how life on the streets limited one’s future prospects. To better
understand being ‘outchere,’ the second section explores the rules that define expectations for
those living in the subculture. Those who adopted these rules achieved a certain status, the
pinnacle of which was known as being a ‘Hood Star,’ the subject of a third section. The fourth
and fifth sections look more closely at the twin processes of either succumbing or resisting the
subculture, a constant challenge that was especially pertinent to the younger residents as they
defined their personal identity relative to the subculture.

“Outchere”: Life in the Street Subculture of Hollygrove
Bourgois (2003) argued that those who immersed themselves in the street subculture “are
seeking an alternative to social marginalization” (p. 143) by refusing to accept structural
victimization. The challenge, he noted, is that by doing so “they become the actual agents
administering their own destruction and their community’s suffering” (p. 143). Efforts to
enhance personal status within the subculture served to impair social capital outside the
neighborhood. This was reflected in the words of one 20-something male who stated:
Something real dangerous happened after Katrina, it became cool to be outchere. You
gonna hear that word a lot from us. Outchere means in the streets, no guidance, I don’t
have no guidance, no ambition, I’m just outchere, head first.
His statement described a ‘head first’ leap into a street life that limited one to the neighborhood’s
social milieu and thus was considered to be dangerous. This concept was described in three
ways throughout the neighborhood. First there was a notion of being stuck, where one’s life
became increasingly limited to the borders of the neighborhood as one followed the rules of the
subculture. Second, anger and power elements of Keeping It Real were a destructive force for
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both individuals and the community. Finally, residents expressed concern that many who were
“outchere” had no future.
Many who abandoned prosocial values and embraced the subculture found themselves
stuck in Hollygrove. One of the 20-something males noted “these dudes, all they know is these
four corners.” Dr. T elaborated on this sentiment, adding:
There are people in Hollygrove that are terrified of leaving Hollygrove. There are kids
that come to the summer camp that have never left Hollygrove. Talk to them about, hey
you guys ever been to the movies? Nope. Walmart? Nope. Winn Dixie on Carrollton?
Nope. Where you shop? Ah, well we go to the corner store. We’ll eat at Popeye’s. If
we need something, somebody will bring us some, our family will bring us something to
Hollygrove so all they know is their neighborhood. All they know is their setting and to
get outside of there is scary.
Outside of the community the rules were different and those who enforced these rules
were unfamiliar. A single mom who lived in a liminal state between the streets of Hollygrove
and her job outside of the neighborhood told me that Keeping It Real “just works in the hood.”
Leaving the neighborhood removed one from the subcultural context where the rules were
known and understood and brought a unique set of dangers. Anderson (2008) found that:
the reality of daily life for too many young black men in areas of concentrated poverty
revolves around simply meeting the challenge of ‘staying alive.’ To avoid being killed as
they navigate their way in public within the disenfranchised community, they acquire
personas with a street-toughened edge. This image becomes generalized, supporting the
negative stereotype that has become a dominant image of the black man throughout white
society (p. 8).
On the one hand residents faced daily the danger of transgressing turf, or as Charles described
“I’ve seen people come from the other, from another neighborhood or another part of town, from
across the river or something and come over here and I’ve seen them get shot.” On the other
hand, young residents faced the very real specter of racism and racial violence outside of
Hollygrove. Kobe, a young man from Hollygrove, attended college in a relatively crime-free

112

neighborhood in Jackson, Mississippi but felt less safe there than in the higher-crime environs of
Hollygrove. He described this fear:
Cause I mean even when I was here, now that I think about it, I never was really scared
about any neighborhood or anybody I knew or anybody from this neighborhood ever
gunning me down cause I just, I mean you probably would know me from seeing me
around the area but I just never had any issues with anybody so they wouldn’t have a
reason to. But the Trayvon Martin killing, the white guy, that’s probably more of a
scarier thing cause I don’t have to know him, I don’t have to have had any issues with
him, you know, he just felt a certain way, acted on it.
As the dangers faced by young black men are bleak both in and outside of Hollygrove some
residents like Kobe preferred the known danger rather than an unknown one elsewhere.
Being stuck inside the neighborhood meant one had limited opportunity for recreation
and self-improvement. Arianne, a single widow in her late 20s, had lived most of her life in a
lethal two block radius between a corner store and a bar. Describing a typical day for many she
stated “everybody hung in the store, like on the corner, when the store closed they would go to
Big Time Tips.” Charles, who like Arianne grew up between the store and the bar, spent a lot of
time meandering back and forth between the two and portrayed his day this way, “The bar was
closed during the daytime so everybody hung on the corner. When the store close and Snake
came to open up, everybody moved from this store or this store around the corner and go to the
bar.” The shuttering of the bar meant that one recreational opportunity was removed. There was
a sentiment among younger residents, reflected through the voice of a community leader, that
this was a significant loss to those immersed in the subculture. She stated “even some of those
young folks who used to go there and were kind of mad ‘cause they didn’t have any place to go,
they understood. You know it was not like they were really angry, it’s just like, but where we
going to go now?”
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Being stuck in the neighborhood may potentially result in loss of hope and the choice to
hang out on the corner, a concept described by Ernest as “Catching the Wall” where “you see
these guys by the store when you ride around the neighborhood, and you see around the grocery
store and they just standing there, that’s guys that literally just gave up and caught the wall.”
Eldridge also noted, “I notice like there’s like a block three blocks down from here and when I
get off work there’s like always like a group of young men standing on the corner.” The
possibility that one “Catches the Wall” was exacerbated by an arrest and subsequent conviction
record, which further limited opportunity. Tameka explained:
There are lots of men, especially African-American men, you know, young men, who
may have been incarcerated, may have gotten into trouble, they get out of jail, got this
record, can’t get a job. So I’m back with my mom, you know she’s on me because I can’t
find a job. You know I have kids, can’t feed the kids, can’t find a job.
One city official implied that getting stuck resulted from the structural limitations faced
by those in the community:
In a city with huge disparities in income, huge disparities in access, huge disparities in
lots of different things, you couple that with just developmental markers of young men
versus young women and I think it largely answers the question. Certainly not anything
that is intrinsic to the young men is that they disproportionately live in poverty and
disproportionately are unemployed. It’s a lot of that. I mean across the country the
disparities for African American men, in particular young African American men, are
clear when it comes to the criminal justice system, the education system and the like.
Robert described the impact of these limitations on his life, saying “And it’s just that when they
took my scholarships away and I went to jail and once I got out of jail I had nothing. I didn’t
graduate from high school ‘cause I wound up going to jail. I had no scholarships now, now what
I’m going to do? I ain’t qualified to do nothing.” Robert was stuck, he was “outchere” with few
options and had “Caught the Wall.”
Because of the limitations imposed by the choice to adhere to the values of the
subculture, one might question why one would make the choice to “Keep It Real.” Anderson
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(1999) found that negotiating the streets of a neighborhood like Hollygrove required a portrayed
image of strength, which he termed “juice,” where one “must send the unmistakable, if
sometimes subtle, message that one is capable of violence, and possibly mayhem, when the
situation requires it, that one can take care of oneself” (p. 72). Prosocial values may be enacted
inside the home or beyond the boundaries of the neighborhood in the educational, economic and
social worlds of larger society. On the streets of the neighborhood, however, especially those
surrendered streets where subcultural values predominate, one must be able to switch codes,
largely in an effort for self-preservation.
Bourgois (2010) described the dichotomy between these two cultures as a divide between
“cultural capitals” (p. 135) which were differentially expressed between the two worlds that
divide the inner city and the world beyond. Thus one must possess a bi-culturalism in order to
live in a neighborhood like Hollygrove while also succeeding outside the community, something
that became increasingly difficult the more one became invested in the subculture. Keeping It
Real was, therefore, a set of power-based survival skills required to be safe within the
community but which translated poorly beyond the neighborhood boundaries.
In the previous chapter the use of violence as a problem-solving skill was explored.
While older residents deplored this violence, those more immersed in the subculture were more
likely to engage it, especially for defensive purposes. Martin, a neighborhood rapper, described
an interaction inside a corner store where he was required to shift codes between decent and
street codes quickly in response to a slight by another male:
Like I was at the store today, Belfast and Monroe, I found $5.00 when I came home from
my job and I was in a good mood. A woman, she didn’t have no money to get her kids
nothing, she had maybe $2.00 in the car. I was like, “I’ll give you $3.00, matter of fact,
what’s this for?” She said, “It’s for the kids.” Like, “I’m a pay for it, get whatever you
want for the children, I’m a pay for it.” I got a black and mild cause I’m slowing down
on the cigarettes. So, he’s telling me to hurry up, or whatever, “that’s why I don’t like
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you ‘N words’ this, that and a third. By me having an anger problem and not being a
bigger person, I snapped on him. And next thing you know he said something smart
about how, like I’m old enough to take mama jokes, but now my mama’s sick, that really
hit me to my heart. I turned back around and told him some words, next thing you know
he went to grab his gun and cock it back ‘cause, you know the clip fall out. Like how
you going to handle a gun but your magazine falls out that holds your bullets. Like I told
him, next time you pull it, you better use it, I’m not afraid of no pistol, I’ve got God on
my side. You might think I’m scared but I’m not.
Martin began by acting from a decent values mode, sharing his money with a woman in need,
but at the perceived slight he shifted codes and violence erupted. Note also that Martin was able
to reflect upon his anger, “by me having an anger problem” and his inward clash between
personal and subcultural values, “not being a bigger person.” His recognition that there may
have been prosocial ways of dealing with conflict were rejected as inappropriate in this situation
because he did not want to appear frightened.
Kobe saw the divide through a racial lens, commenting “White people, they have like
these big, nice looking places and you know they are probably doing well, doing well financially
and all that stuff like that, so it’s not a lot of reasons to just out and be angry and attack
somebody versus out here where you have a lot of anger.” His comment reflected a view that
financial power shielded one from having to respond with aggression to perceived slights. Both
interviewees displayed an understanding of the need to exercise power in response to slights
while simultaneously recognizing other operative codes that existed elsewhere.
Others made the connection between power and anger as well. Dr. T noted that the
ability to trust was part of the challenge faced by those in the subculture when he stated “where
they didn’t trust someone or someone was showing violence or aggression towards them [they]
reciprocated. They just gave it right back.” Daneta described a similar dynamic where her
cousin was shot in a power display occurring during a dice game, “They were playing or
shooting dice or something and then the guy got mad because he lost the game, you know, and
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then he just like took it out on the boy and started shooting at him and then he, I guess, went to
retaliate and then my cousin got shot.” Aggression in Hollygrove served a purpose, it let others
know that perceived threats to one’s person would be met with power. As will be seen later in
this chapter, those with the most power became known as Hood Stars.
Displays of power may also become lethal when they escalated to the level of the ‘street
beef,’ an ongoing feud between two members of the subculture. Martin noted, “we get into a
fight. From now on whenever I see you it’s on and popping, we’re beefing. And sometimes that
beef escalates to violence.” A street beef occurred when two residents had conflict. Unless
resolved through other means, something unlikely in the subculture, the beef could progress to
lethal violence. Ernest, who printed memorial t-shirts for many of those killed because of street
beefs, chronicled the end result of such violence, “So that would be a group of eight guys come
in and order shirts one day, and the next week it went to a group of seven, then a group of six,
five, till there was none ‘cause they was killing each other.” This was most intense during a
period he entitled The Vacuum, a period at year-end when debts were collected, “the most
violent time about November the 15th to January the 5th, I call it the vacuum, people just get
sucked up. It’s when all the debts get called in.” His business in memorial t-shirts would peak
during this period, when “60% of the shirts for the whole year for the funeral went down in just
those few months.”
While enhancing one’s personal power, lethal violence associated with the subculture
was perceived to have a negative effect upon the life chances of those immersed in it. Four of
the study’s respondents understood that a distinct challenge of those living “outchere” was a
constricted ability to plan for the future. They reflected Anderson’s (1993) thinking as he wrote
“the ghetto adolescent sees no future to derail, no hope for a tomorrow very different from
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today” (p. 93). A police precinct commander stated it thus “if you have nothing, what do you
have to lose” and added “If I thought I would be dead in five years, why would I be planning for
retirement?” His comments addressed a hopeless that occurred for those without viable
prospects and reflected an understanding of why neighborhood males were not afraid of
violence, they had nothing to live for.
Daneta’s comments reflected an understanding of this reality. She was a single mother
trying to raise her son, whose father had succumbed to the Keeping It Real subculture. She had
chosen to break up with him and was now dating another young man who sat on the porch
nursing a bullet wound received in a Hollygrove altercation. Her understanding of the future of
neighborhood youth reflected the police commander’s, “it’s just nothing to do here, it’s just the
same old thing every day,” adding “they feel like they don’t have anything to live for” and “they
have no money every day and they doin’ the same thing every day and they parents don’t want to
do anything so how could you expect them to do, to change?” She expressed the deep
hopelessness that was also reflected in the words of one 20-something male “they out here with
no ambitions, they don’t know, they not planning for nothing, they don’t have no goals in life.”
Charles explained the thinking of those with no future, saying “their mentality is, you know, I’m
going to get everything and get it now because they don’t have anything to look forward to.”
With minimal future options outside of the neighborhood, they are limited to being “outchere”
and to live by the rules of Keeping It Real, thus becoming agents of their own destruction.

This Crazy Code of Honor: The Rules of “Keeping It Real”
Life in the Keeping It Real subculture was lived by well-defined rules, what one highraking police official described as “this crazy code of honor.” Anderson (1999) found that these
rules “prescribe both proper comportment and the proper way to respond if challenged” (p. 33).
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Although most respondents acknowledged that these rules ran counter to prosocial values,
residents understood that awareness of the rules were important “in order to enable them to
negotiate the inner-city environment” (Anderson, 1999, p. 33). The residents of Hollygrove
delineated 14 rules of the Keeping It Real subculture, which were grouped in this section under
the categories of Being Hard, Not Snitching on Others, Maintaining Respect, Protecting Turf,
and Prohibitions against Violence toward Whites.
Martin and Daneta explained Keeping It Real through two lenses, the street definition and
their personal definition. These were excellent examples of how many residents negotiate the
complicated interplay of publicly displayed street values and privately held prosocial values.
Martin was raised in a family of Jehovah’s Witnesses, with a strong, prosocial value-orientation.
Although he considered his religion important, his desire to be a rap artist and his occasional
forays into drug dealing had led to his involvement in the neighborhood street life something he
considered to be a mistake. When asked to describe what it meant to keep it real he responded,
“Real, real is mean, you bout yours, this is the street, the street Ebonics term, you real, you bout
yours, you follow a code, you don’t snitch, you don’t break the rules, you ain’t gonna let nobody
play you or punk you.” Martin recognized the codified nature of the subculture and its
importance to survival on the streets of Hollygrove. He also expressed the divergence between
his personal values and the street’s when he added a caveat, “real, to me, my definition, being
real, as I said, being yourself, that’s the most realest thing you can be, why try to lie, especially
to yourself?”
Daneta expressed a similar conflict between the street culture and prosocial values. In
this exchange she compared “white folks” values, or prosocial values, as contrasted to the values
of the subculture:
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D: Like we learn a lot from, well I guess the white folks, I don’t want to say it like that
but we can learn a lot from them too, you know, because they see things differently
versus the way we see stuff. We just want to be real and what’s being real? Being real is
holding a gun in our hands every day, walking up the street with a stack of money that I
made off selling whatever I just sold to a person, you know, but that’s not how it’s
supposed to go. Like that gets you fast money and quick money but as far as when
somebody putting a book in front of your face you can’t read it. And you know, what’s
the point in you don’t even know, you know, well it’s just (pauses)
K: What is, you just mentioned something several other people have mentioned, being
real.
`

D: Being real
K: What does it mean to be real?
D: Well to us, being real, being real is just, I guess, being hard, you know, like walking
with your chest up. That’s like being real like having people with fear in their hearts
when they see you. That’s being real. Well that’s their definition of being real versus
what real is really is (pauses)
K: Who’s definition?
D: to me, being real is a person that’s loyal, being true to yourself, knowing, you know,
being true to yourself, you know, that’s what being real is, being yourself.

As they explained the rules of the subculture both Martin and Daneta presented alternative
definitions for Keeping It Real. These ambivalent definitions showed how community residents
negotiated between the subcultural and prosocial values, understanding the rules of the
community while simultaneously recognizing the primacy of dominant societal definitions.
Both Martin and Daneta also pointed to the importance of being hard or being able to
show a calloused, bold exterior to others, the first rules category. Others expressed this rule in
terms of violence and gun-ownership. The 20-something males recognized that “you either real
or you fake and you got to show that,” implying that acts of strength must be enacted in order to
prove realness, something they understood to happen when one was “willing to shed blood from
somebody” or, as Martin stated, “if you talk like you bout that, make sure you be bout that and
you can back it up.” Daneta added that backing it up meant “walking around every day with a
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gun feeling like they have power over your life,” or as she stated in the previous paragraph,
“holding a gun in our hands every day.” It also meant being willing to use the gun, as the 20somethings suggested, “being willing to shed blood,” or as a former resident now in a politicallyappointed office put it “if you interfere with me then therefore, it’s better for me to take you out
than to talk to you.” These younger residents were opining that the subcultural rule of being hard
was often accompanied by a weapon and a willingness to use it.
Related to personal toughness was the prohibition against being involved in others’
business. In Hollygrove’s subculture talking about others’ issues, especially to agents of formal
control, was tantamount to personal weakness. For Martin strength was shown by being “bout
yours,” or not getting involved in others’ skirmishes, a part of the street code that Anderson
(1999) phrased as “see but don’t see” (p. 133). This was most prevalent in the rule that snitching
or ratting on others was a major subcultural code violation. Ernest, the neighborhood
entrepreneur told me that “in this culture nobody’s gonna tell.” Brandon Aggison’s killer,
although known to people in the community, was never apprehended because of the prohibition
against snitching. This rule was especially challenging for the police department who had
difficulty finding information leading to an arrest.
The district commander connected this prohibition to the community’s collective
efficacy when he contrasted an arrestee’s response as opposed to the community’s, “it’s not the
criminals not snitching on each other cause guess what? Once they get caught, you know what
they doing? They snitching. It’s the citizens that live in the neighborhood that get caught up in
that.” There was good reason for this; violating the rule resulted in reprisal, often violence
against the person who told or their families. The commander noted, “by this crazy code of
honor you have to avenge that with some type of violence.” Tameka affirmed this statement
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when she stated, “whoever committed the crime is gonna find out and they’re gonna come back
and get me,” as did William when he said “most people that rat are looking to get killed.”
Residents noted that these threats extended to the family of the informer, causing even more
community anxiety. Martin told me that “people still kill people’s families because, you know,
you rat” and “if they can’t kill me they’re going to go to the next person that’s close to me,”
while Caroline, whose mother was in prison for murder and whose boyfriend was shot in the
head over turf issues, added “someone in the family doing that and they go and be looking for
the person and kill ‘em all.” The threat of retaliation posed a challenge to neighborhood
collective efficacy; minding one’s business and keeping silent fostered an environment where
violence was unchecked.
Failing to mind one’s own business was related to the third set of rules in Hollygrove’s
subculture, don’t show disrespect. Kubrin (2005) noted “disrespect can come in a variety of
flavors include disrespect by testing or challenging someone, disrespect through victimizing—
usually robbing—someone, and disrespect by snitching” (p. 373). One community leader
connected the desire for respect to its roots in the nation’s history of slavery, connecting it to
“taking away black mans’ dignity” and unhealed wounds from the past. Others implied it was
rooted in shame that came from living in what was considered to be a ghetto neighborhood.
Tamesha described coming home from her elite public school with a white classmate and being
concerned with what the classmate would think, “I didn’t want her to feel like she was going into
a bad neighborhood…I kinda avoided saying Hollygrove so she wouldn’t feel unsafe.”
Anderson (1999) writes “Many inner-city young men in particular crave respect to such a degree
that they will risk their lives to attain and maintain it” (p. 76). Charles illustrated this by saying
residents had to “be very careful with what you say to people, you have to be careful how you
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look at people” implying that using the wrong word or wrong look could be interpreted as
disrespect and may be met with violence.
Another term for respect was General Principle, or G.P., which Ernest described in the
following vignette:
Guy said he had gotten into a dice game with phony money. And the other guy lost his
money, George lost his money. George didn’t know whether it was true but some guys
on the corner by the store, “Aw, dude took all your money and had fake $100 bills, he
didn’t even have real money. You gonna let him play you like that George? Huh, bruh?”
“Man, he ain’t gonna play me like that, no uh unh, where he at?”
“He around there by his house now.” They just bucking him up, just to get some activity
stirred up, just for some entertainment. And George took this thing so serious, George
went around there, “Man, where my money at, bruh?”
Boy talking about, “What is you talking about?”
“Man, uh uh, you played me out there, you had a phony $100 bill.”
And so the boy said, “I ain’t got no money, man, go ahead on George, you be tripping.”
Cause he knew him real good, see him every day, they was born there together, raised up,
Dunbar together, you know?
And uh, the boy’s grandmother was sitting on the porch, she said, “Oh no, please don’t
kill my grandson, no, no.” And she was saying about he owed a hundred dollars, the lady
ran inside and got $200, tried to give it to him. So he had $200. “Please don’t kill my
grandson.”
George turned to that woman and told her, “I’m sorry, I gotta do it. It’s G.P.”
Ernest’s narrative described two respect principles: don’t play people, or make them appear
foolish and don’t mess with others’ money, both being reasons to enact G.P.
Charles related a story from his drug dealing days when somebody took his money but
didn’t give him product in exchange. For Charles to save face in the community he felt
compelled to retaliate, “so finally I caught him and when I caught him he went to running and I
grabbed him, knocked him down and I pulled a pistol on him” adding “I was going to shoot him
too, Kevin, ‘cause he had put me in a bad spot.” Both Ernest and Charles illustrated the danger
123

residents faced when they showed disrespect; dishonor must be met with violence in order to
restore the honor lost in the exchange. Langston, a wiry young man who lived equidistant
between two neighborhood crime hotspots, summed up the concept by saying “they wanna take
your life ‘cause they figure if you disrespect them, your life need to be taken.”
Respect extended beyond interpersonal boundaries to spatial boundaries and presaged a
fourth rule of the subculture: respect for turf. Jenks (2005) defined turf as “sites or spaces
wrested from the constraints of capitalism and the dominant order” and “geographical metaphors
such as ‘turf’, ‘territory’, ‘terrain’ and ‘space’ and the boundaries, which enable entry or
exclusion, [which] are marked out by language and style” (p. 119). There were two sets of
boundaries to be respected in Hollygrove: the neighborhood as a whole and those of individual
players who carve out a portion of the community, such as a corner or a block, as their personal
turf.
In Hollygrove these contested spaces were prone to violent conflict between parties
competing for control of them. The 20-something males described neighborhood turf challenges
this way, “Street real is, man we from the 3rd ward, they from the 17th, we don’t like them, let’s
go air it out, that’s street real,” where airing it out meant shooting. One example of a turf
violation was dating women from a ward other than one’s own. Charles described a shooting
that occurred when young men from another neighborhood attempted to date women from
Hollygrove:
Mainly it was behind a female, it’s really pretty much what started it. But if you in there
from another neighborhood messin’ with the girls from back here, and then the guys that
live back here, they’re like, “Well what you doing back here talking to our girls?” That’s
how they justify it. Shouldn’t have been back here, this is not your area, shouldn’t be
back here at all.
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In addition to delineating the neighborhood as turf there were individuals who carved out
personal turf inside the neighborhood. Caroline’s boyfriend was shot when he returned from jail
and tried to re-establish his turf where he was selling drugs. In this exchange she describes his
murder:
C: This was after Katrina. He end up getting shot over drugs. He was selling drugs and
end up, he was in jail for a while and came out and went back to the same place. People
killed him.
K: Why did they kill him?
C: Over territory, he was going, I guess selling, trying to sell on the same block he was
selling at and other people had already took over when he was gone. So he came back
and then now you’re trying to get your spot back and these totally new people, probably
moved in the neighborhood, you know?
Individual turf extends to women as well. Langston related his understanding of this turf rule:
Like, if you like girls now, people being shot over females, like if you talk to someone
girl now. A guy actually got shot in front of a girl from talkin’ about a guy girlfriend.
Like he was, she was talkin’ to him, and the guy was like tryin’ to get her number, but
she did not tell him that she had a boyfriend. Like the guy just walked up to him, like
pulled a gun on him for no reason.”
Violations of turf, whether they be ward boundaries, drug sales territory, or women were
considered to be personal affronts and thus were to be met with violence to re-establish honor.
A final rule expressed in the data regarded race: don’t mess with white people. This rule,
perhaps more than the others, helped explain why most homicide in New Orleans was black-onblack in nature. Residents perceived whites to have formal control on their side which meant the
consequences for perpetrating interracial violence would be met with greater sanctions. Charles
reflected on this disparity as he discussed the roots of the rule, “they still have that mentality the
White man that’s who, you don’t back talk ‘em, you do what they say do and if you go along
with them you have a better life. You don’t buck the system.” He saw whites as sources of jobs
and money and thus as untouchable. The result, according to one of the community leaders, was
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the understanding that “if I go messing with white folks I’m going to be in trouble, I’m going to
get caught. They feel like they can shoot somebody on the corner and they have it on video and I
might get away with this, though.” This rule limited violence to the boundaries of the
neighborhood. This finding was consistent with Anderson’s (1999) who wrote:
In the inner-city community there is a generalized belief that the police simply do not
care about black people, that when a crime is committed in the black community, little
notice will be taken. If a black man shoots another black man, the incident will not be
thoroughly investigated. A double standard of justice is thought to exist: on for black
people, and one for whites. This distrust is fueled by the lawlessness that is observed on
the local streets of the community, most notably in the prevalence of functional crack
houses. Residents often note that such people and places would not be allowed to operate
in the white community. Such observations reinforce people’s belief that they are on
their own, and this attitude has crucial implications for the code of the street” (p. 321).
The knowledge that laws were enforced in ways biased toward whites had strong implications
for understanding lethal violence in Hollygrove. The prohibition against killing whites played a
strong role in limiting murder to the neighborhood.

Being a Hood Star: Status in the Keeping It Real Subculture
As with mainstream society, there were strata within the Keeping It Real subculture. At
one end of the spectrum were those who gave grudging respect to the rules of the subculture for
the sake of survival on the streets. The opposite pole consisted of what Martin termed “Ultravultures” those he described as “hard core exterior, don’t have no heart.” Ultra-vultures were
those who garnered the respect of others in the subculture through exhibitions of strength and
violence, what Anderson (1999) termed ‘juice’. In the following exchange the 20-something
males described the importance of status to those deeply embedded in the Keeping It Real
subculture:
M1:

it’s always about status
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M2:

Oh I just put on, I just put on Instagram, I just put on Instagram, oh, I forgot how I
worded it.

M3:

Becoming a Hood Star.

K:

Hood Star?

M2:

Hood Star. Meaning you a star in the neighborhood.

M1:

Man you like a basketball player round here.

M2:

Basically when you a hood star it’s not just being popular, you like Lil Wayne
back here, everybody love you and know you.

The Hood Star was the epitome of popularity something they compared with superstardom akin
to Lil Wayne, the nationally-recognized, platinum recording artist from Hollygrove. One of the
20-somethings described the pathway to becoming a Hood Star, “they want to be killers and they
want to be gangsters and that, they want to be that because they know they can’t be nothing else.
And the only way to get status and to be real popular in this city is to do that.” Langston, also in
his 20s, thought that a reputation for being a Hood Star must be earned through violence, “The
reputation of being dangerous is like I’m tryin’ to get my reps up. They tryin’ to get they reps
up, they’re trying to be the big dog in the neighborhood.” Daneta connected the violence to
power and respect, “once they have that power, the neighborhood gonna respect them.” Being a
Hood Star, therefore, required garnering power and respect via a reputation for being dangerous.
Rewards were associated with being a Hood Star. The first was a sense of pride, as stated
by Kobe who connected personal worth to the ability to survive violence, “the people that I’ve
like, that I’ve known that have been shot all, like, I don’t know, for to me it seems like they got,
they gain a sense of pride after being shot.” One of the 20-something focus group members
connected popularity with women to being a Hood Star, “they [women] only want to mess with
the dudes known in the city from killing and robbing people.” Others saw financial rewards
connected to neighborhood stardom, as one of the 20-somethings explained the perspective to
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me: “I want to get all the money so I could let people know I’m the only one with money and I
got that status.” Arianne echoed their words, “they trying to hustle and sell drugs and come up
and be millionaires.”
Becoming a Hood Star, in rare exceptions, could occur without violence. Ernest told me
“I was one of the only heads of the hood that wasn’t a drug dealer or gangster.” He earned his
status in the neighborhood by working with the emerging rap artists and their record labels,
printing shirts and selling them at their concerts.
Hood Star status was conflicted; some in the community did not recognize it while others
competed for it. The power that came from being a Hood Star was not universally accepted as
being positive as expressed by Dr. T who told me it is a “false sense of authority.” It also came
with a cost, an increased likelihood that one would experience lethal violence; Martin noted that
such popularity meant their names “will ring a bell, why, because I’m such a hot topic I mean,
and I didn’t have to say it. Somebody might kill me behind something like that.” Many of the
elders of the neighborhood thought the power and popularity of Hood Stars was illegitimate,
while the younger residents were able to see the limitations of this popularity.
Bourgois (2010), describing the struggle for personal respect of crack dealers in New
York, contended they “have not passively accepted their structural victimization. On the
contrary, by embroiling themselves in the underground economy and proudly embracing street
culture, they are seeking an alternative to their social marginalization” (p. 143). Those limited
structurally from advancing in society, whose lives were restricted to the boundaries of
Hollygrove, translated their marginality into respect via a reputation for violence. The reputation
carried both rewards, women, money, power and status, and concomitant consequences, the
increased likelihood that one might lose their live as others strived to replace them. Respect,
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therefore, in Hollygrove’s Keeping It Real subculture was both a powerful motivating force for
those stuck in the neighborhood but also a cause of lethality in the neighborhood.

You Don’t Have No Other Way: Succumbing to the Keeping It Real Subculture
The Keeping It Real subculture could be alluring, especially for those with limited
options outside of the neighborhood. The push of structural limitations outside of the
neighborhood and the pull of the subculture’s status within combined to draw those who were
marginalized into a position of choosing street versus conventional values. The data addressed
three factors leading one to prioritize Keeping It Real over prosocial values: limited options
elsewhere, a sympathetic view by those in the neighborhood, and the lack of prosocial mentors
who could potentially facilitate other choices.
A former police commander commented upon the options for those in the neighborhood,
“I’m 19 years old and I look out in front of me and I don’t see a whole lot and when the options
come for me to make something hard and fast, I’m gonna do it.” This could be intensified by
limitations of cultural capital outside the neighborhood, as explained by an official in the
Mayor’s office:
Networks only extend so far, so if in a high poverty area you’re also less likely to have
access to personal transportation, more reliant on public, then most of your life is
probably lived in a small geographic area. That said, your network and the individuals
with whom you might have conflict probably also going to be in that neighborhood so
now it’s largely, it’s self-perpetuating characteristics of the neighborhood that keep the
conflicts.
Limited options and constricted networks were further enhanced by personal fears such as this
one as expressed by Daneta, “they feel like, I guess, being successful and opening their minds to
other things, they’re scared of that, you know?” The neighborhood became a zone of comfort in
the face of perceived hostility elsewhere. William noted “once you’re in your comfort zone and
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you’re not getting caught, you’re not going to jail but you’re having this money so you buy these
tennis shoes and impress your friends or your cousins or whoever, I mean you’re bound to stick
with that code.” Bound by limitations and personal fear, some residents found comfort in the
street life where the rules were clearer and paths to success were more legible and easily
understood.
Many Hollygrove residents understood these realities and expressed sympathy for those
entrapped. The 20-something males, conflicted themselves about which set of values to follow,
felt a certain kinship with the members of the subculture, suggesting “you from that
neighborhood, you can’t judge them,” and “I grew up with you, like I don’t look at you as a bad
person.” This sympathy extended beyond the youth; Angela, a senior citizen, had a son who was
caught in the subculture and explained her understanding of his dilemma this way, “Of course
you cared about your family for the most part and your friends cause if one of your friends got
something happened, you were there to help fight the battle,” a recognition of the alluring
camaraderie that existed between those who chose the Keeping It Real subculture. Dr. T also
expressed a compassionate understanding of this solidarity as he stated “it’s love, it’s trust, it’s
that comradery that they have with their fellow brothers or gang members or whatever.”
The fellowship experienced was enticing for those experiencing societal marginalization.
Langston shared his desire to be part of the in-group during his adolescence, “So as I was
growin’ up, that’s what—all I wanted to do was to hang out with the older guys—the big, tough,
bad guys that was selling drugs.” Although Kobe had largely escaped entanglement in the street
subculture by leaving the neighborhood to attend a university in Mississippi, he also expressed
an understanding of the desire to belong, “they like to look up to the drug dealers or the
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gangsters or whoever is around the neighborhood, so if you want to be looked at as cool in their
eyes then you gotta, you know, you gotta do the things they do.”
Despite the compassionate understanding of those who chose the lifestyle, however, there
was still recognition that violence accompanied it, something William acknowledged, “Selling
drugs, hanging out, you know [they] wanna be, you know, a part of what’s going on. I mean,
that’s the real reasons, you know, violence takes place.” Most people in the neighborhood were
bound by the same limitations, resulting in an empathy for those who opt for the Keeping It Real
lifestyle. As was seen in the values chapter, however, that understanding did not extend to
condoning the accompanying behavioral choices, especially the violence.
William’s previous comment led to a third factor pushing some to succumb to the
subculture, a dearth of prosocial mentors. Eldridge contrasted the impact of his parents upon his
choices with those who lacked positive influences by saying “these young guys, they don’t have
any guidance.” He noted:
People like always talk about male role models but that really is like a big problem. I
mean, you might not think about it, you know, if you had male role models in your life,
but if you haven’t and you look at those people some of those people their lives are
changed because of that. They gonna look up to the next person who happens to be male
who might be doing negative things out there. They might be, they might not sell drugs
in their face, but you know you might see them pass by in a nice car, they might act a
certain way, you know, they might have a certain demeanor about them and then the kids
who don’t have that in their life they might emulate that and the next thing you know
they on the road to doing what that person does and that person might be a drug dealer or
a murder or you know anything.
Langston connected the lack of parental guidance with the choice to commit violence:
Like their dad not in their lives to teach them how to, you know, fist fight or, you know,
get along with someone. So now, it’s since my dad’s not here for me, you not gonna be
here on this earth because all I know is guns now. So if I’ve never been taught how to
respect someone, now all I know about is guns ‘cause that’s what I’ve been growin’ up
with these years all my life. So that’s what they know about now is just guns.
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To Dr. T the lack of prosocial mentors caused the subcultural worldview to become normative, at
which point street values were “just kind of ingrained into them like, well this is just how we,
just how we supposed to grow up.”
Faced with limited options outside the neighborhood, a sympathetic community that
understands the realities faced by those in the subculture, and the lack of mentors to create
bridges to resources outside of the community, the choice to succumb was understandable. As
one’s network became increasingly constricted to the neighborhood the draw to the lifestyle of
the streets became stronger and one’s choices increasingly reflected the available mentors,
despite personal views of the primacy of prosocial values. In spite of this attraction, some
actively resisted the pull. Such resistance comprises the next section of this chapter.

If You Got Beef, Put It on the Grill: Resisting the Keeping It Real Subculture
Those who resisted the subculture had sources of social capital both within and beyond
the neighborhood. Kobe provided an excellent example. Although his family was deeply
immersed in the subculture, he refused to succumb, choosing sports, religious life and academia
as substitutes. Because of his social skills he was able to use available resources, like his
connection to the local community center, to enhance his resistance. In his interview Kobe
contrasted the 1960s and 1970s Afrocentric power movement to the Keeping It Real subculture:
Now that’s not even the case anymore, it’s like, “Alright, if I don’t like this person then
I’m gonna shoot him.” If I have a problem with you because of something you said to
me, because of something you did, I’m gonna take your life. That’s like the worst thing
you could possibly do to be a black man. I don’t know somewhere down the line
someone received the wrong information because now it’s like no more like a Black
Power thing, to stand up together, united, like Dr. King, Million Man March and all that.
It’s like, “I’ll shoot you and kill you,” you know? You don’t see him as your brother
anymore, you see him as someone who’s opposed to you. It’s so corrupt and negative
now that I don’t even understand to be honest, it’s crazy.
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Kobe was able to take a resistive stance, observing the subculture through outside cultural lenses
rooted in his enhanced social capital. This allowed him to situate it in light of broader social
movements. Others in the neighborhood expressed resistance in three ways: an appreciation for
life and prosocial values instilled by family, a future-orientation, and via an understanding of
collective efficacy.
Dr. T, a physician, had opportunities to practice medicine within the prison system. His
value for life emanated from two sources, his allegiance to the Hippocratic Oath and from his
religious training as he pursued a Ph.D. in Theology. He expressed it thus, “you have one life to
live, it’s an important life, it’s the only one you’re going to get.” Martin, the 20-something
rapper, situated his appreciation for life in a family context, “I don’t want my mother to bury me
and she be in that front pew, shot and killed by a gunshot wound. I want to live.” He exhibited
ambivalence for the subculture because he had one foot in each world, even making an
appearance in the aforementioned music video celebrating the subculture. His ability to express
resistance came from his family’s influence, something that many felt was an underlying source
of strength for resistance.
Charles indicated that resisters needed “someone in their home that would instill in them
the belief that you can be anything you wanna be if you excel and push yourself.” One way
parents did this is by restricting their children’s ability to roam the streets of Hollygrove. A
community leader noted “they literally keep their kids in the house all day long,” and Kobe,
reminiscing of his own upbringing, said of his mother, “she doesn’t like me walking around the
neighborhood doing anything.” Others sought ways to remove their kids from the neighborhood
entirely, hoping for a safer place to raise them elsewhere. Daneta, a single mother told me, “I
don’t want to feel like they running us away with this gang violence, but then again it makes you
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wanna run away when you have little infants and kids to raise, knowing that they can grow up
and, you know, be the way that they are and that’s the main reason why I’d rather get my kids
out of the neighborhood.” Most allowed their children to be active in the community while
watching them closely, like one community leader who related his fear for his young, adolescent
son:
I’m concerned about like kids I don’t know, like Jerome (name has been changed) is
getting to an age where you know he wants to walk up to CVS now and he wants to walk
over here to the center and I don’t, I let him do it but I tell you it’s one of my biggest
fears. I mean I know a lot of kids in the neighborhood but I see a lot of kids in the
neighborhood that I just don’t know. I always see a group of boys that I just never seen
before and I’m like what’s going to happen to my son walking up, you know, and it could
be that wrong group of boys. So I fear it but I still let him go.
Parents who instilled prosocial values were only half of the equation; their children must
also decide which code to follow. Eldridge noted, “if we have more people that value a home
life, as opposed to a street life, eventually one is gonna outnumber the other.” Interviews data
demonstrated that parents were actively trying to instill resistance to the subculture in their
children through a variety of means, while hoping their children internalized their worldview and
appreciation for life.
Many recognized a conflict between the live-for-the moment view of those in the
subculture and the ability to envision a positive future. Kobe expressed it this way:
So initially a lot of kids is going in the wrong direction just because they want to fit in
and the other ones, there might be one or two that you might see around the
neighborhood, they’re uh, just strong, mentally strong, they can understand that, all right
if I don’t do this something good might happen in the future, so that’s how I was, you
know? I never wanted to do drugs because I was like, I might not be looked at as like the
popular kid or that cool kid in the neighborhood but I could make up for it by whatever
comes next.
He chalked up his resistance to mental strength and a willingness to sacrifice short-term status
for long-term success. One of the 20-somethings, struggling to emerge from the street
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subculture, shared Kobe’s view, noting resistance meant “you gotta tell yourself I don’t want to
be a product of my neighborhood.” Martin’s future-orientation stemmed from his understanding
of the consequences for those who choose the Keeping It Real subculture:
I actually want a career, I don’t want to be one of these people out on the street because
everybody want to claim, “Oh, I’m a real member or, I’m a real blank this, I’m a real
blank that,” like I told you yesterday, man, everybody wants to be this or that, be yourself
it gets you farther in the long run. Real niggers, excuse my language once again, don’t
get that far. Name one real one of them who’s either alive right now, they either dead,
they either in jail or they dead.
Even those within the subculture, according to two 20-somethings, desired a way out as seen in
this interchange:
M1: and I guarantee, if you would sit out and talk to some of those dudes, I guarantee
they want to put their gun down, they just can’t.
M2: Oh, and Mr. Kevin, you really want perspective on violence, go talk to one of those
crazy, ignorant dudes who ain’t got no hope, ain’t got no future, like they’ll tell you…
The first of these two voices proposed that even those deeply embedded in the subculture had a
desire to leave it while the second voice in the exchange expressed why it is so difficult to
choose to resist, the lack of a future-orientation. Given limited prospects outside of the
boundaries of the neighborhood, those in the subculture found it difficult to envision a hopeful
future, choosing instead to live for the moment.
A third focus of those who resisted was a faith in collective efficacy. As suggested by
Kobe’s monologue about the unity of the black power movements, some resisters understood the
importance of neighborhood unity in light of positive racial consciousness, working together to
project a positive view of a black neighborhood. Charles also evoked the black consciousness
movements of the past when he stated “this new generation they don’t wanna do nothing. I mean
they just don’t. Martin Luther King must be turning over in his grave, man.” These voices noted
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the gains made by African Americans which they felt were being undone by the Keeping It Real
subculture. Ernest viewed efficacy through an ecological lens, noting:
I look at Hollygrove as being stagnated, almost to a point, you know what I’m saying, so
to where there’s literally dying, even though you see progress. I think Hollygrove should
have, the Hollygrove that I’ve seen when I was a kid, should be a greater place than what
it is now. So in order for it to happen like that, somewhere stagnation need to come in
there and nothing just grew and nothing, the community is a living environment so it’s
either got to be growing or dying.
His solution to stagnation was a series of events in the community where people are taught to
“say no to that culture,” via the transmission of prosocial values by community leaders. Martin
viewed efficacy through the lens of the “street beef,” a more grassroots perspective adding
“we’re all the same hood, we should be united as one and all this beef this, beef that, if you got
beef put it on the grill, you know, because life is too short.” The collective efficacy view of
resistance had garnered support as the community experienced an upsurge in social capital in
recent years. John, a neighborhood senior active in neighborhood improvement efforts, noted,
“misconceptions are only corrected if you put the truth on ‘em. So it’s gonna take a while, but as
long as we maintain the commitment of the neighborhood, ‘cause it took a neighborhood
commitment to get this thing done.” From this perspective resistance could be facilitated when
those who desired a safer community worked together for the well-being of the community,
using collective efficacy to push back the growing involvement of youth in the Keeping It Real
subculture.

Summary
Duneier (1994) wrote “human beings desire to participate in a world that validates their
own images of self-worth” (p. 109). In a society that invalidates those on the economic and
social margins, alternate pathways to self-worth must be created. The “Keeping It Real”
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subculture was one of those pathways. Within its rules those who experienced what Wacquant
(2008) termed advanced marginality, which resulted from sociospatial isolation and exclusion
endemic to advanced capitalism, could climb a social hierarchy to become a Hood Star. The
empathic feelings of the community expressed for those in the subculture implied that many
were able to understand this reality, even while eschewing the violence and disorganization that
accompanied it.
Even those embedded in the Keeping It Real subculture often privately embraced the
supremacy of prosocial values. Given the opportunity for economic and social advancement via
conventional means, they would choose it. Those who could both learn and exercise the
“cultural capital” of Bourgois (2010) or to “code-switch” between prosocial and street values
(Anderson, 1999) may be able to appropriate these opportunities, as have Kobe and Tamesha.
Those who could not became stuck in the subculture, “outchere,” with few options for
advancement but through the pathway of the Keeping It Real subculture, may find themselves
alienated from others within and without the community who structure their lives around
prosocial values.
The conflict within the community between the Keeping It Real subculture and the
prosocial values of the old-timers had created a new dialectic in the years since Katrina.
Advanced marginality gave rise to a subculture oppositional to prosocial values and provided an
alluring alternative for some who experienced exclusion by a dominant society perceived to
enforce these values. Yet this subculture was also threatening to those in the community
espousing prosocial values, as both its defiance of prosocial values and its practices further
isolated Hollygrove, undoing gains made during the Black power movements of the 1960s and
1970s. During the post-Katrina years the community experienced enhanced political and social
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capital as resident efforts to rebuild the community embraced the help offered by outsiders:
organizations both inside and outside Hollygrove, the City Councilperson, and agents of formal
control such as the New Orleans Police Department. The result was a power shift away from the
subcultural codes and toward the prosocial values expressed by those opposed to them. This
shift signaled newfound collective efficacy. The resulting empowerment served to reduce legal
cynicism and allowed those espousing prosocial values to challenge to the more destructive
elements of the subculture. One of the key battlefronts was the violence and disorder associated
with drugs, the subject of the next chapter.
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Chapter 8: Findings
What Prompts People to Kill is Drugs: The Connections between Violence and Drugs

Hollygrove’s Keeping It Real subculture and its accompanying violence was considered
by many in the study to be closely related to the illicit, underground economy. A major theme
running through the interviews with Hollygrove residents was the perception that the use and
sale of illegal substances was the major cause of neighborhood violence, especially homicide.
Although there were other parts of the underground economy that were not violent, such as lawn
care, unlicensed day care providers, and shade tree mechanics, these were not mentioned by
residents as causes for neighborhood violence.
At the same time many recognized that the inability to participate in the formal economy
drove some into the illicit marketplace. Tameka, an African American homeowner in her mid40’s, expressed these twin sentiments as she considered the cause of neighborhood homicide:
I think what prompts people to kill is drugs. Poverty, along with that goes
unemployment. Sometimes it’s just people trying to feed their families, you know, “I
gotta rob because I need to feed my kids. I don’t have any money, I don’t have a job.”
Sometimes it’s a guy on drugs that’s trying to get jobs and he doesn’t have any money
and he doesn’t have a job. He can’t hold a job ‘cause he’s on drugs. So he’s robbing
somebody and in the process he might kill the person because the person either fought
back or just happenstance.
Her statement reflected the empathy felt by a middle-class neighbor for those that were
‘outchere’ struggling against limitations and exercising desperate choices. A dearth of jobs
coupled with role models who have achieved success in the illicit economy presented an
alternative pathway to financial accomplishment. Despite personal values that proscribed drugdealing, some saw little alternative to participation in this marketplace.
Wilson (1997) described the urban conditions that pushed some Hollygrove residents into
the illicit economy:
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Neighborhoods that offer few legitimate employment opportunities, inadequate job
information networks, and poor schools lead to the disappearance of work. That is,
where jobs are scarce, where people rarely, if ever, have the opportunity to help their
friends and neighbors find jobs, and where there is a disruptive or degraded school life
purporting to prepare youngsters for eventual participation in the workforce, many people
eventually lose their feeling of connectedness to work in the formal economy; they no
longer expect work to be a regular, and regulating, force in their lives. In the case of
young people, they may grow up in an environment that lacks the idea of work as a
central experience of adult life—they have little or no labor-force attachment. These
circumstances also increase the likelihood that the residents will rely on illegitimate
sources of income, thereby further weakening their attachment to the legitimate labor
market (pp. 52-53).
Neighborhoods like Hollygrove developed underground economies to survive when residents
lacked skills required to gain and maintain employment in a complex formal economy.
Venkatesh (2006), chronicling the economic life of an inner-city Chicago neighborhood,
concluded: “The demands of the ghetto require an economy utterly different from what most of
America can imagine” (p. 4). The informal economy that he described was a shadow of the
formal marketplace with rules and controls that would be largely unrecognizable to those who
did not live in neighborhoods like Hollygrove. Those that do harbored mixed feelings toward it,
empathy for those that participated and discomfort from the violence that resulted.
Four key themes emerged from the data regarding the interplay of drugs and violence.
The first of these delineated the community’s understanding of the connections between drugs
and violence. The second addressed hotspots for violence which many understood to be
alcoholic beverage outlets (ABOs) including bars and corner grocery stores. A third theme
tackled the economics of violence and included resident recognition of the necessity of the
underground economy and the perceived allure of easy money. The final section concerned
participants’ views of formal and informal controls in the efforts to reclaim the neighborhood
from the violence related to the sale of illegal substances.
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It All Started with Drugs: Drug-Related Violence in Hollygrove
On July 30, 2015 a shooting occurred in Hollygrove. Three days later I would interview
Robert who described his interaction with the shooter before it occurred:
I turned onto Forshey Street and I looked at the dude that did the shooting. I seen him. I
haven’t seen him in years because he been in New York. He’s a longshore seaman in
New York. He make good money. He’s just down here visiting. I jump out the car. I
go, “What’s happening? Holler at him, blah, blah, blah. Later on that day or that night,
well the next morning, I’m sorry, I see the news. Said there was a shooting on Forshey
Street like right where I was at. And I’m looking on Facebook, the dude wanted for it is
the dude I jumped out the car and went and hollered at. And they said it was behind
$5.00.
Robert would later tell me that, like many of the shootings in the neighborhood, it was drugrelated. The relatively minor debt of $5.00 that led to the shooting was shocking even to Robert,
a veteran of Hollygrove’s underground drug economy.
Drug-related violence has been a pervasive feature of life in Hollygrove. Every
interviewee, whether they were public officials, senior citizens or younger males, made this
connection. Most understood it to be the primary cause of homicide in the community.
Furthermore, the violence was not limited to those directly involved in the drug deals. Three
respondents made comments similar to Caroline who said “a bullet ain’t got no name on it,”
noting that unintended victims can die when shootings occur. To understand homicide in
Hollygrove one must recognize the role of the illicit economy in neighborhood violence.
A former high-ranking police official, explaining the connection between homicide and
drugs, summed it up this way:
You can think about it one of three ways. If I’m buying or selling narcotics, I have to
protect my business, which can result in violence. If I’m using narcotics, I usually make
a lot of poor choices on a lot of levels that can also lead to violence. And if I’m not using
it and I want to break in, if I’m not the main guy and I want to break in, then I’m willing
to use violence.
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Expanding upon this understanding a current district commander echoed the words of Wilson
quoted earlier in the chapter to explain why young black men murder other young black men:
I think it’s if you are a young, a young black man now, and you don’t have the job skills,
if you’ve come out of a school system…and if you see that you get involved in this
narcotics trade, and that’s the easiest way to get money and if you don’t have the
education, if you’re not going to college, if you don’t have a trade, if you don’t have
either one of those things, what kind of job are you gonna do? You gonna be a
dishwasher, you gonna be in a minimum-wage job? You gonna be working, you know,
some kind of really—those jobs are tough, you know? And you’re gonna be working
nights, you’re gonna be working weekends. I think a lot of times people gravitate away
from those jobs and they go for the fast life of narcotic trafficking, and that narcotics
trafficking breeds violence.
The absence of livable-wage jobs available to those with limited skills created the necessity for
new economic pathways. As both Tameka and the commander noted, the current economic
climate was anathema to those without proper education or training, forcing the choice to be
destitute or pursue alternative means of income. This gave rise to an informal economy, a
marketplace regulated by the Keeping It Real subculture and its accompanying violence.
Drug-related activity in the neighborhood was cited by most as the main cause of
Hollygrove’s reputation as a violent community. Neighborhood seniors, those who lived in the
community before drug-related violence became common, had a perspective on the
neighborhood that predated Hollygrove’s violent reputation. During a focus group one
respondent connected drug sales to outsiders entering the community from public housing:
It all stems back to the problem with drugs. It all started with drugs. Now the
homeowners, most homeowners back here are senior citizens, but when like I said, broke
up the projects they moved the crime on us. They brought their criminal ways to the
neighborhood with them. They recruit the young people in the neighborhood. And then
when you can’t come up with my money and I got to pay back Mr. So and So’s money,
that’s where the problems started. That’s where the crime started…
At the other end of the age spectrum the 20-something males traced Hollygrove’s violence to the
1980s and the introduction of crack cocaine to the neighborhood. In this interchange two of them
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attempted to explain their understanding of how crack-related violence changed the
neighborhood dynamic:
M1:

That’s the beginning of it, they explained to you…

M2:

(interrupting) Once they took crack, once crack cocaine came, it had messed up a
lot of black communities.

M1:

The dude explained to you like before this we was doing this and doing that, they
was this fighting, then once this got into the neighborhood they started fighting to
rob you and that’s when people started robbing, started robbing with guns.

M2:

Yeah, you’re talking about the crackheads, like, when habits changed, at first
when they wanted the drug they might…

M1:

(interrupting) Like in the late 80s, early 90s, that little 10-, 12-year era was when
everything just sunk into this…

M2:

If you go up to any black man who’s really conscious of the problems that’s going
on in cities across the world, he’s going to name crack cocaine as one of the main
reasons.

Highly addictive and relatively inexpensive, crack cocaine played a role in neighborhood
violence, creating a highly lucrative market. Bourgois (2003) addressed the 1980’s advent of the
urban crack epidemic by concluding the drug “tapped directly into the entrepreneurial urge that
is such an integral facet of the American Dream” (p. 75). Neighborhoods like Hollygrove, he
noted, were economically and socially marginalized due to “the restructuring of the world
economy by multinational corporations, finance capital, and digital electronic technology, as
well as the exhaustion of social democratic models for public sector intervention on behalf of the
poor” (p. 319) which served to escalate inequality. In this context, concluded Anderson (1999),
“crack has become a seemingly permanent fixture of life, and dealing is a way to earn a living—
even, for a few, to become rich” (p. 121).
To Eldridge, crack was but a symptom of this neighborhood reality. He noted, “it’s not
just that it is crack but it’s so many other things, illegal money coming through the neighborhood
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and with illegal money comes guns ‘cause you have to have guns in order to protect your
money.” His comment pointed to an important insight, when formal controls do not support the
neighborhood economy other regulating mechanisms will.
Several of the interviewees had participated in this unregulated marketplace and
possessed insider knowledge important to understanding it. Charles was involved both as an
addict and as a dealer. He described Hollygrove’s violence from both perspectives:
Well gun violence, it devastates wherever it is. But here in Hollygrove the gun violence
is just destroying this neighborhood because of the drugs. They know, if you selling
drugs nine out of ten you got a gun and if you get caught up in the wrong thing the
person, the drug person will shoot you. Or the person that’s trying to get drugs, if they
got a gun, they gonna try to rob you. If you don’t give them what they want, they gonna
shoot you. So the gun violence is, is, it’s out of control because it adds to the
deterioration of the neighborhood. Because the people are worried, either way it goes, if
you’re selling drugs you’re gonna have a gun because you’re gonna try and protect
yourself, protect your little neighborhood, protect your income. And if you’re using
drugs you’re going to use a gun and go and rob someone to get money to get drugs.
Participation in the sale of drugs, whether as a consumer or as a provider, brought the possibility
of lethal violence. Those selling experienced an even greater likelihood of violence because of
competition. When asked what motivated homicides in the neighborhood Martin responded
from his perspective as a dealer:
You selling $20 grams and you making money. Off an ounce of, off an ounce of good
weed, like purple, could make you like 5-something. So you booming off that. They see
you steadily got clientele coming and you showing the love and they like, “This dude got
such and such and such and such. He doing this, that and a third,” you know, “Let’s go
get him.” And what you really isn’t learning, you might find two ounces of weed, some
mags and maybe eight or nine ounces in a stack, a stack is a thousand. Other than that
you done killed somebody right behind something petty, you know, and at the end of the
day is it worth it?
Those who experience extraordinary success in the marketplace became Hood Stars and faced
greater scrutiny by others competing to replace them. Martin’s comments argued that what
appears to be success could be illusory, part of the image portrayed by those working to rise in
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the social strata of the Keeping It Real subculture. Even the illusion of success invited potential
lethal violence. Anderson (1999) referred to this type of subcultural social capital as ‘juice’ and
proposed that it was enhanced when one was “capable of violence” (p. 72) which was
communicated via “facial expressions, gait and direct talk” (p. 73) and required “constant
vigilance…against giving even the impression that transgressions will not be tolerated” (p. 75).
This violence had spillover effects for community members who chose not to participate.
Violence served to impair the neighborhood’s collective efficacy in two ways: first as neighbors
retrenched from community life and later as individuals and businesses abandoned the
community. Retrenchment accompanied fear that the street violence may extend to oneself upon
violating the Keeping It Real rule of minding one’s business. Arianne, in the following
exchange, described this fear:
A:

the police used to come around all the time and give them fines and citations not
to hang on that porch and they’re still there. The porch gone, now they just stand
on the corner.

K:

Chasing people away, but that didn’t really work. What other ideas do you have?

A:

That’s about it, maybe we could get the police to stand out there all day and run
‘em.

K:

Constant police presence. Beside the police, other things that could be done?
Things that average people could do.

A:

Nothing that I know of, you can’t go out and tell them to get off the corner.

K:

Because?

A:

They might shoot you.

Her remarks reflected the feeling of many in the study who thought that only formal controls
were sufficiently powerful to curtail drug-related violence as informal exercises of control may
invite lethal retaliation. In an atmosphere of legal cynicism, however, the police were not trusted
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and residents were left to fend for themselves. In this scenario the choices were few: retreat from
public spaces or abandon the neighborhood altogether. Such retrenchment may have
emboldened those in the underground economy.
Some decided to abandon the community altogether, seeking a less-violent neighborhood.
Charles recalled a time when the neighborhood was ethnically mixed and explained the whiteflight phenomenon through the lens of drugs and violence:
It used to be pretty much mixed. But now it’s predominately black. They used to have
black and white people back here but it got so bad with the drugs and the, the dog-eat-dog
mentality that people moved away. ‘Cause I guess they didn’t want to be in that type of
environment ‘cause that tends to put you in the frame of mind that you always on the
defense, you know, you always watching yourself.
This statement managed to capture both the retrenchment, “on the defense” and “always
watching,” and the subsequent neighborhood abandonment by whites. Others moved after a
member of their family became involved in the illicit economy inviting potential for retaliation,
as did Caroline who said “I have a family member that’s in the neighborhood that actually does
some things, he does crime or drugs, so I prefer not to be in the neighborhood because of that.”
When asked to clarify what she meant, Caroline elaborated, “if they want to go after this person
that’s doing all this crime or whatever, they want to go after the family members also.” The fear
she experienced was not the generalized fear of the whites who left, but fear based upon serious
potential for lethal violence individually directed toward her. Angela’s family did experience
such retaliation; their neighborhood business, an ABO, was firebombed and burned to the
ground. She connected the arson to a neighborhood drug dealer who thought her mother, the
owner of the ABO, had informed the police about their activity:
And they got upset with Mama, ‘cause Mama would always come out, I guess sometimes
during their busier period, and of course she’d make comments under her breath. Well it
ended up with them believing Mama was gonna call the police on them, and they got
tired of what they called “that old…” and they had closed up the bar, they had gone in the
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thing, and they threw a bottle. Mama heard a crack of a bottle and inside the thing but
nothing exploded. And then, maybe an hour later, she started smelling smoke, she and
Ricky, and they got up and went outside and saw smoke coming out of the garage. And it
ended up with the whole, everything burning down, you know?
Her mother would later decide not to rebuild, thus abandoning her business.
Mirroring the retrenchment and abandonment just described, there was a sentiment by
many that the city itself had abandoned the community too, leaving it to fend for itself. From her
office in City Hall one government official described Hollygrove’s abandonment from a birdseye perspective:
But what it looks like to me is that poor communities have fewer services, less support,
fewer options—I mean, in terms of even trying, if you live in one of these communities
and you are low-income and you don’t have a vehicle, your options for jobs are
incredibly limited because of the lack of good transportation. And so all of that I think
leads to, you get less service from the city, and there’s less opportunity and more
opportunity to, I mean more, you know, criminal behavior becomes more of an options
because it will give you money.
One resident, a senior homeowner who lived in the neighborhood for 45 years, described this in
similar fashion:
But it was the idea of the thing that how can someone that’s over these things let, you
know, this happen by not workin’ on it? You know what I’m sayin’? So it’s like
something’s wrong with this picture, and again it goes back to bein’ unfair because in this
neighborhood that should not be happenin’. This should not be happenin’. So when you
really look back on life, in a lotta different ways it’s like why certain areas are being
flooded? Why are certain areas not bein’ taken care of in a lot of different ways? With
the crime and the drugs and all of this stuff, you know? And I feel that it’s drivin’ the
people out. They wanna drive the people out.
Her comments reflected the deep mistrust that many in the community experienced with regard
to the city. Some saw their abandonment as conspiracies directed against the neighborhood.
These included: drugs being intentionally foisted upon the community to profit wealthy residents
of other neighborhoods, guns being imported by profiteers while agents of formal control turned
a blind eye, and poor police response to neighborhood violence which was thought to be a
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strategy to limit it to the neighborhood and keep it away from others. The mistrust they
expressed resulted from their long history of structural marginalization and abandonment.
Both inside and outside the community Hollygrove’s reputation for drug-related violence
had impacted the perceptions of the community. The rise of Hollygrove’s illicit economy was
widely thought to account for most of the lethal violence in the neighborhood, even by drug
dealers. The fear of this violence led to retrenchment and abandonment by individuals,
businesses and the city. The subsequent void produced an environment in which the illicit
marketplace could flourish. Venkatesh (2006) wrote “the underground enables poor
communities to survive but can lead to their alienation from the wider world. For groups and
organizations, as well as individuals, surviving in the ghetto via shady means can result in their
overall remove from the city. It is a pernicious cycle” (p. 385). These words aptly described the
vicious cycle experienced by those in the study, and formed the basis of the neighborhood’s
understanding of “why” violent crime occurred. Equally important, however, was “where” it
happened, at specific crime hotspots in Hollygrove.

Only When the Store is Open: ABOs and Violent Crime in Hollygrove
Although Hollygrove had the reputation as a dangerous neighborhood to those inside and
outside the community, residents recognized that most violent crime was limited to
microlocations within the community. In a 2009 survey conducted by the Policy & Research
Group and commissioned by AARP, residents were asked to identify corners they would avoid
because they felt safe or unsafe. The five worst corners were all associated with alcoholic
beverage outlets (ABOs). In the words of the 20-something males, “every corner where’s there’s
a corner store is nine times out of ten dangerous.” The location considered unsafe by most
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residents was a two-block section in the middle of the community where both a bar, Big Time
Tips, and a corner store, the Olive Superette, were located.
St. Jean’s (2007) research addressed a limitation of macrosociological studies that
compared dangerous neighborhoods. He noted that crime was differentially distributed
throughout these neighborhoods, some locations inside the community experienced higher crime
than others. His study found that “both street drug dealers and robbers in the research site are
primarily attracted to locations with businesses such as liquor stores, grocery stores, checkcashing outlets, and fast food restaurants” (p. 5) located near prominent intersections. Those
living in Hollygrove understood corner stores and bars to be the most dangerous places in the
community.
The Olive Superette was a corner store located at the corner of Olive and General Ogden
Streets. Two blocks away, at the corner of Eagle and Edinburgh Streets, sat Big Time Tips until
its closure. Two other ABOs were once located on these blocks as well, Morris Lounge which
was torched by a drug dealer in retaliation for calling attention to his activities, and the
Edinburgh Market which wasn’t re-opened after Katrina. These were spaces understood to
belong to neighborhood drug dealers. One of the seniors provided this historical perspective:
The corner store right there on Edinburgh and General Ogden, that’s where they young
people, when I first moved back here in ’94, the winos used to sit across the store and
they could drink their wine and have conversations, ‘cause I was inside the house and I
could hear them going around the world and back every day, every day. Well then the
young people started so I didn’t see them anymore. So A&P was still in the shopping
center, so when I went there I saw them sitting on the car, I said, “Y’all don’t be on the
corner anymore?” He said, “No, ma’am, no ma’am, we winos, we ain’t no drug dealers
and we ain’t no drug users, we can’t handle young people so we just moved on out and
let them have it.” And that’s when a lot of the disruption started coming into focus.
The two-block section was identified in both this study and the Livable Communities Survey as
the most dangerous in the community.
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Arianne, Robert and Charles lived on those blocks and experienced violence they
connected to this specific location. Arianne described the flow of people between the two
ABOs, “Everybody that hung in the store, like on the corner, when the store closed they would
go to Big Time Tips.” She describes a shooting in Big Time Tips the day of her cousin’s funeral,
a killing which had taken place in Hollygrove:
I was eighteen I think, it was the day of my cousin’s funeral, he had got killed by the
duplex and we was around there celebrating for him and two boys had, I guess they had
been fussing earlier that day or whatever and one of those boys came in there and he
pointed the gun in there and started shooting. And he would, the person he was shooting
at was like in the back by the pool table. And he came outside and shooting at him and
they was running back and forth in the barroom shooting at each other. And the one that
was already in there, he had got killed and they dragged him from the back of the bar to
the front of the bar.
Robert lived across the street from Tips. A former drug dealer, he would spend his days at the
corner stores selling drugs and then continue into the evening inside the bar, “The bar was closed
during the daytime so everyone hung on the corner. When the store closed and Snake came open
up, everybody moved from this store or this store around the corner and go to the bar.” He
recalled the history of the ABO across several owners until its closure:
In the beginning it was bad, when Big Time Tips used to be called Ghost Town. The
guy, well he passed away not, Eli used to own it. It was called Ghost Town and Ghost
used to be throwing a lot of concerts down there and it was, that’s when it started to get
shaky back there, you know what I’m saying? Just shootings and all that shit right there
by the bar and it closed down for a minute. Then this guy, a little guy bought the bar, Bo
Lee. He bought it and opened it up and called it Big Time Tips. And he had a little
hookup with Q93 (a primarily African American radio station), so every Wednesday
night Q93 be out there and then everybody just shooting, went and started it again. Bo
Lee got incarcerated. Then Snake bought it and that’s when it just got horrible cut, you
know, Snake was a good man, you heard? Snake used to look out for people in the
neighborhood. If you needed money, he was a loan shark. He’d loan you some money,
just make sure you bring him his money. He was a good dude, but around that time these
little youngsters, like I said, they just want to hang in front the bar and they get mad when
Snake call the police. People getting shot all under the house next door, you know what
I’m saying? Man I can’t count how many people got killed inside that bar, while I was in
there.
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Charles, also a former drug dealer, lived across from the now-closed Edinburgh corner store and
one block from Big Time Tips. About 20 years older than Arianne and Robert, he considered the
closure of Tips and the corner store to be catalytic in ending some of the drug-related violence in
Hollygrove:
Well, now Hollygrove is kinda like, like it has cleaned up since the hurricane. Since the
hurricane a lot of riff raff and the druggin’ and the drug suppliers, they’re not here now.
Hollygrove was a hub, they would come from across the river, they would come from all
over and they would come to Hollygrove and get drugs but since the hurricane that has
slowed down a whole lot. Slowed down quite a lot. The homeowners is kinda getting
back in control thanks to you and Joe Sherman and the other activists in the
neighborhood that got sick and tired of this stuff. They been sick and tired of it but,
excuse me, didn’t do anything about it. I‘m so glad that store across the street is closed.
I am glad, Kevin, I’m so glad that place down there, Big Time Tips is closed. That
stopped a whole lotta stuff man, just those two spots stopped a whole lot of chaos in the
neighborhood. Right now up on that corner where the grocery store is, that, for some
reason, and I never saw this in California, but for some reason these neighborhood
grocery stores they attract the wrong type of people. They attract people that are just nonproductive, they are maybe down on their luck, drugs, you know that’s where, once you
see a grocery store and they hang out, you know that’s where you can come and get
drugs, at least find out where to get drugs. So if they close Henry [Olive Superette],
‘cause Henry was complaining to me this morning said he’s sick of back here. If they
close Henry down the neighborhood is gonna improve greatly ‘cause there’s not gonna be
a centralized location for you to come buy drugs.
These three respondents echoed the findings of St. Jean that violence was located primarily at
sites where people gathered and was not evenly distributed throughout the community. Drugrelated activity occurred at all hours, during the day at the corner stores and during the night at
the bars.
On two occasions neighborhood residents were able to temporarily pressure the New
Orleans Alcoholic Beverage Control Board to rescind the liquor license of Big Time Tips only to
see it re-open after making changes. After Katrina the residents worked with the City
Councilperson and the New Orleans Police Department to permanently close the bar, restricting
a prominent location for drug-related activity and substantially reducing the drug-related
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violence described by Arianne, Robert, and Charles. A high-ranking police officer provided an
outside perspective on the closure:
The violence was already really slipping down already, and I really credit the violence
slipping with the great network in the neighborhood of really, you know, drivin’ some of
that stuff out. And then we came back with the icing on the cake of getting rid of Big
Time Tips, which was kinda like the last anchor spot back there. You know, you have to
get rid of anchor spots. So we knocked off the anchor spot, which was our plan, and then
we came back in with that organized-crime Rico investigation, swept the last major gang
problem out of the area. And now what you have left is just some residual hanger-ons
that may be not even anchored there but come back there ‘cause that’s the historical base.
Then we try to attack them as they come in. But I don’t even, you know, police love to
take credit for things when they go right, and when they go wrong we love to blame other
people, you know. But what I would say—and I’ve said this publicly—is that I attribute
at least half of the success we’ve had in Hollygrove, not to us, but to the great work of the
community.
These ABOs were microlocations within Hollygrove, or what the police official termed
anchors, and served as gathering places in the neighborhood. Such locations were attractive to
drug dealers because they drew a specific clientele (St. Jean, 2007). The closure of Big Time
Tips, accompanied by the loss of Morris Lounge and the Edinburgh corner store, left only the
Olive Superette as a gathering place, decreasing the appeal of the location as a crime hotspot.
The result was a drop in violent crime in this location and a greater perceived sense of safety by
residents.
Violent crime was rooted in specific places; in Hollygrove these were places where
alcoholic beverages were sold. Not all places within the neighborhood were equally dangerous.
Because macro-perspectives consider neighborhoods safe or dangerous based upon gross violent
crime statistics, they had limited power to explain violence at specific locations inside the
neighborhood.
Location alone was not sufficient to explain lethal violence in the community, however.
Equally important to the understanding of the phenomenon were the economic considerations
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that undergirded the illicit economy and made it a viable alternative to participation in the formal
economy. This is the subject of the next section.

Their Only Funds Was to Sell Drugs: Economic Consideration of Drug-Related Violence
Hollygrove’s drug-related violence was rooted in places but it was also rooted in a larger
structural context. Wilson (1997) connected it to a neighborhood’s internal organization,
concluding “The presence of high levels of drug activity in a neighborhood is indicative of
problems of social organization. High rates of joblessness triggered other problems in the
neighborhood that adversely affected social organization, including drug trafficking, crime, and
gang violence” (p. 59). Structural limitations faced by Hollygrove residents were similar to
many African American neighborhoods in New Orleans, noted one city official, including “an
unemployment rate that is like twice the city’s average, a level of high school attainment that is
half the city’s average and average incomes that are like 40% lower than the city’s average.”
These factors were understood to drive the impoverishment of neighborhoods like Hollygrove
and gave rise to the participation in the illicit economy and its accompanying violence. In words
similar to Wilson’s the official concluded “concentrated poverty begets other issues…their
access to numerous things is different, their access to education, their access to transportation,
their access to jobs is different, and that has an adverse effect.” Charles summarized it this way
‘they were economically impoverished so their only funds was to sell drugs.” In a neighborhood
structured by poverty the underground economy may become a viable source of income for those
limited from participation in the formal economy.
Those participating in the study had two views regarding the sale of drugs in the
community, sometimes expressed simultaneously. Most understood drug dealing to be an
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economic necessity for those unable to earn a livable wage in the formal economy. At the same
time there was a strong sense that their participation in this part of the illicit economy was
destructive to those involved and to the community as a whole.
As noted earlier, most in Hollygrove personally subscribed to prosocial values, even
those who participated in the sale of drugs. Unable to find livable-wage jobs in the formal
economy many succumbed to selling drugs in the neighborhood even though this violated their
personal values. Martin described this phenomenon from his perspective: “Like, like, alright I
done changed my life around so many times but I can’t lie, the Devil keeps sucking me back in
sometimes and I don’t want to go. I hate, I hate, like I said yesterday, I hate the person I become
because I’m not that person.” Martin’s involvement in the drug-related economy caused
dissonance, he both hated his choice to sell drugs but felt he had no other viable options. One of
the 20-something males described this dilemma:
It’s like man, I want to be a painter but I don’t know nobody who paint. Nobody come
up to me and say, hey that’s cool like. Where everybody around here selling drugs,
though, that’s cool, let me go sell some drugs. And that might be one of the reasons,
another reason might be that every day you walk out your house, you ain’t got no money
in your pocket, but that guy do. He got a car and a house. And he not even a bad person,
he’s just selling drugs to take care of his family, so you start to look at it from that
perspective, like. You’re not looking at it like, oh I’m messing somebody’s life up and I
could possibly go to jail, all you thinking about is providing for your family, making sure
you survive every day.
While recognizing that there are personal and societal ramifications that follow the choice to deal
drugs, he saw few legitimate options. Given the lack of viable opportunity in the legal job
market he resolved the dissonance by separating an action he considered to be immoral, dealing
drugs, from the quality of the person, “selling drugs to take care of his family.” The indignity of
not being able to find good work was resolved by the dignity of caring for one’s family despite
the clash of values that accompanied it.
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A former police official described well the desperate situation faced by many in the
community, “they’re poor, disorganized families for the most part. Lots of young men going
nowhere fast, unfortunately for a lot of reasons: didn’t get an education, they got arrested early
and often in their life and kind of left them fewer options.” The options that were available were
often fast food or service-sector jobs which did not compare to the money that could be made in
the illicit economy. This was undignified and demeaning work, contended one of the 20something males and was not worth the effort compared to the alternative:
Nine times out of ten you bout to quit that job because you not making enough money.
You go stand on the corner you could make a week’s pay, that one day standing out
there. Once you see that you like, shit, I ain’t going back to work. I ain’t worried about
nobody else hiring me. If I could, if I sit out here for a week I could probably make like
$1,000. I sit out here for another week I could make $2,000, like, it’s just that simple.
Participation in the illicit economy also brought the very real possibility of arrest and felony
conviction, requiring the potential job applicant to admit to a prior conviction, further lessening
the chances of finding legitimate employment. Kobe noted “the drug dealers or the people who
have been in jail multiple times on different offenses and stuff, they can’t really get a good job
because of the way things are set up.” His comment reflected a core tenet of Institutional
Anomie Theory; barring legitimate means to success attainment people will turn to illegitimate
means.
Despite the potential consequences, participation in the sale of drugs was thought to be
driven by economic necessity, and thus became a viable pathway to economic attainment in the
face of structural limitation. One official in the Mayor’s office noted:
I suspect that the violence that often accompanies other criminal activity would be
lessened if people were not engaging in the criminal activity that was largely then driven
by economics; so if you’re not selling drugs then there’s less chance of you being
involved in much of the violence that comes along with it. And the selling of drugs really
is what comes from pursuing an economic opportunity that they view as a viable one.
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Hollygrove was ringed by fast food outlets, the main source of jobs for those without skills,
training or adequate transportation, but these were low-wage jobs with minimal benefits. In
addition to low wages, fast food and service sector work was associated with low status. The 20something males thought that participation in the underground economy brought both higher pay
and improved status. In the following interchange the 20-something males described their
perceptions of higher pay and social status made possible by selling drugs on the street:
M1:

Why get a job if I know this dude don’t want to hire me? Gonna put me in the
back to wash dishes for $7.50.

M2:

Yeah, why break my back for this much money, make this much illegally?

M1:

You could work six hours probably, nine times out of ten you work in a fast food
restaurant. Start out with probably eight hours, after a couple of months you be
down to six or five, you broke after that.

M3:

Racial profiling is at your job.

M1:

You ‘bout to quit.

M2:

They give you all these rewards just to keep you there for a while. Sucks you in,
it’s like they set up on you so that you can’t leave.

M3:

This is truthful stuff, like.

M2:

This is a real subject.

M1:

Nine times out of ten you ‘bout to quit that job because you not making enough
money. Gou go stand on the corner you could make a week’s pay, that one day,
standing out there.

M3:

Couple of hours.

M1:

Once you see that

M2:

You hooked.

M1:

You like, shit, I ain’t going back to work, I ain’t worried about nobody else
hiring me. If I could, if I sit out here for a week I could probably make like
$1,000. I sit out here another week I could make $2,000, like, it’s just that
simple.
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M3:

Son, and then, once you really get up there, you could make $1,000 a day, that’s
when you really don’t want to leave.

M1:

Now those dudes knowing they…

M2:

They done spoiled themselves to it…

M1:

…literally, really making more money than that guy that didn’t want to hire him.

M2:

And after that they’re not looking back, a job is nothing to them now.

M3:

A job is obsolete to them.

Their perceptions of available options were key to understanding the realities faced by many in
Hollygrove’s underclass. Available jobs in the legal economy were perceived to be accompanied
by low wages, hard work, insufficient hours, racism and lack of control over one’s situation. In
contrast the illicit economy afforded higher pay, easier working conditions and the dignity of
knowing they could make more than the boss who dictated the poor working conditions in the
formal marketplace. While prosocial values eschewed the illicit economy, those observing the
challenges that many in Hollygrove faced could understand its value for those without options in
the formal economy and thus perceived it to have legitimacy.
At the same time there was a strong sentiment widely shared by most in the study that
this alternative economy was destructive to individuals involved and to the community as a
whole. Most in Hollygrove ascribed to the value of hard work and delayed gratification. The
fast and easy money that accompanied the drug-market were thought to be an illegitimate
substitute for a longer-term perspective which prioritized success via sanctioned pathways.
Charles summed these understandings:
I was raised to have a different mindset from the people that I see back here now. The
older people that were here 30, 40, 50 years ago, they were raised to get up and got to
work, and if you don’t go to work, go to school, and if you don’t go to school, go into the
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military. They were raised to be productive with their life, do something with their life,
don’t just lay around.
He highlighted three pathways for deferred accomplishment: jobs, education, and the military.
The increasing complexity of the job market often requires an education beyond high school. A
career in the military required one to complete high school. Thus education, at least to high
school graduation, was key to success in the formal marketplace. Louisiana’s public schools
ranked 44th in the nation (Editorial Projects in Education, 2015) and Orleans Parish Schools
underperformed 62.5% of them (Sims & Rossmeier, 2015). The educational pathways leading to
jobs in the formal economy or the military were difficult for students attending schools ranked
among the worst in the nation.
Some observed that the impact of poor quality schools began early in one’s academic
career and then continued to negatively influence opportunity throughout the lifespan. One
governmental official raised in the community thought this realization began as early as junior
high:
But there aren’t that many opportunities out there. Why? Because you need to be able to
read and write. And guess what? Tom and Jane don’t want to read and write because
Tom and Jane decided that when they got to junior high school they did better selling
crack on the corner than going to school. So now all the time and all Jane knows is to
either sell crack or sell themselves. And so now they in that spiral of crime and that’s
what happens.
The choice of more immediate rewards of the underground economy, thought to emerge at an
early age, then had repercussions throughout one’s life. Arianne addressed her perception of the
long-term consequences of this decision, stating “they be starting young, like 17 or 16 selling
drugs and they’ll do it like till they’re 40 or 50 and don’t have no money and still living in
Hollygrove, they ain’t got no car, they be riding around on the bike.” In additions to the
impaired long-term prospects that she highlighted, others recognized the negative impacts of the
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illicit economy on Hollygrove’s reputation, as expressed by William, “I guess they figured
selling drugs is the way out, but selling drugs is not good for the community.”
While the illicit economy appeared to be a viable path to economic security, it had a
significant downside. On one side of the ledger was the myth that drug sales were lucrative.
Bourgois (2010) found that while “dealers tend to brag to outsiders and to themselves about how
much money they make each night…their income is almost never as consistently high as they
report it to be” (p. 91). According to his calculations drug dealers made “slightly less than
double the minimum wage” (p. 92). On the other side of the ledger were the costs of
participation. As Arianne and Wilson both noted, the long-term prospects were grim. For
Wilson the choice brought increasing marginality as job-related prospects were diminished via
loss of skills and connections to the workforce, while for Arianne it limited one to economic
marginality and relegation to a peripheral existence in the neighborhood. The possibility of
lethal violence was also enhanced, especially as one progressed through the hierarchy toward
Hood Star status. Finally, the illegal nature of the marketplace carried with it the possibility that
dealers would come to the attention of both formal and informal controls, the subject of this
chapter’s final section.

More like an Occupying Force: Formal and Informal Controls in Hollygrove
Hollygrove residents expressed mixed feelings toward the police. At the time of Brandon
Aggison’s death there was widespread distrust of the NOPD. The police exhibited disdain for
the community. Moore (2010) noted that “the NOPD had a distinct institutional culture that
emphasized an ‘us versus them’ attitude toward the communities in which they served,” one
“infused with obvious anti-black attitudes and feelings” (p.7). The environment of mutual
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hostility and distrust fostered an environment in which both the subculture and the underground
economy could thrive. Moore (2010) wrote “although black residents wanted the drugs out of
their community, they wanted the police out as well” (p. 209). In their marginalized condition
residents had to choose between the worst of two ills affecting their neighborhood.
After Katrina, Hollygrove’s attitudes toward the police appeared to change. In May of
2007, AARP selected Hollygrove as a pilot neighborhood for their Livable Communities project.
An initial phase of the project was an eight-week leadership training course during which
residents began to identify key issues of concern to the community. One of the four areas these
leaders desired to address was violent crime. Deeply impacted by Katrina in August, 2005, these
leaders were primarily homeowners with deep ties in the community that led them to return from
evacuation earlier than others. Many of them were elderly, which was a key selling point for
AARP. All of them were in some phase of rebuilding their homes and lives, and were united in a
desire to see the community rebuilt better, safer than before the storm. The training proved to be
a major turning point in the community’s differentiation between crime prevention and law
enforcement.
Prior to the training, the community was heavily focused on police response times, the
need for a police substation, why the police had not addressed the pre-Katrina practice of open
drug sales on street corners, and the issue of racial profiling. A deeply frustrated community
experienced the police force as their adversaries and felt vulnerable in a community that had
become notorious for violent crime. The Second District of the New Orleans Police Department
(NOPD) was frequently stonewalled in their attempts to solve the crimes by a community deeply
distrustful of them. A police official described the relationship at the time, “we were probably
more perceived as an occupying army than people back there trying to help.”
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As the community’s view of crime shifted from police-centered and reactionary, to
community-centered and preventative, a simultaneous shift in their view of the police began to
occur. The police became community partners, willing to work cooperatively in a variety of
ways, even to the point of having their ideas of effective crime prevention challenged upon
occasion and to provide a representative at the community crime meetings. This change marked
a turning point from attitudes of mistrust and cynicism toward formal control agents, to
cooperation and empowerment. It also marked a dramatic change of attitude for those that
previously considered themselves victims of Hollygrove’s drug wars.
Alexander (2012) contended that the War on Drugs in America had been differentially
waged in African American neighborhoods like Hollygrove.
From the outset, the drug war could have been waged primarily in
overwhelmingly white suburbs or on college campuses. SWAT teams could have
rappelled from helicopters in gate suburban communities and raided the homes of high
school lacrosse players known for hosting coke and ecstasy parties after their games. The
police could have seized televisions, furniture, and cash from fraternity houses based on
an anonymous tip that a few joints or a stash of cocaine could be found hidden in
someone’s dresser drawer. Suburban homemakers could have been placed under
surveillance and subjected to undercover operations designed to catch them violating
laws regulating the use and sale of prescription “uppers.” All of this could have
happened as a matter of routine in white communities, but it did not.
Instead, when police go looking for drugs, they look in the ‘hood. Tactics that
would be political suicide in an upscale white suburb are not even newsworthy in poor
black and brown communities. So long as mass drug arrests are concentrated in
impoverished urban areas, police chiefs have little reason to fear a political backlash, no
matter how aggressive and warlike the efforts may be (p. 124).
While those engaged in the sale of drugs recognized this as a negative side-effect of their career
pathway, law-abiding residents were also victims. Innocent residents were caught in what a
former police chief termed “dragnet mode,” where a community pastor was pulled over for an
inoperative turn signal, one of the 20-somethings was searched for wearing a white t-shirt and
having dreadlocks, and this researcher was patted down for talking to a neighborhood friend.
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The result was that residents did not view agents of formal control as allies but rather as an
occupying force.
One of the neighborhood seniors active in the Livable Communities Project, recalled a
time before the alliance with the NOPD as a period when “our police department wasn’t worth
shit ‘cause they had a whole bunch of crooks in the police department. They had a whole bunch
of rednecks in the police department.” Some, like Daneta, thought the NOPD had misplaced
priorities, “I mean they’re out giving tickets every day, but where y’all really need to be is where
people getting hurt.” Others, like Kobe, cast the police assigned to the neighborhood in a
nefarious light, “Hollygrove doesn’t have, I guess you would say, cops who, who would uh, who
pretty much aren’t corrupt I would say, who aren’t just randomly stopping people or some of the
cops might even be in drug gangs or you know, stuff like that.” Innocent bystanders caught up in
the dragnet mode became angry and oppositional, as did one of the 20-somethings who said,
“they don’t care about me, f them too.” In this climate formal control agents were seen as the
enemy, rather than allies seeking to enhance public safety. Mistrust of the police stymied efforts
to interdict participants in the illicit economy with the result of enhancing the likelihood that the
sale of drugs and its accompanying violence could flourish.
In recent years the NOPD recognized this dynamic and made efforts to engage the
community. A former police chief commented on this change:
If you tie yourself closely to what a community is, they’ll tell you what their quality of
life problems are. And if you’re willing to turn that decision over to the neighborhood,
which is essentially community policing at some level, then whatever it is you choose to
enforce with the neighborhood support, you’re never gonna run into a problem. You’re
not going to run into the neighborhood turning against you. You won’t be perceived as
an occupying force.
Starting in 2009, when the Hollygrove Livable Communities Project was introduced, the NOPD
began engaging the community in a purposeful way: attending community meetings,
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implementing an anonymous crime-reporting hot sheet, and developing relationships with
community leaders. John, the senior community activist who called policemen crooks and
rednecks, changed his perspective in response. When asked how to make the neighborhood safe
he remarked:
Well, you identify who’s causin’ the problems in the neighborhood. That’s who we deal
with, the guy who’s doing’ all the killin’. And that really disrupted. Then you get the
authorities to work with you. And you can make a big difference in what’ going on.
His comments reflected a neighborhood change in strategy. Rather than being victims of both the
drug dealers and the NOPD, residents began to engage the police as allies in efforts to curtail
drug-related violence, via a strategy of prevention as opposed to response. This strategy led to
the closure of Big Time Tips, one of the neighborhood’s violent crime hot spots, resulting in a
reduction in neighborhood violence.
Related to this was a newfound understanding of the role of residents as the frontline of
violence prevention. When asked for her perspective about why shootings occurred, Zora
remarked “People allow them to do stuff, and things are allowed to happen,” a comment on the
neighborhood’s lack of collective efficacy. Asked to elaborate, she responded:
K:

You said the phrase “people allow them to.” Talk more about that.

Z:

Yeah, the person that own the store. Or the person or people that live in that area,
you know, because they’re afraid to say anything. So it’s allowin’ things to
happen. We complain, but we still allow.

She later remarked, “I’d rather stand up for something good and lose my life behind it than sit by
and, you know, let everything happen. You’re gonna lose your life to the violence anyway at
some point, you know.” Her comments reflected how informal neighborhood controls could the
leading edge of efforts to curtail drug-related violence in Hollygrove. An elected official, who
took office after the Hollygrove Livable Community’s project was implemented, stated:
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I believe that neighbors banding together, whether it’s, you know, called Neighborhood
Watch, whether it’s called, whether it’s Soul Steppers [a program where Hollygrove
seniors walked for exercise through violent crime hot spots]. There was a significant
drop in crime when they were walking regularly. You know, I believe that neighbors
banding together and being watchful and reporting criminal activity, that lets the police
know that, you know, people are watching them and people care about the neighborhood,
people are watching them and so they need to perform.
These voices reflected change that occurred as the neighborhood shifted from dependence upon
the police as the sole agents of crime prevention to a recognition that prevention began at the
neighborhood level.
Exercising collective efficacy required political capital. Standing up to drug dealers was
not easy, especially when residents feared that an agencies of formal control would not protect
them from retaliatory violence. AARP’s participation in the Hollygrove Livable Communities
Project brought influence, helping residents to engage city agencies in a way that previously was
lacking. The result of this enhanced political capital was an empowered citizenry willing to take
risks to intervene, recognizing the police as allies rather than adversaries. The subsequent
reduction in drug-related homicides served to validate these efforts, thus bolstering the
perception that informal controls could be an effective component of neighborhood to combat
the violence that accompanied Hollygrove’s illicit economy.

Summary
Perceptions of the drug-related economy in Hollygrove were mixed. Most in Hollygrove
recognized that an increasingly complex job market, combined with poor educational
preparation, racism, underdeveloped soft skills, limited transportation options, lack of social
capital and a dearth of mentors had created an environment with limited options for livable wage
jobs. In this context, many both understood why the illicit economy existed and empathized with
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those who chose this economic pathway. This empathy had limits, however, as residents blamed
it for the bulk of neighborhood violence while understanding that other options were available to
those engaged in the sale of illegal substances. Even those with a history of drug dealing
recognized their role in the violence that tarnished the neighborhood’s reputation and eroded the
positive social networks that marked Hollygrove’s past.
Venkatesh (2006) concluded his study of Chicago’s underground economy by noting that
structure and agency are interwoven in a complex tangle. Bourgois (2010) ended his study of
New York City crack dealers by noting that violence which would be more appropriately
directed “against their structural oppressors” (p. 326) was enacted interpersonally and locally.
Residents of Hollygrove also had difficulty disentangling structure and agency. They recognized
the structural elements that produced the conditions giving rise to the illicit economy and the
accompanying marginalization, and some even concluded that drugs and violence were
intentionally foisted upon their community. The proscription against violence toward whites was
an important structural element as well, one that largely maintained violence within Hollygrove’s
boundaries. At the same time residents recognized the personal and corporate toll the drug
economy exacted in the community and experienced anger toward these agents of community
destruction. The tension between structure and agency found in the work of Venkatesh and
Bourgois was one reflected in the voices of the community. Bourgois contended that the violence
was misplaced, directed into the neighborhood rather than toward the structures that maintain it
there. If, as Bourgois concluded, the violence was to be appropriately directed toward those in
power perhaps greater attention would be paid to the structural elements maintaining it in
Hollygrove.
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Two factors prevented this from occurring. First, neighborhood perceptions that drugrelated crime was largely limited to hot spots within the neighborhood allowed those living away
from them to distance themselves from it. Most considered their street and their neighbors to be
safe and violent crime to be occurring at gathering places where alcohol was sold and drugs were
distributed. While violence impacted the entire neighborhood, this impact may seem indirect
when it is bounded and site-specific. Just as more powerful neighborhoods view Hollygrove as a
dangerous neighborhood to be contained and avoided, residents of Hollygrove perceived drugrelated violence to be a phenomenon situated elsewhere, albeit in their own neighborhood.
Second, residents still maintained their fundamental confidence in the primacy of the formal
marketplace and the sanctioned pathways to participation in it. This was true even for those
interviewed with experience in the illicit economy. This confidence may have been bolstered by
a recent upsurge in political capital brought about by collective action. The neighborhood had a
new public school, a new community center, new homes, an improved park, and numerous
innovative neighborhood-improvement projects while simultaneously experiencing deepening
relationships with political decision-makers like the City Councilperson, the NOPD Second
District Commander, and even the mayor. These changes appeared to have lessened cynicism
while improving trust in the efficacy of participation in mainstream, sanctioned routes to success.
In addition to perceiving violence as occurring elsewhere, Hollygrove residents used
another distancing strategy: projection. They perceived that much of the violence was imported
by others coming to the neighborhood who did not share their values. This led them to distrust
outsiders who were widely considered to be the source of many of the social ills they
experienced. This will be explored in the next chapter.
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Chapter 9: Findings
Strangers in the Neighborhood: Hollygrove’s Views of Outsiders

Hollygrove’s long history of abandonment by the power structures of the city created a
climate in which residents concluded they must fend for themselves. The cynicism they
experienced led to a perceived need to differentiate between those who were “from” the
neighborhood and those who were not. This became an important facet of maintaining
neighborhood order and safety. On one hand the ability to distinguish between insiders and
outsiders allowed the neighborhood to more readily differentiate between safe people and
troublemakers. On the other it constricted opportunities for an influx of new people and ideas
that could facilitate opportunity. The boundaries were most rigid when the neighborhood
experienced high levels of marginalization; they became more diffuse as the community
experienced an increase in social capital. Residents expressed tension between the need to
protect their neighborhood against invaders with bad intentions and the need for those who could
bring much-needed resources to help them emerge from their marginalized condition.
Wacquant (2008) defined the struggle Hollygrove residents faced, “it is the collapse of
public institutions, resulting from state policies of urban abandonment and leading to the punitive
containment of the black (sub-)proletariat, that emerges as the most potent and most distinctive
cause of the entrenched marginality in the American metropolis” (pp. 3-4). As described earlier,
Hollygrove residents had developed an “us versus them” mentality regarding formal power
structures such as the police and city government. Although improvements had occurred in
recent years, distrust of outsiders lingered. Two NOPD officials described law enforcement’s
relationship with the community as an “occupying force.” One white city government leader,
describing a potential rebuilding project in the neighborhood, tearfully recognized “the pain for
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the first time of black people who have lived a life of being lied to, to the point that they would
insist on leaving an unusable community center in place, you know, because they thought the
dollars to replace it would be stolen from them.” The mistrust had deep historical roots and was
based upon cynicism developed in the face of structural and institutional neglect.
The distrust was not limited to formal institutions; it extended to those entering the
neighborhood who did not share residents’ concern for the community. Residents perceived a
need to defend themselves against individuals who did not care for their property or who caused
violence. This became especially pronounced in the immediate aftermath of Hurricane Katrina.
The widespread devastation of the community’s housing stock led to significant abandonment by
those who were evacuated and decided not to return. Tameka, a longstanding resident and
middle-class homeowner, told me that “a lot of people from before didn’t return but a lot of new
families, new people are coming to the neighborhood.” This influx of new residents brought
those who, according to Dr. T “don’t seem as concerned for the community as the older senior
citizens do.” There was a sense, expressed by most, that these newcomers cared less about the
safety and well-being of the neighborhood and thus were not to be trusted.
There were two sub-themes that emerged from the data. The first was concern about
“invaders” and a need to defend the community from those that did not share a positive interest
in Hollygrove’s well-being. The second was mistrust directed at outsiders who brought new
ideas for neighborhood improvement. While invaders were universally perceived as negative,
changers received a mixed review, especially in light of positive developments that occurred in
Hollygrove since Katrina.
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People from Outside the Neighborhood: Resident Negative Perceptions of Invaders
Hollygrove residents categorized the tension between insiders and outsiders in two ways.
The first was between stable homeowners and newer, more transient renters. The second was
between long-term residents and those they considered to have come to the neighborhood to
cause harm. Tameka was a 40-something homeowner and noted that danger was connected to
renters who were not acclimated to the neighborhood’s mores:
I would have to say that the areas that are more dangerous probably are the people who
are renters. The few people that you have back here that own their home, I’m thinking
they’re the safer areas, like closer to Carrollton and closer to Earhart. I probably would
have to say that those people are renters, haven’t lived in the neighborhood that long like
some of us have. And you know, it goes back to the same thing, the parents start out on
Section 8 or whatever and the children kinda follow in their footsteps because they think
that that’s okay and that’s the way it should be.
Other homeowners, especially those with longevity in the neighborhood, also expressed
concern about an influx of new renters in the community, many coming from the public housing
complexes that were closed, razed and rebuilt after Katrina. Gardner, Irwin and Peterson (2009)
found the federal government’s HOPE VI program had begun to enact “highly punitive policies
to ‘manage’ people who remained in public housing, including a community service requirement
and a ‘one strike and you’re out’ policy that set stern rules on residents’ behavior” (p. 104).
Some Hollygrove residents attributed the influx of new renters to these policies which displaced
those who didn’t meet the behavioral requirements to neighborhoods like Hollygrove. In the
following exchange of seniors from a focus group the members expressed this sentiment:
S1:

Single parents and I don’t know what all, but these are places that they brought
people from other areas and put them back there, there are times when they have
parties and um, and they have all this loud music, oh 10 or 11 o’clock at night and
all like that and my neighbors say, “Oh this is not a project, this is my home,” and
she called and reported and I haven’t heard that noise since then. So it’s the
outsiders, people that are invading, the young people that are invading the
neighborhood that’s…
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S2:

My cousin live in Hollygrove and my 7-year-old, have a party for my 7-year-old
by my cousin house, so all the rest of the kids they know my (indistinguishable)
and they having a party here because they can’t have it where they live in…

S3:

(interrupting) in those new projects.

S2:

(resuming) in the new projects, they cannot have it. So if your cousin live in
Hollygrove but she say, “Oh, you can come and have a party in the yard.” So
people migrate to the party. And when they have a children party it’s an adult
party anyway. So they goes to 2 or 3 o’clock in the morning, although the
children are asleep somewhere. Next time it might be downtown, somebody’s
daughter having a birthday party but they can’t have it in the project ‘cause they
knew they’d get put out.

Hollygrove residents understood these residents to have different standards of behavior,
something homeowners considered disruptive to the quality-of-life in Hollygrove and a precursor
to trouble. Eldridge, a 20-something homeowner, attributed the danger in certain areas of
Hollygrove to transient renters:
Well, a lot of that has to do with, it’s just a certain types of people that live in those areas.
A lot of people rent properties and stuff like that and it’s a lot of people that move in and
out, in and out. Like in this neighborhood (noting the section where he lives) it’s not too
many people that move in and out. I think the only person that moved in is on that, I
think a duplex on the corner and they’ve been there a few years. I think when you
constantly have different people you don’t know what kind of element you adding into
that community and I think it’s like lower income people that’s poor and they’ll be more
likely if there’s so many people living in one household it’s a higher chance of the wrong
person, the wrong type of person. You know you got some people have like 10, 15
people living in one house.
Renters with a longer history in the neighborhood expressed similar opinions. Caroline, a longtime renter in the community, shared the homeowners’ perceptions connecting danger to newer
residents. Despite Hollygrove’s reduction in violent crime, she said “it feels more dangerous
because the people that is doing the crime, I don’t know the people,” adding “so I don’t want to
stay anywhere where the neighborhood has a lot of new people. I know the elderly people that
stay back here but they got a lot of new people that I don’t know and that’s what I’m afraid of

170

and why I wouldn’t stay back here.” While she continued to work at a Hollygrove community
center, her fear of outsiders led her to live outside the neighborhood.
Renters, however, were not the sole cause of danger in the minds of Hollygrove residents.
Many thought outsiders intentionally came to the neighborhood to cause problems. Residents
mentioned three problematic things that outsiders were thought to bring into into the
neighborhood: guns, drugs, and visitors to neighborhood ABOs.
Several interviewees presumed the guns in the community were being imported by
outsiders. Claude, a senior homeowner who lived in Hollygrove most of his life asked, “Where
the hell they getting all these goddamn guns from?” One of the community leaders, a 40something director of a nonprofit agency, lamented the widespread availability of guns,
especially in the hands of younger people:
I cannot understand for the life of me where are all the guns and ammunition coming
from? If we’re talking about 14 to 18 year olds, where are they getting these weapons?
How are there so many weapons on the street, and then, not to just have the weapons but
to continually get ammunition for em? Where is this stuff coming from? I, that’s not,
how you just get that? Constantly. And we poor. So, bullets are not cheap, where,
where I don’t get it.
In 1998 a former Mayor of New Orleans, Marc Morial, lost a high profile lawsuit against
gun manufacturers for making guns too easily available. One of the seniors recalled that effort,
explaining that the loss had long-term implications for the safety of communities like
Hollygrove:
So you gotta remember, you’ve had drug addicts in the community forever, however in
more recent years not only did the drugs come in but guns came in. As poor black people
we have not the means for getting in the guns and drugs. So somebody is financing the
guns coming into our neighborhood and the drugs and it’s not us. And they’ve got our
children with the guns and the drugs, with the violence, you see. And Marc Morial tried
to see if he could have some legislation about not having the guns or going after the gun
manufacturers. Well as you know there’s a very strong gun lobby that prevents this. And
not only do we have this here but you can go around to all the urban areas in this country
and you have this violence, this shooting of people on a regular basis. I don’t know why
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you’d ever let 30 people a day get killed by gun violence and that’s a big upcry when we
have an unfortunate police officer because someone didn’t frisk somebody properly. You
had this poor girl that was shot, she wasn’t the intended victim but a bullet doesn’t know
who’s the intended victim and who isn’t, you see. So part of it goes to the gun
manufacturers and the gun lobby and of course they say the second amendment right, the
right to bear arms.
The 20-something males knew how and where to buy a gun as well as the purchase price,
$100 for someone familiar to the seller and $250 for a stranger. Purchased legally the cost of a
firearm was twice that amount. Since there were no gun shops in Hollygrove residents thought
that guns were imported to the neighborhood by outsiders who profit from their sales. One
community leader thought that little was being done to trace the source of these guns, implying
that gun violence in Hollygrove was of little concern to agents of formal control:
we make guns, we gotta track em, you know? It’s just crazy. Ammunition is tracked, it
has tracking numbers on them and all that stuff. So, how do we get it? Fourteen year
olds carrying guns, really? Had to come from somewhere.
Law enforcement officials and residents both stated that neighborhood gun violence was
linked to outsiders entering the community to both purchase and sell drugs. One senior,
commenting on this, stated “I think it’s the people who don’t live in this neighborhood who
come and conduct their business in this neighborhood and when it goes wrong they’re not
interconnected with over the river because it happened over here. You go back over the river
and the, someplace else.” These words reflected an understanding that outsiders brought guns
and drugs in the neighborhood, benefitted from the profits but escaped culpability for the violent
neighborhood results.
In addition to the widespread availability of guns as a source of violence, residents also
connected violence to outsiders who came to the neighborhood to purchase drugs. One senior
described drug deals happening across the street from her home, “when I was living in the front
of my house, my kitchen was right there on Gen. Ogden, you would be surprised at how many
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white people come back here, make their transaction and go back to their office.” A former
neighborhood drug dealer described this from the perspective of the seller:
They got a bunch of drug dealers out here hanging. He has his own clientele. And
everybody be dealing with different people from different neighborhoods. I don’t sell to
just people in my neighborhood, I sell to people outside the neighborhood, so when you
call me, well whatcha need? Where you at? I’m on Forshey Street. So they got people
from other neighborhoods coming back to come score so they know, where it’s at. So if
they want to come in there and do you something, they know where you at.
Even law enforcement officials acknowledged this as one police officer state, “You have some
great people back there, a lot of great people, but you also have some really violent people that
are still either anchored back there or, ‘cause of whatever reason, have left the neighborhood and
they no longer live there but historically have done their violence there, they have trafficked in
narcotics there, and they still come back to that area to commit those crimes.” Many attributed
the supply, sales and purchase of drugs to outsiders. When violence erupted it differentially
impacted the residents; the outsiders could leave while the residents remained to absorb both the
impact of the violence and the enduring reputation of the neighborhood as a dangerous place.
Residents stated that violence related to guns and drugs was more prevalent at
neighborhood ABOs. The flashpoint for much of the neighbors’ concern was a two block stretch
of the neighborhood where most of the drugs were sold and where a significant amount of gun
violence occurred. Several singled out Big Time Tips, a bar located in that area, as an especially
dangerous place where outsiders would gather. Tips had a long history in the neighborhood as a
family-owned gathering place but in recent years it changed ownership and was managed by
outsiders who were not thought to share the community’s concern for the neighborhood. Charles
lived on the same block as the bar and was impacted by the escalating violence that took place
there. He recounted its demise:
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These new people come back here, you don’t even know ‘em. Before the hurricane, it
was really bad. They done got completely out of hand. They always had drugs back here
but it wasn’t centralized, it wasn’t rampant. But it got to the point where they had Big
Time Tips, before that used to be Margie’s Bar, on that corner, on the corner of Eagle and
Olive, Eagle and Edinburgh, that was Ms. Margie’s Bar. Harry Valley was the name, that
was way back, every now and then you’d have a couple of skirmishes but you didn’t have
all that killing and all that dope. Everything was OK, was low profile. You really didn’t
hear too much about it. But when Eli, they called him Ghost and that’s how they came
up with the name Ghost Town. Eli, when he got the place, they started letting all the
young people come back here, they’d come from all over, everywhere.
His explanation for violence was the presence of youth from other neighborhoods. Angela lived
on the same block, across the street from Tips. She stated that the recent reduction of violence
occurred when the bar was shuttered by neighborhood activists:
When the bar shut down, there was that congregation of people weren’t coming there.
You didn’t have an influx from all the different areas ‘cause it was a very popular bar
‘cause you can be there and participate in all kinds of activity and you weren’t being shut
down from it. You had an inside scoop and there was always somebody from outside,
“Hey man, here comes the police” and informs somebody. And things would cool down,
calm down, flush down, whatever, you know? So you didn’t have people just coming in
the neighborhood any more like that, certainly not that time of night. So that
automatically changed the area.
In her recollection, the bar had become a staging area for drug sales by and to outsiders. The
closure of the ABO meant that outsiders were no longer coming into the neighborhood at that
location to participate in the illicit economy which she surmised was organized specifically
around Tips.
These respondents considered outsiders, rather than Hollygrove residents, to be as
important as location in their understanding of neighborhood violence. While drug use and sales
had a long history in Hollygrove, residents understood violence to occur when people from
outside the neighborhood became involved. This hinted at collective efficacy, as neighbors saw
those with a stake in the neighborhood, even when involved in the illicit economy, as less likely
to engage in violence inside the community. Outsiders, on the other hand, were not thought to
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have a stake in the neighborhood, bringing guns, drugs and violence, then escaping to other
places and avoiding the ill effects their actions were perceived to cause.
The view of outsiders as primary agents of neighborhood violence was interesting.
Several of the participants in the study acknowledged participating in violence so it was apparent
that outsiders were not the sole cause of it. There appeared to be two reasons for this. First,
residents differentiated between the motivations of those engaged in the subculture and violence
of the underground economy, attributing insider involvement to economic necessity and outsider
involvement to predatory motives. Second, resident desire to defend their neighborhood required
an ability to define who belonged and who didn’t. When formal controls did not serve the
neighborhood adequately, neighborhood boundaries became more rigid and residents saw
outsiders as the primary threat to community safety.

We’re Gonna Fight That: Outsiders as Agents of Change.
The distrust of outsiders was not limited to those engaged in the illicit economy but
included those who wanted to impose new ideas for neighborhood change. Hollygrove residents
resisted change, mistrusting outside interventions that could lessen their tenuous hold on control
of their own neighborhood. One example of this was mentioned earlier in the comments of a
government leader citing the seniors’ fear of razing a long-neglected community center due to
concern that the money would be stolen and the building project abandoned. Others thought that
neighborhood violence was related to outsiders who profited from their misfortune. One resident
even suspected that a plot was underway to devalue property values in an effort to reclaim
valuable land strategically located in the center of the city:
I think, I think people are awake at night when we’re sleepin’ and tryin’ to think about
OK, what can we do to change the construction or whatever you would call it within an
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area. And Earhart, when I was in Booker Washington in 1965-66, that Earhart
Expressway was thought about, and it was many years ago. I’ve been out of school 50
years and that Earhart Expressway was thought about back then. There were, blueprints,
on that bein’ done. The connection was supposed to be Earhart to the Interstate, so they
need this land. And now we’re still talkin’ about the railroad comin’ from Metairie here.
It’s all in the plan. And we don’t know when the plan gonna go through, but it’s gonna
go through or it planned to go through, but we’re gonna fight that.
Resistance to change in Hollygrove reflected the historical lack of political capital and the
accompanying powerlessness that residents experienced. Residents regarded change agents with
mistrust in light of years of community neglect by those in positions of power. Thus outsiders
with ideas for neighborhood improvement were met with resistance and suspicion. At the same
time change was needed for neighborhood improvement, especially changes that led to violence
reduction.
Since Hurricane Katrina many outsiders relocated to the community. Some brought ideas
for community improvement but thought their ideas were being resisted. One community leader
from the focus group, an African American woman in her 60s who purchased a home in
Hollygrove and has been active in the community, expressed a sense of frustration with this
dynamic:
When, post-Katrina, when we sat around downstairs and talked about the history and how
many years you’ve lived here, it was a real sense of I didn’t belong here because, for, at
the time I didn’t even live in Hollygrove. I represented somebody from the outside. I
guess more prominent for white folks, but it’s not just white folks, it’s other people and
that represents change and when you talk, when we do, used to do surveys and so forth,
people could see no, what’s the point? There’s no sense of need for growth, I don’t want
to say there’s no sense of need, but there’s no urgent feeling for we need to get better, do
things differently, things are fine just the way they are.

Despite having worked in the neighborhood for 15 years, she experienced resistance and
attributed this to her status as an outsider. She reflected upon her experience of the cynicism of
the community toward change efforts, noting that residents resist based upon their perceptions
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that such efforts in the past have not resulted in substantive improvement. Residents were both
weary and wary of novelty.
The resistance toward outside agents of change appeared to be lessening, however. The
same community leader would later reflect on new developments in the neighborhood imported
by outsiders that were effective in improving the community and brought an element of hope:
I think post-Katrina so many positive things happened. Not everybody in the
neighborhood got involved in change, making things better but I think almost everybody
was impacted by the people that were involved. What we did with the AARP and even
the Hollygrove Market and all of that, the seniors, all of those things were small and
somewhat connected and involved a handful of people, it did not involve the whole
neighborhood. But you can’t say how directly they were influenced except that it
changed the atmosphere in the neighborhood. I think the threat, that fear of outsiders
coming in, began to dissipate and the resistance to change lessened, I think everybody
actually did, many people, the majority of people really did have concern about crime.
And we did that thing, we’re going to reduce crime and it, for the first time people said,
“Yeah, you know, something could happen.”
A police official also noticed the changes brought by outsiders:
The farmer’s market back there is great, which is bringing different people back to the
community, bringing people from outside. I’ve even gone there to get eggs before. So
you know it brings outside people into the community. That’s great—you can’t even put
a price tag on it because it’s a neighborhood that in the ‘90s anybody would have been
scared to go in. And now you have people, ‘cause of the farmer’s market, that are not
from Hollygrove and maybe not even from New Orleans—maybe they’re from Jefferson
Parish—that traditionally would have been, “I would never go to New Orleans,” scared to
come into the city. And the only way they’d even come into New Orleans is if they’re
drivin’ on the interstate and they just keep goin’, now coming to the farmer’s market on a
regular basis to buy things. When I’ve gone there, I’ve seen people from all over the city.
And I think that’s great because it makes the neighborhood almost like a normal
neighborhood now. And somebody who would’ve said before, “I’ll never live back
there” now would maybe even consider movin’ back in there…
Recent neighborhood changes brought increased political and social capital and an improved
neighborhood reputation. This may explain some of the reduced resistance toward outside
influences. Dr. T explained the change in attitude by opining, “As more and more people come
in and not only move into the community, embrace the community, and care for the community,
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change can happen.” Positive developments in the neighborhood occurred when outsiders were
allowed to collaborate with the community. As the neighborhood’s boundaries became less rigid
and defended it allowed the neighborhood to experience more political and social capital, thus
helping the neighborhood to reduce its marginalization.

Summary
Hollygrove was a neighborhood that had experienced what Wacquant (2008) termed
advanced marginality defined by sociospatial isolation, the retrenchment of the labor market, the
intrusion of the formal police controls, and the recoiling of the welfare system. In the context of
political and social abandonment Hollygrove residents developed a siege mentality fostered by
both the strong need for self-preservation and a deep mistrust for those from outside the
community whose motives may be detrimental to its well-being. Outsiders were branded as
invaders and defenses were erected to protect against their advances. The police were seen as an
occupying force. Politicians were widely considered to be biased against neighborhood interests.
The economic interests of the city were thought to be profiting at the expense of local residents.
The resulting resistance, even against those outsiders who could potentially facilitate change,
brought further isolation and marginality.
Given the longstanding neglect and marginalization of the neighborhood, such resistance
was understandable. And yet, in the years since Katrina, residents appeared to be more
comfortable with some outsiders. Sampson (2012) credited post-Katrina rebuilding efforts for
triggering collective efficacy and collective action, concluding that “despite poverty, racial
segregation and other challenges exacerbated by the truly top-down force of mother nature,
community-based organizations provided an opening to enhance collective efficacy and
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collective civic action” (p. 372). The widespread devastation of Hollygrove provided
opportunity for the community to rethink previous attitudes toward outsiders. As residents
returned to the community in desperate need of help, outsiders were allowed a unique window
through which they brought novel ideas for innovation. Outside ideas alone did not build
collective efficacy, however, the difference was the collaborative relationship between residents
and outsiders, where local visions for a better neighborhood were coupled with resources they
could not have secured on their own. The result was an empowered citizenry with enhanced
social and political capital.
At the same time residents still experienced mistrust of other outsiders. These included
new residents who didn’t share their values, renters who were perceived to cause disruption,
importers of guns, drug purchasers and visitors to neighborhood ABOs. Many perceived these
outsiders to be a significant source of neighborhood lethal violence.
The difference was one of definition; residents appeared to more ably delineate between
those who would harm the neighborhood and those who would help. Two realities made this
possible. The first was an increase in political capital as outside actors helped residents to gain a
voice and sufficient power to attract the attention of the city. The second was an influx of new
residents who did not share the longstanding mistrust of outsiders. This combination led Dr. T to
note “as the numbers of safe people and the trustworthy people go up and the people that were
once on the outside, doing the violent acts and being the aggressors come into this safe place,
then the number of the dangerous people are gonna go down and this ratio of safety to dangerous
is gonna go down to the point where there is no more danger, there is no more violence.” While
this may prove to be an overly optimistic view, his perspective did serve to capture the
burgeoning awareness that not all outsiders brought danger to the community.
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The post-Katrina rebuilding experiences of Hollygrove residents were unique. They were
not simply rebuilding homes, they were attempting to rebuild a better, safer community. During
many community meetings conducted during those years residents exhibited an ability to
innovate and creatively enact solutions resulting in a neighborhood better than the one they
evacuated. Extending this creativity to the problem of neighborhood rates of homicide, the next
chapter focuses on resident-driven solutions to neighborhood homicide.
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Chapter 10: Findings
The Difference is Me: Grassroots Solutions to the Problem of Lethal Violence

Early in his interview Robert, the former drug dealer with multiple felony convictions,
shared a revelation he had in the courtroom. He remarked upon the changes in his life that
prompted him to choose the occupation of auto mechanic, a job for which he was trained in the
penitentiary, over drug dealing. We were discussing his life in Hollygrove’s subculture and his
transition back to the neighborhood. I wanted to understand what factors led to the change of
occupation. In the following exchange he explained his reasoning:
The difference is me. The difference is me right now, like I said, I’m not about to put
myself in a position where, I’ve been home over a year now, a little over a year now.
Judge White told me I have five felony convictions. Judge White told me, she said
“Robert, you have no room for error right now. You mess up one more time, I promise
you, you never come back home again.” And I believe her. I got too much to lose right
now. I got a wife. I got kids. And like I said, I’m not about to go spend the rest of my
life just sitting in a prison with a bunch of, you know what I’m saying?
After years of participating in the Keeping It Real subculture, something changed. The prospect
of the rest of his life in prison brought Robert to the realization that his future was one he could
control; he was the difference-maker. He was not alone. Hollygrove’s change is recent years
was the result of many deciding that they were the difference, that the solution to Hollygrove’s
violence rested in the neighborhood’s control.
Gregory (1998) wrote “the concept of an ‘inner city’ isolated from the American
‘mainstream’ and plagued with escalating rates of welfare dependency, crime, and teen
pregnancy has served as a dominant trope for representing urban black experience in the postcivil rights era, conflating, in the minds of many, black identity, urbanism, and the ‘tangle of
pathology’ of the poor” (p. 5). He chronicled the struggle of African Americans in a
dispossessed community for political power, neighborhood services, and environmental justice,
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while combatting the prevailing attitudes that conflated race, poverty and social pathology.
Tamesha was a college sophomore raised in Hollygrove by a single mother with limited
intellectual skills. She fought hard to graduate from the city’s flagship public school, receiving a
full ride to an elite college in the northeast. Tamesha described Hollygrove in a similar fashion
to Gregory’s:
I mean, just look. This is a black neighborhood. And in this neighborhood, in the South I
feel like at least in Louisiana, black is equated with like poor. It has to do with
segregation, it has to do with—I don’t know if you’ve ever noticed, and I’ve always
brought this up, literally you cross Earhart, or you go down this way, it’s like sectioned
off. It’s like you go from the slums, no trees, all concrete, to like trees and palms. And it
has to do with the structure of the city back in the day. And I feel like violence, gun
violence in black communities, is something that has been structured. It has almost been
formulated. You have an oppressive system sayin’, oh, you can’t, if you want financial
assistance you can’t have a husband basically. You have a system that makes you as a
person livin’ in, you have a system that makes you feel like, I have to take matters into
my own hands to protect myself…Anybody can call the police, but does everybody feel
secure? Does the police make everybody feel secure?
In a city where structural forces limited the help that black neighborhoods received, an ethic of
self-help became paramount. In Hollygrove the residents had to fend for themselves for so long
that distrust of formal systems emerged.
In the years since Katrina, however, neighbors long marginalized as residents of a
dangerous, poor, African American, inner-city community began to create a new narrative.
Community residents worked to engage politicians and agents of formal control, to rebuild longneglected community infrastructure, and to address systemic injustices, shifting from passive
victims to active participants. Cowen (2014) concluded that the “rebirth of the ‘neighborhood
effect’” (p. 114) in Hollygrove was brought about by two factors: collaborative partnerships and
shared community vision. Wooten (2012) chronicled the neighborhood’s efforts to improve its
reputation after the storm and pointed out that the efforts occurred despite local government’s
inattention to their work. Rich and Benson (2012) situated one post-Katrina resident project, the
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Hollygrove Market and Farm, among the nation’s best-practices in food security. This external
praise was mirrored by residents who expressed a growing sense of pride and optimism as
neighborhood improvements, coupled with a significant reduction in violent crime, led to
revitalized collective efficacy.
Most macrosociological studies of neighborhood homicide concluded with sweeping
policy suggestions that proposed top-down solutions. Many academics and politicians created
programmatic interventions to combat neighborhood violence with minimal input from those
who daily lived in the milieu. There was a paternalism in this approach, one that reified the
prevailing mainstream judgments of a helpless population in need of outside intervention. In
Hollygrove, however, residents drove grassroots efforts that marked their post-Katrina
rebuilding. Building upon those successes at neighborhood change, recognizing that Hollygrove
residents possessed untapped knowledge, part of this study was devoted to understanding
whether this knowledge might be extended to novel solutions for neighborhood homicide.
This supposition proved correct, Hollygrove’s residents advanced 120 separate solutions
for reducing homicide in the community. These were analyzed into five categories: community
strategies, educational strategies, formal control strategies, quality-of-life strategies and
economic strategies. The remainder of this chapter is dedicated to sharing the best of these ideas.

Community-based Strategies
Most of the strategies for the amelioration of community violence were communitybased. Many residents referred to the importance of meetings, specifically highlighting three
types: organizing meetings where residents could strategize ways to improve collective efficacy,
parties to solidify community unity through relationship-building, and special service-related
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events. William, a 30-something renter, proposed two types “meetings on how they can make
things safe around here” and meetings where “white and black come together and fight against
it.” He considered neighborhood unity to be an important component of violence reduction and
noted that community efforts would be enhanced if the greater New Orleans community,
especially the dominant white power bloc, would choose to exercise their power on behalf of the
neighborhood. In a similar vein a member of the community leaders focus group recommended
that the neighborhood needed to “continue what we were doing, having vacant houses that are
troublesome torn down and doing community action against it, having community meetings,
talking about problems and coming up with solutions, that’s been, that has been the big change.”
This comment reflected recent successes at violence reduction that occurred after implementing a
crime prevention expert’s strategy of fixing neighborhood physical disorder.
The community residents also recommended that some of the meetings be fun and
focused upon relationship-building. Angela remembered a time in Hollygrove when:
We used to, every Easter, we’d have a big party. Everybody on the block would be
barbecuing, you know, or boiling seafood. And we’d be dancing in this yard or this yard,
you know, or whatever, laughing, just everybody having a good time. I would love to go
back to that. I mean people used to cook, send somebody something, you know? I used
to love to bake my bread. I can’t remember my recipe to save my life. But I used to love
to do that and send it to my neighbors, you know? Just having camaraderie with others,
not staying in your house.
Zora, the day care provider, had a similar view:
Again, we have to get together and do more stuff, like more fun stuff. Just more fun stuff
for kids and adults to participate in where they gonna say, “You know what, I can help in
doin’ that, I can help in doin’ this.” And talkin’ to them. That’s how you get to talk to
people, by doin’ things, you know?
The work of community building can be taxing. Residents thought that celebrating hard work
marked important milestones and built relationships. These residents asserted that periodic
celebratory meetings might be interspersed with working meetings as components of violence
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reduction. They desired a milieu that enhanced relationship-building and community collective
efficacy.
A third type of community meeting were service-related. Robert, formerly involved in
the neighborhood violence shared this solution:
Yeah, like I said, just get more involved in the neighborhood. I be going to different
neighborhoods when I used to be just getting around, they be havin’ a lot of shit
everywhere else. People just out there. They neighborhood, they got shit going on at the
park. They might have the Indians at the park, free food giveaway, another park, they got
a basketball tournament goin’ on out there. Go over here they got a flag football game.
You know what I’m sayin’? People in general like to feel like they a part of something.
You know what I’m sayin’? They just want to feel like a part of something. So get out
there and do something about it.
Neighborhood service was an effective part of the neighborhood’s self-improvement strategy.
The neighborhood association wrote and received a grant to purchase lawnmowers to cut
overgrown vacant lots. Residents planted trees. Neighbors planned and conducted an annual
Night Out Against Crime in conjunction with the city. The seniors conducted their own
community programs for ten years while awaiting the rebuilding of the neighborhood senior
center. Several seniors began the Hollygrove Soul Steppers that walked for exercise past crime
hotspots to maintain vigilance and send the message that the community was watching. These
resident efforts were innovative ways of organizing the community around improvement. As
residents realized their power to reshape the community, they built collective efficacy.
Residents also mentioned church attendance as a way to both transmit positive values and
redirect bad actors to a more constructive path. This suggestion came from a wide age range,
from the oldest member of the study to the youngest. Claude, the oldest member of the study
was a lifelong church attender who thought the answer was “education and the churches,” adding
“get these children into Sunday School, get ‘em active in the church to keep them doin’
something.” Langston, in his early 20s, thought that “prayer walking and, you know, goin’
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around getting along with people, like inviting people to church” was the solution. Dr. T
concurred, noting “in praying for situations to cut down on violence, God will show us how to
interact with these people, how to engage these people.” Kobe who, in his late teens was the
youngest member of the study, gave an expanded explanation of his solution to Hollygrove’s
murder rate, beginning and ending with a spiritual emphasis:
I think the only way you could ever change something like that is through education and
the church. I think that’s the only way you could turn it, ‘cause some of the people are
already too late in their life to like affect in big ways versus the drug dealers or the people
who have been in jail multiple times on different offenses and stuff. They can’t really get
a good job because of the way things are set up. That’s always gonna be in they head,
that’s always gonna bug them. But then you got kids who aren’t at that point where
they’re going to start getting into some serious trouble and you could still affect [them]. I
think if you could affect kids you could stop that cycle of senseless murders or robbery
and drug use. If you could somehow affect those kids you could affect the ones that
come up after them because the ones that come up after them are going to look up to
them and they’re going to see, alright these kids aren’t doing drugs, they aren’t shooting
and killing people and that’s how you start up a new cycle, a better one. But as for the
older ones, it’d be cool if they could somehow set up some kind of job for ‘em, some
kind of way of having work and earning a fair [wage], without having to do anything bad.
And also church because I think a lot of people haven’t found Jesus and it’s like they
pretty much don’t know why they living. You know they just out there, “I gotta get some
money so I can eat,” get drugs or whatever. And if a lot of them actually turned to God I
think it might change their lives for the better. And, in fact, that could triangulate to the
younger kids.
Kobe’s solution was especially poignant as his mother and siblings were all immersed in the
drug subculture and had been to prison, while he had never used drugs, had been involved in
church and was the only one in his family to attend university. His perspective was based both
upon his personal experiences and his recognition of the limiting impact of drugs and mass
incarceration upon the life chances of those like his mother and siblings.
Several in the study mentioned mentoring as a solution for neighborhood homicide. The
young men in the 20-something focus group bemoaned the neighborhood’s lack of mentors:
M1:

They don’t have mentors, they need mentors.
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M2:

Daddies don’t want to take care of them.

M3:

Mentors, like [name deleted] said, there’s no opportunity. Like, OK, let’s say I’m
13 years old and I’m thinking to myself, “I’m good, Mr. Kevin got this program
he going to help me get in. Play basketball when I’m this age, and I’m going to
school here when I’m this age,” they don’t have that, and if they had it they don’t
know where to find it.

All the young men in the focus group were raised without fathers. They experienced a need for
positive role-models who could help them map their future, get them involved in sports, and act
in their absent fathers’ stead. One of the seniors offered an intriguing type of mentorship, using
unemployed and retired men experiencing joblessness or retirement to act as job mentors for the
community’s young men:
We got a lot of men that’s sitting around doing nothing when they could be teaching
these young men how to be men, because a lot of these young boys don’t have men in
their homes; they mother, they mother is the whole source of everything, but they have
men in the neighborhood that’s sitting around all day doing nothing, might have been a
carpenter, might have been a mechanic, might have been, you know? They could teach
these kids how to do painting, do, paint the houses there, whatever.
This proposal had three implications. First, the years immediately following retirement could
become extremely productive for men willing to pass their knowledge to younger men. Second,
those who are unemployed were thought to have valuable skills which could be transmitted to
mentees, providing worth for men devalued by the job market. Finally, this idea presented a
ready source of mentors within the community, men who had existing ties to the community and
understood the realities faced by the youth of Hollygrove. Rather than bringing outside mentors
into the community, this solution had potential to bring meaning to both Hollygrove’s youth and
to those who were unemployed or retired.
Several mentioned recreational opportunities for Hollygrove’s youth as potential
solutions. One senior pointed to the fact that seniors had a place to go, “we come here, we meet,
we try to support each other, but young people have nowhere to gather and nothing to do.” She
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pointed to the need “to do something that will entice and help our young people on the good
side.” The solution she forwarded was “something in every neighborhood for these children to
do.” Other ideas included accessible and inviting parks, neighborhood basketball tournaments
and a community pool. Because youth crime peaks during unstructured, non-school hours
structured activities for neighborhood youth was thought to serve two purposes: prosocial values
transmission and positive diversion from the allure of the subculture.
Residents thought community centers might help reduce violence. Several mentioned
Trinity Christian Community, a faith-based community center located in Hollygrove that offered
programs but had also been key to advocacy and community redevelopment efforts in the
neighborhood. A former resident, now in city government, mentioned an innovative solution of
intergenerational programs that could take place at the senior center that was undergoing reconstruction in the neighborhood, “You also might see a change once the center is opening again
and we can get the seniors back there to start instilling [values] and to get the people to buy into
generational programs where the seniors can help the young people to give them some basic
skills and help them with their education and see if we can change this around.” As the new
senior center was one block from the newly constructed community school, this idea had merit.
Seniors had a lifetime of experience that could be beneficial to the youth of the community. He
was suggesting that both values transmission and educational and job-related skills could be
tapped in an effort to enhance the lives of both youth and the seniors themselves.
The literature notes that mentoring does have a positive impact on at-risk youth. Tolan,
Henry, Schoeny, Lovegrove and Nichols (2013) used meta-analysis of 46 studies published
between 1970-2011 to find that mentoring at-risk youth had a significant and positive effect on
delinquency, aggression, drug use and academic functioning, issues that residents reported to be
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important in their understanding of neighborhood violence. DuBois, Holloway, Valentine and
Cooper (2002) in a meta-analysis of 55 studies found only modest effectiveness overall but noted
that mentoring’s impact is significantly improved under two conditions: when empirically-based
best practices are used and when strong relationships are formed between mentors and youth.
Community-based volunteers exposed to many of the challenges faced by Hollygrove’s youth
may understand them better and thus had an enhanced ability to relate to their unique
neighborhood context.
Two other community-based strategies mentioned by participants included
homeownership and community rain gardens. Eldridge was a young homeowner in his late 20s
who stated “I’d like to see a lot more homeowners around. I’d like to see a lot of these
abandoned houses that nobody reclaimed since Katrina either torn down or remodeled.” Angela
submitted that Section 8 renters could be converted into homeowners:
I think it’s so foolish, this Section 8 thing. You gonna pay the landlord this much money
where the people who are living in the house that you’re paying for, if you just gave them
a little help they could be buying a property instead of you just helping the people who
have something already get more, and these people are not feeling good about
themselves. Renters don’t really have to worry. But if it was their property, you know,
they would be taking care of it ‘cause they’d have pride of ownership. They’d have pride
in themselves. They’d be feeling good. Why the government is so foolish—I’m on my
soapbox.
Hollygrove’s abandoned houses provided a unique opportunity for homeownership and could
provide locations for experimentation with innovative homeownership funding strategies such as
the one expressed by Angela. Kane and Cronin (2009) connected residential instability to a lack
of neighborhood social controls and social disorganization leading to neighborhood violence.
Residents thought that increased homeownership would lead to neighborhood stability and
reduced neighborhood violence and thus this solution was consistent with one of social
disorganization theory’s explanations of violence.
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Another community problem was street flooding. Much of New Orleans was below sea
level and prone to flooding after torrential rains when the city’s pumps became overwhelmed.
Caroline referenced the rain gardens, a collaborative project of the Tulane City Center, the
Carrollton Hollygrove Community Development Corporation and Trinity Christian Community
to construct water-retention gardens in resident yards thereby keeping the water from entering
the city’s drainage system and potentially preventing street flooding. Flooding was a sign of
neighborhood infrastructure disorder, a condition that Skogan (1990) connected to higher rates of
crime. Caroline saw this connection and proposed the expansion of an innovative solution to
flooding with potential impact upon neighborhood violence.
Sampson (2012) found that altruistic communities, those that pair shared expectations for
action with behavioral action, had significantly lower homicide rates. Saville (2009) noted that
communities who were trained to “create and regulate their own safety in collaboration with
service providers” (p. 309) were able to effectively reduce neighborhood crime. St. Jean (2007)
showed that “neighborhood collection action resulted in displacement or elimination of criminal
activities” (p. 247). Existing research established that communities willing to take action and to
act altruistically on their own behalf could curtail violent crime. Furthermore, Skogan’s (1990)
finding that a community’s physical disorder was positively associated with neighborhood crime
indicated that Hollygrove resident’s concerns about disorder was well-founded.
Hollygrove’s community-based strategy solutions had potential to significantly reduce
violence in the neighborhood by both enhancing neighborhood control and drawing attention to a
marginalized community. Internally the strategies drew neighbors together and provided
ownership and pride of place, a key to neighborhood collective efficacy. These strategies had
also captured the imagination of outsiders who observed, studied and wrote about how the
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community’s efforts helped to increase the neighborhood’s social capital. The net effect was
empowerment, a sense that residents could do for themselves something that externally-imposed
strategies had failed to accomplish.

Educational Strategies
Hollygrove residents in this study valued education and considered it to be a key in the
struggle to reduce neighborhood violence. There were two sets of strategies suggested by
respondents regarding education: those that involved the formal educational system and
strategies that involved informal educational opportunities. Through the duration of this study,
the local public school was under construction. During the ten years between Katrina and the
current study residents had fought diligently with the school board to have Paul L. Dunbar
School rebuilt. As construction commenced residents fought another battle to ensure control
over which charter school entity would operate the school. The concern was that an outside
operator would not value the desires of the community and might cater to a student population
bused into the neighborhood while neglecting the needs of the local community’s children.
Angela, who was educated at Dunbar Elementary as were her children, captured well the
sentiment of many in the study toward formal educational strategies:
You gotta start at the very bottom of the ladder. You have to give everyone, or as many
as you possibly can which should be everyone, an education. You need dedicated
teachers, you need dedicated parents, and you need students to be informed almost
continuously that you are important, you can do this if you truly want to have a good life.
You have to inform them that selling drugs on the street is not the life you want. You
want to, everything isn’t about sports or being a rapper, you gotta want more out of your
life besides cash. You want to feel proud of yourself. You want pride in your area and of
your children. You have to realize that what you’re doing now is going to be passed on
to your children. And the parents got to realize it and they gotta get their children—they
gotta do their durndest to—not to say that they’re gonna listen, but you gotta fight for
them. So I think everything has to start with a good education. And there are a lot of
parents that need to be going to school right along with their children.
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Schools, according to Angela, were more than purveyors of academics but should be places that
helped their students embrace a vision for their futures. Along the way schools must involve
parents in the process of education, embracing them as partners in the process. Parental
involvement was also mentioned by John, who told me that “the parents have to get involved, or
the parent, really needs to understand, you know, the consequences of what’s going on.” Prior to
Katrina the Parent-Teacher Organization at Dunbar was sparsely attended. John’s assertion
intimated that quality schools required active parental participation once the new school was
completed.
Caroline thought that schools needed to provide enhanced opportunities for students. Her
ideal school “would give ‘em, I guess a lot of opportunities, they got schools that have, you
know, the French, they have French in school, you know, so a nice school having the materials,
materials they could use, computers and stuff, you know?” Quality schools were thought to be
well-resourced with broad curricula including foreign languages and access to technology. This
was no idle speculation; during Caroline’s years at Dunbar her guardians had to provide toilet
paper as part of her school supplies. Tameka thought that schools should:
teach financial literacy to children, start out when they are young, make that part of the
curriculum in school. Teach them about investing, teach them about what’s a Roth IRA
or a 401k, so when they are older and they have two dollars to save, they can put those
two dollars into a Roth IRA or a mutual fund or whatever, you know, instead of putting
them in the freezer like my grandmother did or putting them under the mattress. Teach
them about those things so when they get older they’ll know what to do and how to do.
When you get that good training and that good job, make some money and be able to
invest and do other things that you want to do.
For Tameka life skills training, such as financial literacy, were thought to provide opportunities
for participation in the formal economy and could become an alternate pathway out of the
structural impediments that marginalized residents and gave rise to the informal economy.
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Out-of-school time was important to residents as well. The Office of Juvenile Justice and
Delinquency Prevention (2014) stated that juvenile violence peaks in the afterschool hours,
between 3 p.m. and 7 p.m., on school days and between 7 p.m. and 9 p.m. on non-school days.
This fact led one former resident to advocate “a stronger educational system where not only are
you able to teach the child during that normal classroom days, classroom time, but also be able to
have them come in after class for additional activities and then activities in the neighborhood that
keeps people’s minds on the right direction instead of the wrong direction.” The 20-something
young men also thought that out-of-school time programs such as the ones provided by a local
community center, could reduce neighborhood violence. In the following exchange they shared
their views about this:

M1:

like the center, you got all those activities going on for all them children and stuff.
When they get out of school they not going on the corner and go fraternize with
all these other…

M2:

they got the opportunity to go to the Center.

M3:

I’m going to the center, ‘cause when I go to the Center, I know I’m going to have
this, that and the other, I know I’m going to be able to do this and it will help with
life. People look forward to that type of stuff, you got people helping you.

Educational opportunities, according to these residents, need not be limited to formal academic
institutions but could continue after the school day concluded. The schedule of working parents
did not conform to school hours, leaving youth with unstructured and unsupervised time between
the conclusion of the school day and the time a parent returns from work. Providing alternative
activities during these hours was thought to impact neighborhood violent crime.
Parenting assistance was another educational strategy forwarded by informants. Charles’
idea was to bring parents to a community center and offer parenting assistance:

193

I would tell them to, to have a meeting, have a community meeting at the school, or at a
neighborhood center, shelter, and have the parents of these kids come there and you’d
have to talk to their parents, have to talk to the parents of these younger kids. Because
these kids, they’re not gonna be conducive to upholding the good standards of the
community if they don’t have the right direction…so they would have to sit down and
talk to these parents, they have to sit down and talk to these parents, say “Look, you guys
have to buck up, tighten up on your kids.” You have to give them notice. “You have to
tighten up with your kids. If you need help, let us know because they’ve got counselors
out there.”
He proposed these meetings take place once or twice a month. One feature of this idea was the
approach to parents; instead of mandating that parents attend such trainings, a coercive strategy,
Charles’ idea would forge a partnership between parents and what he referred to as “civic
leaders.” Zora’s position as day care provider in the neighborhood brought her into contact with
many parents. She observed deficits in the skills of her ward’s parents and wanted to “bring in
more people that can help the parents with literature and knowin’ what it is that they’re supposed
to do.” Known to many as “The Baby Whisperer,” Zora had tremendous rapport with children
and valuable skills that could be tapped to help struggling parents overcome personal parenting
deficits. One senior pointed to a gap in thinking about parenting training, noting “a lot of
children have parents that’s in prisons, a lot of ‘em parents are dead because of the shootings and
they have grandparents and relatives taking care of these kids and a lot of ‘em is not doing what
they’s supposed to be doing with these kids and these kids is acting up” implying that parenting
training might be extended to caretakers thrust into a parenting role due to the neighborhood
violence and high incarceration rate.
Another idea for parenting training was noted by Caroline. The City’s Health
Department created the Hollygrove Best Babies Zone, based upon the Harlem Children’s Zone.
Caroline told me the program “helps young moms, you know, with children under the age of
two. You know they help them probably, help them with GED, help just give ‘em information
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about how to raise a child.” Its location inside the neighborhood improved the likelihood that
young mothers would participate in wraparound services designed to enhance the lives of their
young children, including parenting training. Providing assistance to guardians was thought not
only to provide valuable information to guardians struggling to raise children but also to alleviate
stress experienced by overburdened caretakers. This was seen as a preventative solution to
neighborhood violence.
One final educational strategy was proposed by Ernest, a neighborhood entrepreneur. His
solution to neighborhood violence was to “push it out with education.” He envisioned a
neighborhood education strategy designed to help people resist the allure of the street culture:
Like that guy that was putting out those signs, “Enough is Enough?” I think if they was
to flood the area, it would resonate. Sometime you got to lay a seed…you might not get
it instantly, but if it’s fed to them constantly. And in the park I think if they had screens
set up where they could have some people come in and explain about that culture, let
them know what is really going on. Set up some entertainment, have some cold drinks,
mingle, and even the police could step in and say, “We’re not here to hurt you, we’re here
to help, everybody’s going to have to be one society.”
His comment about the “Enough is Enough” signs made reference to an initiative by Pastor John
Raphael who created signs with the word “Enough” to decry the high homicide rate in New
Orleans. Ernest’s two-pronged, anti-homicide strategy would combine a public relations
campaign of posting signs throughout the neighborhood like those of Pastor Raphael to be
followed by a conscious-raising event at Conrad Playground where the struggle between
prosocial and street values would be explicated and where the police department would seek to
better ally themselves with the community. Unlike the other educational strategies this was
specifically envisioned to target neighborhood violence through a grassroots educational
campaign led by residents in collaboration with the police department.
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In sum, educational strategies were proposed to reduce violence in four settings. First
were strategies designed to enhance the life chances of neighborhood youth through formal
educational institutions. Second were strategies to educate students during the non-school hours
when violent youth crime was at its peak. A third set of educational strategies were conceived to
assist caretakers in a parental role with the challenging task of raising children. The final
strategy was a grassroots program conceived to intervene directly in the neighborhood violence
via a public relations campaign coupled with special events to educate residents about the
consequences of street violence.
The literature supported the four educational strategies advanced by the residents.
Wilson and Lipsey (2005) performed a meta-analysis of school-based violence prevention
programs through 2004 and found them to be especially effective with higher risk students who
lived in “high poverty, disadvantaged neighborhoods” (p. 25). Webster and Illangasekare (2010)
reported positive results of the Aban Aya Youth Project in Chicago which combined an in-school
educational curriculum and community support to significantly reduce incidences of violence,
provoking behavior, drug use, school delinquency and other risky behaviors. The After School
Alliance (2007) reported that out-of-school time programs have proven effective in both
preventing and reducing neighborhood violent crime. Programs they cited included the Bayview
(San Francisco) Save Haven program, the California Juvenile Crime Prevention 12-cities
Demonstration Project, the Baltimore Police Athletic League, New York City’s Boys and Girls
Clubs and the Los Angeles BEST program. Greenwood (2010) found four family educational
programs that were effective in reducing youth crime and violence. These included the Nurse
Family Partnership where registered nurses educate at-risk mothers regarding parenting skills,
Functional Family Therapy which provides in-home therapists to educate and support parents,
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Guiding Good Choices which promotes healthy, protective parent-child interactions, and the
Strengthening Families Program that enhances parenting, family relationships and teaches
communication skills. Haggerty, McGlynn-Wright and Klima (2013) found two additional
programs to be effective in training parents to reduce children’s violence-related behaviors.
These included The Incredible Years, a 22-week group program for parents of children aged
three to six, and Staying Connected with Your Teen, a seven-week program for youth aged 1217. Finally, the use of communications and media strategies suggested by Ernest has been
adopted by several violence reduction initiatives including Boston’s Ceasefire Program,
Chicago’s Cure Violence Program, Project Safe Neighborhoods, and the Drug Market
Intervention Program (McGarrell, Hipple, Bynum, Perez, Gregory, Kane & Ransford, 2013).
These strategies represented a multi-faceted approach to prosocial values transmission.
As seen in an earlier chapter, Hollygrove residents were concerned that positive values were not
being passed to future generations. Each of the four proposed approaches attacked this concern
from different vantage points: in-school, after-school, in the home, and community-wide. In
essence these were battlefronts in the war of values taking place in Hollygrove and were a
comprehensive set of tactics to assure that prosocial values were passed to the next generation.

Formal Control Strategies
The third most commonly mentioned solution to Hollygrove’s violence were strategies
that involved agents of formal control. Many residents expressed distrust of the New Orleans
Police Department, while police officials thought they were seen as more like an occupying force
than as partners in the effort to reduce crime. Several respondents expressed novel ideas as to
how this could be changed. While some residents did mention a desire for more agents of formal
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control, some suggested that these should not be NOPD officers. Others mentioned strategies
related to the police department that could improve the community’s relationship with the
NOPD.
Hollygrove residents had mixed feelings about formal controls. Silver and Miller (2006)
found that residents with strong attachment to the community and who were satisfied with the
police had lower levels of legal cynicism and were more likely to exercise informal social
controls. Kirk and Papachristos (2011) noted that residents who did not trust agents of formal
control, viewing them as illegitimate, unresponsive and uncaring, were more likely to engage in
behaviors that ran counter to dominant norms. Hollygrove residents’ long experience of
structural neglect resulted in a spectrum of cynicism ranging from complete mistrust to a
willingness to work cooperatively with agents of law enforcement. This spectrum was reflected
in the variety of formal control strategies proffered by residents.
William, a security guard at a local hospital, recommended the neighborhood “hire a
security guard company to ride around at night ‘cause everybody don’t have a car…so some
people have to catch the bus and walk home at night.” This was a reference to self-taxation
programs available to communities in New Orleans for such purposes. Daneta advocated for
“getting more state troopers or something, or the military men,” referencing a recent effort by the
city to supplement flagging numbers of police officers by bringing the Louisiana State Police
into the city. There was precedent for this idea; in the years after Katrina the military did patrol
the streets setting up checkpoints throughout the city to maintain public safety while Louisiana
State Troopers had been deployed in New Orleans’ French Quarter to supplement NOPD patrols.
Recognizing the disconnection between the police department and Hollygrove’s
residents, she advocated hiring officers from the neighborhood:
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You want cops, but you want them to be focused on the right thing. You don’t want them
to be spendin’ their time frisking you when the guy is jumpin’ out the window. They are
comin’ from outside. They don’t know who is who. I mean there’s a disconnection
there. We have a very disconnected legal system ‘cause they don’t know [the
neighborhood]. I mean you don’t wanna be so biased, but I do think it has to come from
within. People try to do that with different things, like Neighborhood Watch teams and
all that stuff. Is that really the best we can do here? Would it be too extreme to say the
only cops that can serve this neighborhood are cops from this neighborhood? Like what
kind of system is that! And the only cops who can serve this neighborhood are cops that
live in this neighborhood, cops that actually have to live here and don’t have a place to go
back to.
Bratton and Kelling’s (2006) Broken Windows law enforcement strategy called for rapid and
strong reaction to minor offenses in an effort to prevent major offenses from occurring later. The
challenge with this type of policing strategy, according to one high-ranking police official was
“we put people in jail for any little thing we could.” Tamesha’s solution would forge greater
connections between the police and community residents by placing officers with a vested
interest in the community strategically in the communities where they live. Rather than being
seen as an occupying force of outsiders these officers would know and care for the community
and thus act as allies in the work of community improvement.
Three additional strategies fit with the theme of formal control: a mentoring alliance with
the police department, enforcement of loitering laws and the expanded use of crime cameras.
Charles’ personal brush with youth violence in San Francisco led his mother to enroll him in the
Police Activities League (PAL), where his mentor was assigned to “keep you in control,” “keep
you on the straight and narrow,” “report on you,” and “keep you in line.” The San Francisco
PAL provides “civilian and police volunteer coaches and mentors” who serve youth through “a
variety of sports and leadership activities” in an effort to “develop personal character and foster
positive relationships among police officers, youth and dedicated volunteers” (San Francisco
Police Athletic League, n.d.). This program fit with an NOPD official’s solution of “enlisting
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kids as allies not enemies of the police.” A program like the San Francisco PAL combines the
community’s solution of mentorship and the improvement of relationships with the police
department.
Arianne proposed improved enforcement of loitering laws as a solution, saying “they
could stop all those people from hanging on the corner.” She described a good neighborhood as
“a quiet neighborhood, not a lot of people hanging around. Sure not a neighborhood with a
corner store, just because they have a lot of people be hanging out like, around good kids that’s
trying to do good and not be outside terrorizing the neighborhood.” Arianne lived most of her
life within a half block of the Olive Superette, a hot spot for lethal violence. As a high school
student she observed the shooting of Brandon Aggison, a former classmate there. She currently
lived in another house that is also a half block from the store, this time with her young son. Her
reflection on loitering stemmed from her lived experience there, one that had associated the
corner store with both loitering and lethal violence. This would help explain her assumption that
enforcement of existing loitering laws would help to reduce violence.
Crime cameras were also mentioned as a formal control solution. John stated, “crime
cameras I think are one of the best ones.” He had been a part of a program to situate crime
cameras in front of private homes, a joint project of the neighborhood’s city councilmember,
ProjectNOLA, Trinity Christian Community, the Carrollton Hollygrove Community
Development Corporation, and the Electrician’s Union. These cameras were connected in realtime via the Internet to ProjectNOLA’s recording equipment and allowed the NOPD to observe
the aftermath of a crime committed in view of the camera. Some Hollygrove residents thought
the cameras served to deter violent crime.
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These resident solutions were thought to change the polarity of the neighborhood’s
relationship to formal control agencies. In the years prior to the study the power arrangement
between the NOPD and Hollygrove residents was unequally balanced, where the police
controlled the playing field. They were viewed as unresponsive and unable to ensure
Hollygrove’s safety, conditions which Kirk and Papachristos (2011) concluded breed legal
cynicism and adherence to oppositional subcultural values. Hollygrove’s solutions sought to
rearrange that balance by allowing residents to collaborate with policing strategies affecting the
neighborhood. This was consistent with Saville’s (2009) SafeGrowth model where community
safety was enhanced as agents of formal control cooperated with residents to enact a conjoint
planning process that prioritized neighborhood concerns. As the balance of power shifts back to
the community, concluded Sampson, Raudenbush and Earls (1997), residents were more likely
to exert greater collective efficacy, to attract more police participation, and to reduce murders.
This had important implications for law enforcement officers as well; as agents of formal control
engaged residents, distrust was lessened, resident cooperation was enhanced, and neighborhood
violence was reduced.
Hollygrove’s City Councilperson stated, “when the people take responsibility for their
neighborhood and let the police know that they are going to hold them responsible to do their
jobs in the neighborhood, then the police are much more likely to step up to the plate.” This
comment reflected her growing realization that the power arrangement had begun to shift from
the police as an “occupying force” to one where the police served and were accountable to the
community residents. Until the agents of formal control were willing to act in partnership with
the community, serving them instead of exercising control, the legal cynicism would continue
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and the relationship between Hollygrove residents and the NOPD would be hostile. Residents in
this study desired an equitable working relationship as reflected by these strategies.

Quality of Life Strategies
A fourth theme found in neighborhood-driven solutions to violence revolved around the
quality of life issues in the community. One former resident now in city government remarked,
“if you start to see an improvement in the quality of life, then you’ll start to see an improvement
in the overall life of an individual that lives back in Hollygrove.” Skogan’s (1990) work on
neighborhood disorder was reflected in a training offered by one of Hollygrove’s crime
consultants during the Livable Communities Program where leaders were taught techniques of
Second Generation Crime Prevention through Environmental Design (Saville, 2009). In this
model residents and NOPD officers were first taught about the connection between visible
disorder and crime and then jointly took a walking tour of a section of Hollygrove to connect
visible disorder to several crime hot spots. This marked a turning point in the neighborhood’s
understanding that prevention of crime and enforcement of laws were separate concepts, not
always related. These strategies reflected resident’s opinions on the importance of quality of life
issues as a solution to neighborhood violence.
Several respondents asserted that part of Hollygrove’s violence reduction strategy must
address the abundance of vacant, blighted and abandoned homes and lots that proliferate
throughout the neighborhood, marking it as a place where owners did not care about the
community. Caroline noted “they got a lot of abandoned houses, a lot of empty lots. Getting
people to build houses, build more property, houses on their property would kind of make it
safer, having some people coming, some nice, decent people coming to the neighborhood, to
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kind of keep the neighborhood up to par.” Eldridge wanted to see “abandoned houses that
nobody reclaimed since Katrina either torn down or remodeled.” The number of blighted houses
increased after Katrina as some residents and landlords chose not to rebuild because the flooding
and subsequent mold infestation made repairs cost prohibitive. One of the seniors thought that:
somebody, the city, somebody in the government should be taking care of this so that you
could either board it up or allow somebody to buy it at a cheap price because it’s not
doing anything but sitting. It’s drawing not only the kids with the bad habits, birds,
animals, different things. And what is that doing to the neighborhood? People want to
have good and [instead] have too much of that.” Another senior added, “they’re fixing
all the downtown houses, they’re not fixing anything back here.
The City Councilmember wanted to “get those properties that are blighted and abandoned back
on the market,” believing that if “the houses were fixed up the neighborhood would be healed.”
Besides bringing disorder to the community, vacant, blighted and abandoned houses sometimes
served as staging areas for crime. The district police commander noted that the neighborhood
blight “creates havens for any type of illegal activity” and “by knocking that stuff out it’s really
helping us reduce crime. The residents, politician and police agreed that blight eradication must
be a part of the neighborhood’s crime reduction strategy.
Two respondents noted the poor quality of Hollygrove’s streets and suggested street
repairs would serve to reduce neighborhood violence. When asked what she would do with
unlimited funds to fix the community Caroline answered “the streets are really bad, streets are
bad, fix the streets up.” The City Councilmember addressed this as well, pointing to “blight
reduction and fixing the streets” as elements critical to the neighborhood’s well-being. Unlike
wealthier neighborhoods, the streets of Hollygrove were in disrepair. There were few curbs,
many cracks and potholes, and in places the street grade was higher than the adjacent yards
which caused flooding during heavy rains.
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Two other quality of life issues mentioned by respondents were trash collection and the
state of neighborhood parks. As we sat on Bert’s porch overlooking Olive Street, across from
the Olive Superette, he stated:
It’s just like the garbage people, they make the community look bad, look on the street,
they don’t even want to pick this up. So they make our community look bad because
they leave it on the, they leave it out here and won’t even try to pick it up…you can look
at every time people put their stuff [trash] out, you don’t even try to pick it up. They
don’t send nobody to pick it up. That makes the community look bad also. You know if
they’d clean that up, it would be pretty decent. Lot of people going to look at a house,
you don’t look at a house like with that stuff out there like that.
He was referring to several piles of trash on the curb in front of houses abutting Olive Street.
The city’s Sanitation Department would often delay collecting trash that was not in cityapproved trash receptacles. This marred the neighborhood, sending messages about the
community’s lack of political and social capital, adding to the perception that Hollygrove
residents did not care about their community.
Neighborhood parks served as gathering places for community residents and thus had
great potential to benefit a community. At the same time parks in a state of disrepair, like poor
streets and blighted houses, sent messages about the ability of the community to exercise
collective efficacy and disorder, thus impacting neighborhood violence. Eldridge mentioned
parks as a way of making Hollygrove safer:
I think they could have more parks. I mean like really well-maintained parks. You know
stuff that people come in and keep and maintained and keep a high quality. I mean every
time you see a park they got like spray paint all over the walls and the water fountains are
broken and stuff like that. People don’t value anything like that. They need to have
something where people can value. You know, a lot of lights at night time and that kind
of thing, that kind of helps.
Eldridge’s solution asserted that well-maintained parks could be a community asset only when
adequately maintained.
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The way interviewees thought about neighborhood disorder was consistent with Skogan’s
(1990) finding that physical disorder connected to social disorder and created an environment in
which criminals were free to act. Sampson and Raudenbush (1999) connected disorder and
violent crime but found that physical disorder’s destabilizing effect was an artifact of
institutional abandonment of inner city neighborhoods and the lack of resident collective
efficacy. The proposed quality of life solutions reflected the understanding that a community’s
visible disrepair mirrors a less visible reality, their lack of social capital relative to better
resourced neighborhoods. Because a well-maintained neighborhood signals a neighborhood’s
political and social capital, it sends messages about its ability to control those who would harm
it. Caroline stated this fact clearly; when asked why she thought quality of life improvements
would deter violence, she concluded “the people that’s doing the crime will see that the
community, that the people love the community and will speak out.” These voices recognize the
need for more community empowerment in maintaining Hollygrove’s infrastructure.

Economic Strategies
The final set of solutions considered economic strategies thought to be an important
component of violence reduction. Institutional Anomie Theory (Messner & Rosenfeld, 1997) is
predicated upon the concept that institutional structures preventing economic goal attainment in
the formal economy gave rise to anomie. To resolve this condition an informal economy
emerged, with the concomitant increase in violent crime. The 20-something males stated clearly
their perceptions that poverty was linked to violent crime. In this exchange they make this
connection explicit:
M1:

But me personally, the underlying cause to a lot of violence is poverty.
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K:

Talk about that.

M1:

Meaning, it’s poverty, like, we uh, all of us broke, all of us got problems, we sit
around and talk about our problems all day and we only know a few ways to solve
‘em. Selling drugs, either getting a job, a bad paying job, ‘cause the people don’t
want to hire no black people.

M2:

Robbing someone

M1:

or we go rob.

M3:

it’s the only way some people…

M1:

so that’s where the killing and stuff come from, ‘cause poverty is the underlying
cause.

The preceding exchange with the focus group members implied agreement with this theory.
Residents stated that economic opportunities were lacking in Hollygrove. This led
several residents to note that ameliorating this condition might be an important solution to the
neighborhood’s violent crime. Tameka’s solution was employment:
Jobs that pay a decent wage where men are able to take care of their families. Jobs that
pay enough where they can be a homeowner. Just basic, not extravagant things. Own a
home, buy a car to get back and forth to work, to provide a good education for your
children…And those jobs need to have a living wage, benefits, disability insurance,
health insurance, all those things are important.
While many thought that jobs were available to Hollygrove’s residents, these jobs were thought
to be insufficient with regard to pay and benefits.
Others pointed to the need for economic drivers of jobs, employers capable of providing
livable wage jobs with benefits. One former resident stated “we have to provide some more type
of economic opportunity [like] Costco’s and the other org (sic), the other companies that have
come to Carrollton over the years and provided some employment.” Caroline added, “Costco,
got this new grocery store, Costco. Well I think it changed a whole lot, you know? Um, I not
sure, they probably gave some of the people in the neighborhood jobs, you know more
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employment in the neighborhood.” Costco Wholesale chose a strip mall, abandoned since
Katrina, for their first Louisiana location. This proved to be a significant development in three
ways: it replaced a blighted structure, it provided an economic engine, and it offered jobs to
neighborhood residents. During a series of pre-construction meetings with the community,
Costco executives told residents that their warehouses drove further economic development in
many communities where they were located. This development provided a much-needed boost
to neighborhood morale and, if the executives’ narrative proves correct, had potential to drive
future economic improvements.
Another source of economic opportunity mentioned by residents was legal
entrepreneurship. The community’s informal economy pointed to the reality that a neighborhood
entrepreneurial spirit existed and could be redirected into legitimate business ventures. Zora, a
neighborhood day care provider and seamstress said:
Everyone is born with some type of creativity—everyone, it’s just a thought process and
not bein’ lazy. We have a lot of bright people in this world, but we just need to get up off
our butts and do what we need to do, you know? What I’m doin’ didn’t come from goin’
to school or somebody tellin’ me what to do. It came from, as a child, wantin’ at some
point to be married and have kids that I decided when I was young I was gonna sew. I
started makin’ my clothes at 12. It goes back to not havin’ places to go to learn what we
need to learn, so you have to be self-taught sometimes. It goes back to not bein’ lazy.
You just need to do what you need to do to take care of your family, take care of
yourself. I used to sew for my mom, I used to do my mom’s hair. My mom used to do
hair for everyone in the neighborhood, so a lot of that is instilled in me. Things that are
instilled in you as a child you cannot get rid of. That’s just the bottom line. Some of the
days when everyone’s layin’ around sleepin’, I think I would like to do that one day.
And then I get up off my butt and say, I would not want to do that because that’s sleeping
time away. We have enough hours in the night to sleep and do what you have to do and
get up in the morning then do what you have to do, and [so] you go to bed early at night.
Of course, that didn’t happen for me. I still get up early in the mornings and do what I
have to do because you have more time in the mornings than you do in the evenings.
There were entrepreneurs in the neighborhood. Some like Zora, who was a seamstress and
daycare provider, and Ernest, who silk-screened t-shirts, earned a decent income by providing
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valuable products and services to the community via the formal economy. Others, like the
neighborhood drug dealers, created and maintained a marketplace in the underground economy.
Zora recognized the inherent creativity of many in the community, a dormant resource that, if
translated into entrepreneurial participation in the formal economy, could become economic
engines that bridge the gap for those currently limited from the formal marketplace.
Institutional Anomie Theory is predicated upon the tenet that economic lack drives
anomie and crime. Hollygrove residents recognized this and provided three economic solutions:
jobs, economic engines, and entrepreneurship. There had been some hopeful developments in
Hollygrove on the economic front with the arrival of Costco and the development of the
Hollygrove Market and Farm. Furthermore, as the examples of Zora and Ernest showed, the
neighborhood had untapped entrepreneurial potential that could also drive the neighborhood’s
formal economy.

Summary
While many solutions to neighborhood violence were modeled upon the best practices in
other places, residents in Hollygrove provided solutions based on the strengths of their
neighborhood. Many of the solutions they proposed were innovative and, when combined, could
comprise a comprehensive solution to neighborhood violence. One city official, in the Mayor’s
office, noted “we can’t create a generic solution to murder. We have to create a solution that is
appropriate for the individuals that are being most affected and too, in specific neighborhoods.”
Hollygrove resident solutions mirrored this conclusion, they were neighborhood-based and
envisioned to target the specific problems that residents perceived to undergird homicide in the
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community, and thus merited consideration as a vital part of efforts to eradicate neighborhoodlevel violence.
There was a common thread to the solutions; they stemmed from the neighborhood’s
recognition of their marginalized status and reflected their desire to reorganize the community in
ways that resituated power and control. The community strategies were based upon the need to
regain control of their community. Each of the proposed community-based solutions provided
opportunities for residents to “own” their community, shaping its values, future direction and
infrastructure. The educational solutions were values-driven. Residents recognized that the
emerging subculture was accompanied by values that ran counter to the mainstream and thus
their strategies were designed to both remedy the lack of prosocial values transmission and to
enhance residents’ opportunities to increase their social capital. The formal control solutions
were conflict-oriented and emerged from recognition that existing policing strategies had failed
to eradicate crime and adequately protect Hollygrove’s residents. These strategies demanded
that formal controls reshape their agenda to reflect long-neglected priorities of the community
and forge cooperative and collaborative relationships with agents of formal control. The quality
of life proposals addressed systemic and institutional neglect. By calling for infrastructure repair
and an equal share of city resources, residents expressed a desire for remediation of their
marginalization relative to better resourced neighborhoods. The final set of resident-driven
solutions recognized that economic disadvantage had given rise to an illicit economy which
limited the life chances of vulnerable residents. Their desire for economic opportunity stemmed
from the harsh reality that Hollygrove’s median household income of $32,695 was only 43% of
the citywide average of $74,596 (Greater New Orleans Community Data Center). Barring
change of this circumstance some residents had few prosocial choices for economic survival and
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therefore residents worried that the confluence of drugs and violence would continue to plague
their community.
The conflation of race and social pathology (Gregory, 1998) had become a dominant
trope used to justify marginalization was not lost on residents of Hollygrove. As evidenced by
the wealth of solutions they advanced, there was a willingness to combat their marginalized
status. Bourgois (2003) wrote “complex cultural and social dimensions that extend far beyond
material and logistical requirements have to be addressed by poverty policies if the socially
marginal in the United States are ever going to be able to demand, and earn, the respect that
mainstream society needs to share with them for its own good” (p. 324). Hollygrove’s solutions,
no matter how beneficial and efficacious they were, could not be implemented until institutional
structures that had marginalized the community recognized their merit and ceded a measure of
autonomy and power to those who sought their own well-being.
Race and poverty cannot be conflated with a lack of resourcefulness. Communities like
Hollygrove have the potential to generate myriad solutions to long-entrenched social problems.
The deficit they experienced was not one of ideas or will, it was social capital and power.
Empowering them to generate and implement innovative homicide reduction solutions had
potential to build collective efficacy, reduce legal cynicism and open a new front in the battle to
reduce neighborhood homicide.
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Chapter 11
Discussion
Introduction
Current American discourses that conflate blackness with poverty and danger brand inner
city communities such as Hollygrove with malignant labels that do not adequately address the
complexities of life there. Dominant societal tropes serve to marginalize such communities
ignoring the strength of the people and their talent for coping with inequity. Rather than
addressing the situational structures that give rise to Hollygrove and other neighborhoods, it is
simpler to construct explanations focused upon individual pathology. Lee (1977) called this the
fundamental attribution error, where internal psychological traits of others are used to explain
their choices rather than external, structural conditions. Applying Lee’s reasoning to a
neighborhood context helps to clarify why pathology lenses rather than situational ones are
employed to brand inner-city dwellers as bad actors rather than victims of structural neglect.
Such explanations limit the ability of residents to act in their own best interests while justifying
interventions that disempower and render them helpless, creating further marginality.
Meanwhile there were significant assets in the community, an untapped and
entrepreneurial wealth of solutions to neighborhood problems, and an uncommon type of
strength engendered from years of learning to cope with overwhelming obstacles. McKnight and
Kretzmann (2002) note “there is rich potential waiting to be identified and contributed by even
the most marginalized people” (p. 160) but it is often overlooked because of the dominance of
deficiency-oriented social service models focused upon needs rather than assets. Far from
helpless dependents, Hollygrove residents developed innovative strategies to actively overcome
structural limitations and survive in what appears to them to be a hostile society outside the
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neighborhood boundaries. A complex subculture emerged that, while appearing to be
oppositional and defiant to outsiders, was adaptive. Residents in the neighborhood possessed a
unique talent for negotiating between the values of mainstream society and the rules of the
neighborhood, a bi-cultural ability which is akin to speaking two languages. Hollygrove has
much to teach about resilience for those willing to shun paternalistic policies and act as her
students.
This study began with three primary theoretical lenses through which neighborhood-level
homicide could be understood. Social Disorganization Theory, especially Sampson’s (2012)
concept of collective efficacy, attempted to explain the ways communities organize themselves
to either defend against or allow lethal violence. Subcultural theories such as Anderson’s (1999)
street codes helped to elucidate the unique challenges faced by inner city residents who operate
in two, often divergent milieus. The Institutional Anomie Theory of Messner and Rosenfeld
(1997) linked the expectations of economic success in a capitalist economy with participation in
the informal economy that often marks central city neighborhoods. While all of these were
present in the participants’ understanding of neighborhood lethal violence, none was individually
sufficient to capture the breadth of the experience. The data found a complex interplay of
conditions that, when combined, better explicate the factors undergirding homicide in
communities such as Hollygrove.

Themes that Emerged from the Data
The five themes emerging from the data are summarized in Table 3 below. This chapter
will attempt to situate these findings in light of existing theories and relevant studies. One of the
challenges addressed in this study was the inability of macrosociological research to explain the
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variations in lethal violence within an individual neighborhood like Hollygrove. Homicide is
unevenly distributed throughout structurally disadvantaged communities. Therefore, a body of
research exploring intra-neighborhood variations in lethal violence may help to bridge the gap
between macrosociological explanations and individual explanations. The intentional focus of
this study upon an individual neighborhood is one attempt to connect agency-based and socialstructural based understandings of homicide.
The five themes and related subthemes summarized in Table 3 are interconnected and
suggest that Hollygrove’s structural marginalization was reflected in the experiences of
neighborhood residents. The neighborhood portrayed its marginalization via a valuesorientation, a clash between the values of mainstream society and those that have arisen inside
the neighborhood, and a boundary-orientation, mistrust or acceptance of outsiders. Rather than
being dichotomous, residents experienced the values clash along a continuum with prosocial
values at one pole and subcultural values at the other. Homeowners and those who were able to
participate in the formal economy lay toward the prosocial value-oriented pole, while those who
participated in the informal economy were oriented toward the other. At the same time most in
the neighborhood differentiated between those whose primary identification was with the
neighborhood, or insiders, and those who did not, the outsiders. This spectrum of attitudes
toward insiders and outsiders manifested in either porous boundaries and trust of outsiders or
rigid boundaries and mistrust of outsiders. Finally, because residents understood their
marginalization via these lenses, they were able to consider innovative solutions to lethal
violence that may be overlooked by those observing the neighborhood from outside.
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Table 4: Themes and Sub-Themes Emerging from the Data
Hollygrove is
Deteriorating:
Hollygrove’s
Values at the
Crossroads

Keeping It Real:
Living Outside
Prosocial
Values in
Hollygrove

A Lost
Generation:
Failure to
Transmit ProSocial Values
A Place where
You Can Trust
Your Neighbors:
The Waning
Ethic of Caring
Raised to be
Productive:
Work Ethic in
Peril

“Outchere”:
Life in
Hollygrove’s
Street
Subculture
The Rules of
Keeping It Real

Homeowners
Care More:
Loss of Pride of
Ownership

Succumbing to
the Keeping It
Real Subculture

They Use
Violence to
Solve Problems:
A Lack of ProSocial Conflict
Resolution Skills

Resisting the
Keeping It Real
Subculture

Status in the
Keeping It Real
Subculture

What Prompts
People to Kill is
Drugs:
The Connection
between Drugs
and Violence
It All Started
with Drugs:
Drug-related
Violence in
Hollygrove
Only when the
Store is Open:
ABOs and
Violent Crime
Their Only
Funds was to
Sell Drugs:
Economic
Considerations
More Like an
Occupying
Force:
Formal and
Informal
Controls

Strangers in the
Neighborhood:
Hollygrove’s
View of
Outsiders
It’s the People
from Outside:
Resident
Feelings toward
Outsiders
We’re Gonna
Fight That:
Outsiders as
Agents of
Change

The Difference is
Me:
Grassroots
Solutions to the
Problem of
Lethal Violence
Communitybased Strategies

Educational
Strategies

Formal Control
Strategies

Quality of Life
Strategies

Economic
Strategies

Hollygrove’s historical disadvantage and marginalization was reflected in residents’
complex dance with prosocial cultural values, described by Anderson (1999) as street and decent
codes. Anderson’s explanation, however, implied that these values are discrete entities, while
the data emerging from this study indicate that all residents understood and subscribed to the
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primacy of prosocial values but were forced by the exigencies of life in an urban neighborhood
to adopt to subcultural values. Browning, Feinberg and Dietz (2004) used the term “negotiated
coexistence” to help explain the complex interplay of neighborhood values regarding participants
in the informal economy. In their model offenders experience enhanced social capital when
residents empathize with the structural challenges leading to their participation in the illicit
economy. Negotiated coexistence might be extended to explain how, at all points on the
spectrum of values-orientation, there was an understanding of those whose values were oriented
differently. This poses a challenge for outsiders trying to understand communities like
Hollygrove. The neighborhood’s internal organization was manifested in strong collective
efficacy which social disorganization theorists theorized should lead to lower homicide rates
(Sampson, Raudenbush & Earls, 1997; Sampson & Raudenbush, 1999; Morenoff, Sampson &
Raudenbush, 2001; Sampson, 2012). However, the neighborhood was organized differently than
these authors envisioned, oriented primarily toward prosocial values while also negotiating
between two value systems that reflected the adaptive response of a marginalized community
(Venkatesh, 2006, 2008; Bourgois, 2003; Bourgois & Schonberg, 2009). At times, such as 2012,
the community experienced both high collective efficacy and high homicide, a situation that St.
Jean (2007) found was made possible when neighborhood factors other than collective efficacy
and informal social controls are considered.
Hollygrove residents’ values-orientation was one of those factors. Much like a second
generation immigrant who simultaneously holds the mores of a culture of origin while adaptively
donning new mores during encounters with the culture of adoption, Hollygrove residents
exhibited bi-cultural ability to shift between competing values systems. A similar dance occurs
when one marries and must negotiate between the values of a birth family and those of their
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spouse’s. Hollygrove residents framed this negotiated coexistence in three ways. First, they
differentiated between outsiders and insiders. Second, they asserted that guns and violence were
imposed upon them by outsiders. Finally, they resisted formal controls and political processes
judged to be acting upon them rather than collaborating with them. What appeared to be legal
cynicism (Kirk & Papachristos, 2011; Kirk & Matsuda, 2011) to those looking at the
neighborhood from outside was actually a very complicated, multicultural response to structural
limitations imposed on them.
While residents subscribed to prosocial values to a greater or lesser extent depending
upon their involvement in the Keeping It Real subculture and reliance upon the illicit economy
for income, they were not blind to the fact that these values were defined by an outside society.
Messner and Rosenfeld’s (1997) Institutional Anomie Theory posits twin forces underlying
urban crime: the assimilation of the black community into prosocial values glorifying financial
success and the alienation of young black men from institutionally sanctioned success pathways.
Even as residents recognized the primacy of prosocial values for success, they also observed that
pathways to success, such as livable wage jobs, quality education, economic attainment and noneconomic social institutions, were limited. Baumer and Gustafson (2007) found this condition
fosters instrumental homicide at the neighborhood level. At the same time, federal government
policies have deconstructed many of the social safety net elements that were designed to mitigate
against such limitations. Several authors noted that the presence of a social safety net served to
reduce the likelihood of neighborhood homicide (Messner & Rosenfeld, 1997; Savolainen, 2000;
Maume & Lee, 2003) by easing the impact of structural limitations upon the most vulnerable.
Holding to prosocial values was challenging for residents under these conditions. Imposed
marginalization, whether it derives from the formal economy or from federal welfare policy,
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strained their identification with prosocial societal values and may help explain the continuum of
values embraced by residents.
For some financial survival necessitated choices that violated privately held convictions,
an anguishing condition in which some residents succumb to the rules of Keeping It Real and/or
the illicit economy while others sympathize, yet resist. Sampson and Wilson (1995) noted such
circumstances give rise to an environment where “crime, disorder and drug use are less than
fervently condemned and hence [are] expected as part of everyday life” (p. 50). Indeed,
Hollygrove residents recognized the values of the Keeping It Real subculture were nonnormative and also considered them to be detrimental to both the well-being of the actors and to
the community. Even those who were participants maintained convictions that the lifestyle was
destructive on both the individual and neighborhood levels. Sampson and Wilson’s conclusion
implies that residents’ failure to exert informal controls served as tacit approval of the
subculture. The residents of Hollygrove would disagree, asserting instead that the illicit economy
is a destructive force imposed upon them by economic realities in a milieu where formal and
political controls have failed to act collaboratively with the community to combat those forces.
Their negotiated coexistence with the subculture and the illicit economy reflected their
awareness of their marginalization.
In the face of such abandonment residents had little choice but to resign themselves to the
negotiated coexistence of life with an illicit economy where the incentives for participation
outweighed those in the formal economy (Bourgois, 2003). It is in this context that the
subcultural rules of the street begin to organize life in the community (Anderson, 1999). An
oppositional status hierarchy emerged in Hollygrove where violence was portrayed as a vehicle
for establishing social identity, respect and social control (Kubrin, 2005) as aggrandized in the
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0017th video The Zoo. The Hood Star became the pinnacle of success inside the neighborhood,
where strength and street credibility required retaliatory violence to establish dominance but also
subjected those at the top to increased risk of lethality (Berg, Stewart, Schreck & Simons, 2012).
Legal cynicism, the “cultural orientation in which the law and agents of its enforcement are
viewed as illegitimate, unresponsive, and ill-equipped to ensure public safety” (Kirk &
Papachristos, 2011, p.1191) became a more prominent feature of the neighborhood as
Hollygrove shifted toward broader adoption of street codes. This further diminished the
neighborhood’s willingness to cooperate with the second district of the NOPD (Kirk & Matsuda,
2011), leading two police officials to assert that they were seen as an occupying force rather than
cooperative participants in the fight against lethal neighborhood violence. In Hollygrove violent
behavior had become an instrumental tool for developing street credibility and enhancing one’s
reputation among peers (Wilkinson, 2003). Thus studies that connect lethality with subcultural
theories were helpful in explaining the high murder rate in the neighborhood.
After Hurricane Katrina residents reported a reduction of legal cynicism as the
demographics of the neighborhood changed. The first residents to return were primarily older
homeowners with a financial stake in the community. Unlike families with children, they were
not required to enroll their children in schools located in the communities to which they had
evacuated. This freed them to return with the first wave of evacuees. The data from this study
indicated that homeowners and senior citizens were more oriented toward prosocial values and
were more likely to be engaged in community betterment projects, both conditions in which
collective efficacy or “social cohesion combined with shared expectations for social control”
(Samson, 2012, p. 27) could flourish.
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In this context a unique window of opportunity emerged in which community residents
experienced a willingness to work collaboratively to rebuild their neighborhood and to allow
outside resources access to the community. Many of these early returners were trained by the
neighborhood community development corporation to serve as block captains who were able to
direct subsequent waves of returning evacuees to resources critical for rebuilding. A
neighborhood planning charrette was conducted during which residents were allowed to envision
an improved neighborhood, under the guidance of an architect, two city planners and a newlyminted community development corporation. The preponderance of senior citizens facilitated
the adoption of the Hollygrove by AARP as a laboratory for the Livable Communities Pilot
Project. The project trained them in leadership skills, identified their neighborhood priorities,
and secured financial and physical resources to implement them. One of the identified priorities
was a reduction in lethal violence, a goal that AARP helped resource by identifying crime hot
spots and securing much-needed training in crime prevention. The collective efforts of involved
residents led to the closure of Big Time Tips, the identified epicenter of neighborhood violence,
and a subsequent reduction in neighborhood lethal violence.
Braga, Welsh & Schnell (2015) found that community problem-solving approaches
resulted in a neighborhood’s ability to work cohesively to reduce crime, while Saville (2009)
proposed that when residents “create and regulate their own safety in collaboration with service
providers such as planners and police” (p. 390) an environment emerges in which crime
prevention can occur. Collective efficacy is hindered in an environment where concentrated
disadvantage coexists with large scale marginalization. In such an atmosphere, distrust and
cynicism is directed toward outsiders while internally residents realize neither social cohesion
nor shared expectations for social control. On the other hand, when outside agents work
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collaboratively with a community, cynicism is reduced and residents are freed to exercise
informal control. When agents of formal control, the NOPD and the city councilperson
recognized Hollygrove residents as equal participants in their own betterment, ceding a measure
of autonomy to engaged residents, collective efficacy was allowed to flourish and lethal violence
was effectively reduced.
St. Jean (2007) noted that it is possible for conditions of low crime and low collective
efficacy to coexist. This occurs because neighborhood-level violence is differentially
concentrated at corner stores, bars and gathering places rather than being dispersed evenly
throughout the community. Hollygrove residents understood this and were able, with the help of
the Livable Communities Project, to both pinpoint the location of these hotspots and bring them
to the attention of formal control agents. Their training in 2nd Generation CPTED, which was
also attended by police officers, empowered them to recognize the difference between crime
prevention and law enforcement. Prevention is organic and is a product of neighborhood
collective efforts to ameliorate conditions which give rise to violence, before it occurs.
Enforcement reacts to crimes that have already occurred. This distinction helped both
Hollygrove residents and the police officers attending the training understand the power of
collective efficacy and collective action, especially when combined with collaboration by agents
of formal control. Neighborhood residents who once found refuge in the blocks without
violence, a condition of low crime and low collective efficacy, were equipped to act in ways that
reduced violence in neighborhood crime hotspots beyond their block.
Structural marginalization hampers neighborhood collective efficacy by limiting access
to social capital and formal power. Without adequate resources community actors have limited
ability to exert informal controls in ways that prevent violence from occurring. Residents who
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subscribe predominately to prosocial values cannot combat armed subcultural actors willing to
enforce their alternative values and street codes with lethal violence. Collective efficacy is
limited, therefore, without the cooperation of formal structures. Macrosociological attempts to
explain neighborhood violence via a lack of informal social controls and collective efficacy have
difficulty addressing these subtle neighborhood dynamics.
Hollygrove’s violence cannot be understood through a single theoretical lens. The
structures that maintained neighborhood violence were complex and multi-faceted. While Social
Disorganization theory can help to explain the interconnections between a lack of collective
efficacy and violence it fails to account for conditions where low crime and low collective
efficacy coexist. Institutional Anomie theory is helpful for understanding how economic
realities give rise to conditions where an illicit economy and accompanying lethal violence cooccur but fails to adequately address the neighborhood dynamics that both maintain it and fail to
combat it. Subcultural theories are adept at describing both the conflicting values held by those
whose lived reality forces them to shift between codes and the milieu in which they live but fails
to adequately address how a neighborhood might change its course and shift its valuesorientation. Elements of each are explanatory and conjointly they do much to explain violence in
Hollygrove and offer avenues for intervention.
Neighborhood empowerment need not be preceded by widespread devastation which
requires completely rebuilding a neighborhood’s physical and social infrastructure. The lesson
of Hollygrove is that residents recognized their marginality, saw the devastation wrought by
well-intentioned policies that maintained it, had solutions for substantive change, but needed
political and social capital to better equip them to enact those solutions. To realize collective
efficacy and change their situation required an uncommon willingness by agents of formal
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control to collaborate with resident efforts directed toward systemic change. Their success has
potential to be a best practice for neighborhood revitalization and lethal violence prevention.

Three Constructs Key to Understanding Homicide in Hollygrove
In the final analysis three constructs were key to understanding the variable rates of
homicide in Hollygrove: resident values, social structure, and boundary flexibility (figure 21).
Each of these was in a constant state of flux and tension, moving in either prosocial or
oppositional directions. As the community’s values shifted toward the mainstream, when they
experienced enhanced social capital, and as the community allowed more input from outsiders,
homicides decreased. When the community embraced countercultural values, experienced social
marginalization, and retrenched from relationships with outsiders, homicides increased.

Figure 21. Neighborhood constructs affecting high and low
homicide conditions in Hollygrove
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Although all residents in the study embraced prosocial values, there was constant tension
with countercultural values. This was consistent with Anderson’s (1999) findings regarding
street and decent codes that showed how inner-city residents constantly negotiated between
them. At any point in the neighborhood’s history one of these value sets were in ascendency.
When countercultural values dominated, the neighborhood experienced higher homicide rates.
As those who held primarily to prosocial values garnered more informal control, the homicide
rates decreased. This extends Anderson’s theory of individual code shifting to a
mezzosociological, or intra-neighborhood, perspective. The code shifting did not occur solely at
an individual level but also at the neighborhood level.
At the same time the study’s respondents described structural conditions ranging from
social marginalization to one of enhanced social capital. During periods of marginalization
residents described cynicism toward agents of formal control while the police described their
relationship with the community as an occupying force. This coincided with higher homicide
conditions. When the city councilmember and the police force began to work cooperatively with
local residents, cynicism ebbed, the neighborhood’s social capital improved, and the number of
homicides diminished. This finding blends the conclusions of Institutional Anomie Theory and
collective efficacy. Messner and Rosenfeld’s (1997) Institutional Anomie Theory concluded that
social institutions regulating norms and behavior were harmed when structural marginalization
occurred and individuals in the community resisted institutional controls by engaging in
countercultural means of financial achievement. Sampson (2012) noted the connection between
a neighborhood’s structural features and collective efficacy, proposing that homicides decreased
as collective efficacy increased and disadvantage decreased. The same structural conditions that
gave rise to the Keeping It Real subculture and the illicit economy, the advanced marginality
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described by Wacquant (2008), were connected to higher homicide. As structural marginality
decreased the homicides decreased as well.
Finally, community residents’ attitudes toward outsiders impacted either rising or falling
homicide rates. In an atmosphere of structural marginalization, a siege mentality developed and
the neighborhood boundaries became more rigid. Outsiders were met with mistrust and this
extended both to those perceived to be harmful to the neighborhood and to those who expressed
a desire to help. As described earlier, in an atmosphere of cynicism and mistrust it can be
difficult to differentiate between the two. The result was generalized mistrust of all outsiders.
At the other end of this spectrum were the experiences of those involved in collaborative action
with the police, politicians, and outside agencies that brought critical rebuilding resources. As
this occurred the neighborhood boundaries became more porous and residents expressed greater
acceptance of outsiders. More porous neighborhood boundaries were associated with lower
homicide while increasing rigidity was associated with higher homicide rates. Bourgois (2003),
Venkatesh (2006, 2008) and Anderson (1999) hinted at this reality as they described how
neighborhoods became places where residents involved in the subculture and/or the illicit
economy experience limitations beyond their community’s borders. Sampson (2012) also
connected neighborhood boundaries to concentrated disadvantage and geographic isolation. This
study extends those findings by submitting that the flexibility of these boundaries is also a factor
helping to explain variable rates of homicide.

Implications of the Findings
There are several implications of these findings. First, high homicide neighborhoods do
not share a monolithic set of values. Residents recognized the primacy of prosocial values while
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simultaneously acknowledging that others exist. Their ability to negotiate between the two was a
highly adaptive response akin to new immigrants shifting between the language and customs of
their country-of-origin and their adopted homeland. Successful adaptation for an immigrant, as
for residents of Hollygrove, required being able to successfully negotiate the two. Hollygrove
residents, and by implication those in similar neighborhoods, have strategies to negotiate
successfully between competing value systems. At the same time, prosocial values were
considered important for connecting to society beyond Hollygrove’s borders. Strategies that
encourage the transmission and adoption of decent, prosocial codes may decrease
marginalization by fostering greater connection between the neighborhood and the rest of the
city. The implication is that prosocial values transmission is one key to reducing neighborhood
homicide.
Second, the structural marginalization of neighborhoods like Hollygrove gives rise to
conditions of higher homicide. The neighborhood’s alienation from the city resulted in cynicism
which played out in mistrust of the police and politicians. In this environment the relationship
between Hollygrove and the city’s structure became oppositional. With enhanced cooperation,
as power structures recognized the validity and efficacy of resident agendas for their community,
social capital improved and residents were willing to work collaboratively toward community
improvement. The unique window provided by Katrina’s devastation showed that collaborative
efforts were possible, but required agents of formal control to engage local residents. Top-down
solutions for homicide, those that are imposed by outside agencies instead of emanating from
residents, are likely to foster opposition and cynicism. This points to two important
considerations. First, when those in power are willing to cede a measure of autonomy to
residents, conditions conducive to homicide reduction occur. Second, solutions that reflect
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resident agendas and incorporate their innovative ideas as part of any homicide solution, are
more likely to succeed. In short, improving the social capital of a marginalized community
creates conditions conducive to lower homicide rates.
Third, there was an important interrelationship between Hollygrove’s values and social
structure that affected the openness of neighborhood boundaries and thus affected homicide.
Wellman (1971) described urban neighborhood boundaries in terms of push and pull; while
structural limitations gave rise to inner-city, African American neighborhoods and pushed
residents into them, there was comfort and meaningful interactions that pulled residents to them
as well. These factors served to define and differentiate the neighborhood relative to others in
the city. Although some in Wellman’s study achieved sufficient capital to negotiate the world
beyond the neighborhood, it remained a place of comfort into which they could retreat.
Hollygrove residents likewise defined the neighborhood as a meaningful place where the rules
and values were legible even when in conflict. It made sense to those who lived there. Outsiders
disrupted this legibility and were met with distrust. At the same time rigid boundaries served to
maintain the status quo, limiting openness to new ideas and agents. As the boundaries became
more porous, made possibly by enhanced social capital and subsequent lessening of cynicism,
residents were able to collaborate with police, politicians and outside agencies and act
collectively to reduce neighborhood homicide. Boundaries proved to be an important facet of
homicide reduction and one promising avenue for future research into neighborhood-level
homicide.
In conclusion, Hollygrove teaches that a complex interplay of values, social structure,
and boundary porosity impact neighborhood homicides. These served as axes along which the
neighborhood oriented itself toward either a prosocial or oppositional direction. As these shifted
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in prosocial directions, conditions conducive to homicide decreased. As they moved in
oppositional directions the converse occurred. Understanding the relationship between these
constructs and their polarity helped to explain variable homicide rates in the neighborhood.
Future studies may wish to explore the impact of these constructs upon collective efficacy and
homicide, especially the impact of neighborhood boundaries as they move between conditions of
rigidly defensive and one of fluidity and receptiveness.

Limitations of the Study
There were sampling, design and scope limitations to this study. The challenge of
snowball sampling, as noted by Babbie (2013), is its questionable representativeness. Research
employing this technique, as this study did, are designed to be exploratory and therefore caution
must be used when attempting to replicate the findings beyond the sample population. The
sampling method chosen was purposeful as it represented a wide variety of stakeholders
representing the neighborhood. Creswell (2014) noted the limits of an ethnographic approach
that is confined to a single, culture-sharing group. On one hand, the author’s relationships within
the community, forged over many years as a resident and community activist, created valuable
inroads that made many of the interviews possible in a neighborhood where trust of outsiders
was limited. At the same time, such relationships are based upon insider status, something with
potential to skew the results and limit their applicability to other, similar communities. A third
limitation was the small sample size of one, bounded neighborhood. Creswell (2014) purported
that generalizing results of a study involving a single group is problematic and thus application
of these findings beyond Hollygrove may prove difficult. Finally, a unique set of circumstance
in Hollygrove were associated with the neighborhood’s newfound collective efficacy. Katrina’s
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complete devastation of the community created a fresh start for a community previously
immersed in conditions leading to subcultural values orientation, advanced marginality, and
cynical attitudes to outsiders. Few similar communities experience opportunity to start fresh as
they did. While this provided a unique perspective from which to study a community’s response
to neighborhood homicide, it significantly constrains the findings.
Tamesha, the Hollygrove student who received a full scholarship to a prestigious
northeastern university, described her relationship with Hollygrove this way:
What would make me, having a family, move back to Hollygrove if I had not been livin’
in New Orleans for a little minute? I think what it would be is because I would want my
kids to grown up with the closeness that does come from this neighborhood, you know
what I mean? Like I could choose to live probably in a suburb somewhere. But it comes
with, yeah, it’s safer, but like as far as the social development of your children, like value
systems, all those different things—I feel like that is fostered by a community.
Even at its worst, Hollygrove was special to many who lived there. This is an important feature
of many marginalized communities; there are people living in them who value the kinship,
camaraderie, and community they foster. There are sources of strength, important assets and
valuable ideas in these communities, waiting to be tapped. Rather than helpless and hopeless
targets for outside interventions, we could learn much from their residents once their potential is
unlocked through empowering strategies that harness what they know and implement their
uncommon solutions to lethal violence.
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Chapter 12
Conclusion

Inner city neighborhoods like Hollygrove are capable of exercising collective efficacy if
provided opportunity and the requisite resources to do so. Tamesha’s remarks revealed two
things that described the lived reality of the neighborhood, “the neighborhood is special” and
“social life is different than in a polite neighborhood.” Hollygrove was special in several ways:
residents with deep roots and strong concern for its well-being, an active corps of leaders willing
to take risks to improve the quality of life, wonderful resources that could be enlisted in efforts
toward these improvements, and momentum toward that end. Furthermore, the neighborhood
has an active social life which was rich and meaningful.
Some outsiders view neighborhoods such as Hollygrove through a lens that conflates race
and criminality. From this perspective, homicide interventions may become autocratic as
dominant forces seek either to shape such neighborhoods to reflect the values of other, more
affluent ones or to control them by raw exercises of power. Such interventions historically
served to increase Hollygrove’s cynicism which led to both rigid, closed boundaries and
oppositional, subcultural values. Instead, strategies that built upon neighborhood wisdom,
knowledge, experience, and assets helped to open those boundaries and to empower those who
shared prosocial values.
The ancient philosopher Law Tzu is quoted with saying:
Go to the people
Live among them
Learn from them
Love them
Start with what they know
Build on what they have
But of the best leaders
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When their task is done
The people will remark
"We have done it ourselves." (Christian Community Development Association, 2012).
Community improvement cannot be something imposed upon a neighborhood; rather it requires
engaging local residents, building upon their assets and knowledge, and collaborating to create
change. Effective community development leads to improved access to power and power
brokers, both necessary elements of neighborhoods with enhanced social capital. One of the key
conditions required for homicide reduction in Hollygrove was emerging from marginalization
into relationships with politicians, police, and organizations with resources beneficial to the
community. Conversely, homicide reduction strategies which do not involve grassroots ideas
and solutions may lead to further marginalization and community cynicism. The data from the
study suggest, therefore, that community-driven solutions, coupled with the social capital to
enact them, may prove more effective than those imposed upon them by well-intentioned
technocrats importing ideas that have worked elsewhere. Enhancing social capital within
marginalized neighborhoods may prove to be an important homicide reduction strategy.
This study began with the question, “What factors at the neighborhood level contribute to
high homicide in New Orleans?” Participants answered this question using three constructs to
explain how neighborhood conditions related to homicide: values, structure, and boundary
porosity. Enhanced collective efficacy, a condition of low homicide, required a confluence of
prosocial values, enhanced social capital, and porous neighborhood boundaries. Diminished
collective efficacy was connected to higher homicides and was accompanied by oppositional,
subcultural values, structural marginalization, and rigid boundaries. Strategies that improve
collective efficacy, therefore, may bolster positive values transmission, enhance neighborhood
social capital, and lead to greater acceptance of outsiders.
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A second set of questions asked whether the lived experiences of residents and those who
have lost loved ones to homicide would reflect the study’s theoretical orientations or advance
new ones. The three theories central to the study were Social Disorganization theory,
Institutional Anomie theory, and subcultural theories. Each of these were present in resident
explanations of neighborhood homicide but none was sufficient to explain it.
Weakest among them was anomie theory, which appeared primarily via resident’s
empathic responses toward those engaging in the underground economy of drug sales. Messner
and Rosenfeld (1997) theorized that crime resulted when prosocial pathways to economic
success were blocked and unsanctioned ones emerged. Residents made a strong connection
between the illicit economy and violence, and did portray structural limitations and economic
deprivation as a significant reason for participating in the both the Keeping It Real subculture
and the drug market. This was a conflicted view, however, as many simultaneously disparaged
those selling drugs and noted that poor values transmission played a role equal to structural
limitations.
Subcultural explanations played a greater role in residents’ explanations for Hollygrove’s
homicides. Anderson (1999) concluded that residents of inner city neighborhoods were forced
daily to choose between prosocial values and practical survival codes and that elderly residents
anchored such communities by their adherence to prosocial values. The conflict between
prosocial and subcultural values appeared throughout the study. While all participants privately
espoused the primacy of prosocial values, it was the disaffected younger males who shifted
between orientations most often. The younger males were also more likely to be involved in
lethal altercations either as victims or as aggressors. Seniors and homeowners were most likely
to eschew subcultural values in favor of prosocial ones. There was widespread perception that
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this clash between the two values orientation was connected to lethal violence. Residents also
thought that poor values transmission and outsiders who didn’t espouse prosocial values to be
sources of community violence.
Participants most strongly reflected Social Disorganization theory’s construct of
collective efficacy in their explanations for homicide. Sampson (2012) defined collective
efficacy as “social cohesion combined with shared expectations for social control” (p. 27). Each
of the three constructs used by participants to describe conditions leading to, or away from,
neighborhood homicide were connected to collective efficacy. In the end, the neighborhood’s
orientation relative to these three constructs best explained the lived experience of homicide in
Hollygrove.
A final research question asked whether concentrated disadvantage and homicide would
be linked by those in the study. Residents did make this connection in multiple ways.
Countercultural values were connected to socioeconomically disadvantaged youth, parents, and
outsiders coming to the neighborhood from public housing. The Keeping It Real subculture was
understood to be a pathway to personal advancement in an environment of economic and social
marginality. The underground economy was viewed as an alternative pathway to economic
viability. Neighborhood boundaries were thought to be violated by impoverished outsiders
relocating to the neighborhood from public housing. Ultimately, residents viewed homicide as a
condition of their structural marginalization which they understood to be a condition of
concentrated disadvantage.
One key finding not widely reflected in the literature was boundary porosity. Residents
defined their community in terms of outsiders and insiders, a strategy used to defend themselves
against those who would harm the neighborhood. Rigid boundaries, however, limited the ability
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of outside agents and organizations to help build collective efficacy. Conversely, porous
boundaries allowed resources to flow into the neighborhood which led to lower homicide
conditions. This appears to be an overlooked feature of neighborhood homicide that might prove
an avenue for future research.
Early social disorganization theorists were more comprehensive in their thinking about
the connection between urban social conditions and crime. Their view of neighborhoods as
bounded, ecological social systems led to a holistic view of a community akin to a biological
system. This allowed them to integrate multiple sociological vantage points from which to
explore the connection between disadvantage and neighborhood crime. Wirth (1931) made a
connection between deviant subcultural values orientation, social class, and crime. Sellin (1938)
noted that conflict between the norms of subculture and dominant society was central to
understanding crime. Miller (1958) understood subcultures to be exercising a different, rather
than oppositional, set of values that were simultaneously adaptive in one environment and
delinquent in another. Lewis (1966) saw subcultures to be responding to anomie in a milieu of
social disorganization and marginalization, and connected this to neighborhood crime. Still
others described broad ethnographic portraits of marginalized subcultures in an effort to explain
social disorganization in specific contexts (Shaw, 1930; Cressey, 1932; Sutherland, 1937;
Whyte, 1943). The findings of this study suggest that studying a narrow population by using a
wider theoretical lens, as did the early social disorganization theorists, may prove helpful in
advancing understandings of neighborhood level homicide. Ethnographic studies which explore
homicide from the perspective of a small, bounded neighborhood may provide both rich
description and depth of information that may help to inform and expand existing theories.
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Policy and Practice Implications
Sampson (2012) recommended that effective violence interventions, instead of being
targeted toward individual offenders, should instead address efforts to restore at-risk
communities by improving both the physical and social infrastructure. His recommendations
included community policing, prisoner re-entry programs, repairs or renewal of physical
structures, community economic development, and programs for early childhood development.
These findings are similar to some of the homicide solutions proposed by Hollygrove residents.
One set of strategies Hollygrove residents envisioned involved repairing physical
infrastructure. These included eradicating blight, repairing streets, collecting trash regularly,
refurbishing neighborhood parks, and building backyard storm water retention gardens to prevent
flooding. While somewhat unconventional as crime prevention strategies, the neighborhood
understood them to be important tools of community revitalization which they connected to
reduced homicide. A second set of solutions they proposed addressed social infrastructure
improvements. These included community meetings, economic improvements, community
policing, increased homeownership, and a variety of formal and informal educational strategies.
The consonance between the solutions proposed by both Sampson and Hollygrove residents
indicates that effective homicide reduction strategies focused upon building neighborhood capital
may prove to be an important avenue for further study. Building a healthy environment requires
attention to both the physical infrastructure signaling neglect and thus attracting crime, as well as
the social infrastructure which, when empowered, can internally combat violence through
collective action.
Anderson (1999) concluded that safe neighborhoods required political leadership capable
of articulating the problems and working diligently to build coalitions with neighborhood

234

residents. Likewise, Saville (2009) theorized that safe neighborhoods were ones where agents of
formal control worked cooperatively with neighborhood residents by building their capacity to
enact resident-driven prevention strategies. Like Sampson, these authors recognized the
importance of building resident social capital as part of any comprehensive neighborhood
violence reduction strategy. This study found that Hollygrove’s enhanced social capital was a
component of collective efficacy leading to lower homicide conditions, which confirmed the
findings of their research.
Neighborhood violence occurs in settings of institutional and social neglect. Combatting
violence, therefore, requires ameliorating the conditions under which it thrives. The legal
cynicism experienced by Hollygrove residents was connected to their lived experience of neglect
and impacted the neighborhood’s high homicide rate. Residents developed a siege mentality
toward outside agents and the police described themselves as an occupying force. A vicious
cycle of mistrust and antagonism existed between both sides. This extended to politicians and
service agencies with potential resources to build both physical and social infrastructure. This
condition changed after Katrina as residents were afforded the opportunity to re-envision their
community in collaboration with politicians, police and outside agencies.
One avenue that proved especially effective during this period was Second Generation
CPTED training. Residents were taught to observe physical cues associated with neighborhood
violence such as overgrown lots, blighted housing and poor street lighting. At the same time,
they were taught how to work collaboratively with politicians and the police to advance their
own agenda of violence reduction. Involving quality of life officers and leadership from the
NOPD in the training improved relationships between residents and the department and helped to
reduce legal cynicism. The resulting improvement of social capital led to greater collective
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efficacy and a reduction in the number of homicides. This program may prove equally effective
in other neighborhoods where structural marginalization coincides with high rates of homicide.
Another development that promoted neighborhood empowerment was the Livable
Communities Academy which educated residents in effective engagement strategies. The
residents’ ability to collaborate with well-resourced agents and organizations such as their city
councilmember and the Recovery School District led to the construction of a new senior center
and school. In addition, their newfound social capital led to relationships with Tulane University
and Project NOLA who provided assistance developing backyard storm water retention ponds
and neighborhood crime cameras. The Livable Communities Model developed in Hollygrove
was credited with a significant reduction in neighborhood homicide and has been replicated by
AARP in other neighborhoods. Equipping residents to engage resource-rich individuals and
organizations is a strategy that could be easily adapted as a homicide reduction tool because the
model already exists and is replicable in other high homicide communities.
St. Jean (2007) concluded his study of neighborhood crime by noting that “policy and
programmatic attempts to address the problem must emphasize early intervention from multiple
angles, including social, economic, and moral development and uplifting neighborhood space
together with neighborhood people” (p. 225). Study participants understood the confluence of
social and economic marginality in Hollygrove to impact moral development and thus lead to
conditions conducive to high homicide. Residents envisioned solutions for prosocial values
transmission including classroom instruction, community-based after-school programs, parenting
classes, mentoring, church attendance, and a community public relations campaign. While the
connection between prosocial values and collective efficacy is clear in the study’s findings, this
cannot be divorced from the structural conditions creating marginalization and cynicism. This
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connection has implication for policy and practices oriented toward homicide reduction;
educating young, inner city residents about values may be insufficient unless accompanied by
social and infrastructural improvements. Wilson (2012) wrote, “it follows, therefore, that
changes in the economic and social conditions of the underclass will lead to changes in the
cultural norms and behavior patterns” (p. 159). Prosocial values, while considered important to a
safe neighborhood, cannot predominate in an environment of structural marginalization breeding
cynicism and mistrust.
Venkatesh (2006) showed the complex interplay of the underground economy and
structural marginalization. While financial survival of those on the economic fringes of society
may depend upon the illicit economy, he noted the practice leads to further exclusion from the
social mainstream. Bourgois (2003) noted that the street culture, which he found to be
intertwined with the illicit economy, “emerges out of a personal search for dignity and a rejection
of racism and subjugation [but] it ultimately becomes an active agent in personal degradation and
community ruin” (p. 9). Advanced capitalism has created places of limitation, like Hollygrove,
where financial viability necessitates drastic choices, ones that violate privately-held prosocial
values. Residents understood that the choice to participate in the illicit economy and/or the
Keeping It Real subculture was connected to economic limitations faced by many. Their
solutions included attracting more economic drivers such as the newly constructed Costco,
livable wage jobs with benefits, and strengthening community entrepreneurship.
Entrepreneurship is a salient feature of the underground economy of Hollygrove. To
Bourgois (2003) drug dealers were “aggressively pursuing careers as private entrepreneurs” (p.
326). They possessed a wealth of inventiveness exercised in a market that is destructive
personally and to the community. Bourgois calls for dismantling of hostile bureaucracies that
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punish the poor for working legally, coupled with “boosting the credibility of the legal economy
as an alternative to crime” (p. 322).
To brave the maze of complex bureaucratic regulations for small businesses requires a
kind of social capital that many in Hollygrove lack. Building on the entrepreneurial talents of
those engaged in the informal marketplace would require a collaborative process between city
agencies regulating small businesses and trainers who could teach entrepreneurial, small business
development skills to budding entrepreneurs. One such collaboration between the neighborhood,
Tulane University’s City Center, the New Orleans Sewerage and Water Board, and the city
councilperson led to the development of a linear park named the Hollygrove Greenline and
showed that this type of collaboration is possible. Developing small, entrepreneurial businesses
in Hollygrove would require similar collaboration between the city’s Department of Economic
Development and educators from one of New Orleans’ business schools, and would take place
inside the neighborhood, allowing for greater participation. Such a model has potential not only
to redirect entrepreneurism from the illicit economy but also to provide economic engines and a
source of jobs for neighborhood residents.
In 2012 the City of New Orleans began NOLA for Life, a comprehensive program to
reduce neighborhood level homicide. A number of the solutions proposed by researchers and
residents in this study are present in some form in the plan. These include: promoting jobs and
opportunity, improving relationships between the NOPD and neighborhoods, character building
programs in schools, and neighborhood blight reduction. Many of the strategies proposed by
both researchers and residents are missing from the plan.
One glaring omission from the NOLA for Life plan is a community listening tour. As the
residents of Hollygrove demonstrated, there is a wealth of knowledge in marginalized
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communities regarding homicide, its reduction, and its prevention. McKnight and Kretzmann
(2002) proposed that any comprehensive neighborhood strategy begins with uncovering assets
hidden in communities and then building upon them to create neighborhood change. Hollygrove
was full of assets waiting to be discovered. When they were brought together and provided with
resources they found their voice and discovered collective efficacy that led to neighborhood
change. Lao Tzu submitted that the first step of change started by learning from the people
themselves. This points to an important component consideration for homicide reduction,
listening long enough to uncover hidden assets in disadvantaged communities.
Through their violence reduction efforts Hollygrove residents became connected to
outside agents that included politicians, police, and organizations with resources. In the
collaborative ventures that followed residents discovered that collective action had a powerful
impact upon homicide reduction. Cynicism and mistrust diminished and neighborhood
boundaries became more porous. Their social capital improved and confidence in prosocial
values was bolstered. This suggests that elected officials and agents of formal control that work
collaboratively with a community may enhance a community’s collective efficacy and create
conditions of lower homicide.
Lao Tzu’s poem ends with an excellent description of collective efficacy: the people will
say, “we did it ourselves.” Hollygrove’s residents discovered that reducing neighborhood
homicide cannot be the sole domain of outside agencies. Waiting for others to fix the problem is
a condition of advanced marginality and its accompanying hopelessness and helplessness.
Instead they were able to move their neighborhood from a position of opposition, mistrust and
marginality toward high collective efficacy, discovering in the process that these were the
conditions required to reduce homicide.
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Appendix II: Questions and Avenues of Inquiry for Interviews and Focus Groups
Neighborhood Level Homicide and Social Disorganization Theory
Suggested Questions and Avenues of Inquiry
Personal history in Hollygrove
 Talk about how you came to live in Hollygrove
 Tell me about your family’s history in Hollygrove
 What was the neighborhood like when you were younger
 Talk about how the neighborhood has changed
Strengths of the neighborhood
 Talk about the things that make Hollygrove unique
 Tell me about the places in Hollygrove that are special
 Talk about the people here and how they sets the neighborhood apart
 What institutions have shaped this community
Life on the street in Hollygrove
 Talk about what life is like on your block
 Tell me some of the things you see that I might never see
 Who are the unique, special people in the community
 Talk to me about people who aren’t so great for the community
Fear and safety in Hollygrove
 Tell me some of the things that Hollygrove residents fear
 The neighborhood has a reputation for being dangerous, talk to me about that
 More specifically, talk about the murders/shootings in our neighborhood
 From your perspective, what prompts people to kill
 Are there things that could be done to reduce violence
Hot spot in neighborhoods
 Certain parts of our community are more dangerous than others; from your perspective.
which parts of the community are safe and which parts are more dangerous
 Talk to me about what you think makes places safe and others dangerous
 Certain corners have more shootings than others, talk to me about you think are the
reasons
 Some places have gotten less dangerous; what do you think are the reasons
Personal history with violence in Hollygrove
 Tell me about your personal experiences with violence in the community
 Talk to me about how violence shapes the way you act in the community
 Has it changed the way you feel about the community this is a yes or no question
 Talk about how the level of violence affects how you think about the community
 Some people move away, others stay; talk to me about why you’ve stayed here
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Compare Hollygrove to other safer neighborhoods
 Some New Orleans neighborhoods are considered safe neighborhoods, talk to me about
what makes one neighborhood safe and another dangerous
 Tell me your thoughts about why Hollygrove is thought to be less safe than other
communities
What would make Hollygrove safer
 Many people have ideas about how to make their neighborhood safer, tell me your ideas
about how we could make life safer here
 You may have heard other people’s great ideas about improving the neighborhood, talk to
me about ideas others have had that would make Hollygrove safer
 Perhaps you have heard of things the city is doing to make the city safer and thought that
might work in Hollygrove, tell me about those things
Your own future and Hollygrove
 Talk about your future in Hollygrove
 Tell me some things you would like to see happen here
Questions for NGO officials and city officials who have some knowledge and experience in
Hollygrove
 Please talk about how you see the Hollygrove community
 To you, what are the elements that make Hollygrove different from other, similar
communities
 From your perspective, what elements does Hollygrove share with other similar
neighborhoods
 From your experience, please talk to me about the people who live in Hollygrove
 Tell me why Hollygrove is seen as a violent community (is this a valid/deserved
reputation)
 What is your theory about why some communities experience more homicides than
others
 Please talk about why homicide happens in Hollygrove
 From your perspective, please talk about how a community like Hollygrove might lessen
the number of homicides in the community
 From your position, please talk to me about what must change for the quality of life of
Hollygrove residents to improve
 As (name the position), talk about the things you know about that have improved in the
community and why these improvements are taking place
 Are you aware of other things that could be happening to positively impact life for
members of the neighborhood
Remember to thank them for their time
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